Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant for political negotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.     

Financial product sensitivity predicts financial health

Recent research has aimed to understand how people consider financial decisions because they have important consequences for well-being. Yet existing research has largely failed to examine how attitudes and behaviors vary as a function of the specific financial product (e.g., debt type). We ask to what extent people differentiate between similarly categorized financial products (e.g., debt or investment) as a function of their terms (e.g., interest costs and expected returns) and whether such differentiation predicts financial health. Across four studies, we find not only that there are individual differences in attitudes toward similar financial products (e.g., two distinct loans), but also that the extent to which a consumer is averse to high-cost versus low-cost products predicts financial health. This relationship cannot be fully explained by financial literacy, numeracy, or intertemporal discounting. In addition, nudging people toward differentiating between financial products promotes decisions that are aligned with financial health.     

用安戈夫方法对网络成瘾与网络游戏成瘾的界定

旨在探讨网络成瘾与网络游戏成瘾的界定问题。采用标准设定中最为广泛使用的安戈夫方法对网络成瘾和网络游戏成瘾分别进行评定,最终得到的网络成瘾的界定量表,共有12个项目,界定分数为8,即受试者在12个项目中有8项作出肯定回答即被界定为网络成瘾;网络游戏成瘾的界定量表,共有10个项目,界定分数为7,即受试者在10个项目中有7项作出肯定回答即被界定为网络游戏成瘾。     

Obligatory and optional personal life investments in old and very old age: Validation and functional relations

Personal life investment (PLI) measures motivational energy invested in central life domains. We distinguished between obligatory PLIs, that is, required investments, and optional PLIs, that is, investments that are possible but not necessary. Data from the Berlin Aging Study (N = 516; 70–103 years) were employed to investigate the validity of this distinction. We further explored how both PLI types relate to aging satisfaction and whether associations with validation variables and satisfaction differed depending on resource limitations (poor health). As expected based on conceptual affinities between the distinctions of obligatory-optional PLI and approach-avoidance tendencies, both PLI types showed positive relations with extraversion (a correlate of approach), but only obligatory PLI was positively related to neuroticism (a correlate of avoidance). Optional PLI (not obligatory PLI) was related to higher aging satisfaction, but only in fairly healthy people. This underscores differential functional relations of optional PLI depending on resource availability.

Personal investment, culture and learning: insights into school achievement across Anglo, Aboriginal, Asian and Lebanese students in Australia

Personal investment theory is a multifaceted theory of motivation, in which three key components: achievement goals (mastery, performance, social, and extrinsic), sense of self (sense of purpose, self-reliance, negative self-concept, positive self-concept), and facilitating conditions (parent support, teacher support, peer support), engage students in the process of learning. Four cultural groups (Anglo Australian, n = 852, Aboriginal Australian, n = 343, Lebanese Australian, n = 372, and Asian Australian, n = 283) of students were compared on these personal investment components and on several outcome measures (engagement, affect, achievement, participation). A series of MANOVAs, followed up by univariate tests, indicated ethnic differences and similarities in the endorsement of the personal investment theory components as well as in the outcome measures. Multiple regression analyses showed that each of the three sets of predictors (achievement goals, sense of self, facilitating conditions) explained a significant amount of the variance in almost all of the outcome measures. Across cultural groups, students' mastery goal and sense of purpose were consistently found to be significant predictors of their intention for further education, positive affect for schooling, and valuing of schooling.     

D. Z. Phillips on the grammar of “God”

In this essay dedicated to the memory of D. Z. Phillips, I propose to do two things. In the first part I present his position on the grammar of God and the language game in some detail, discussing the confusion of “subliming” the logic of our language, the contextual genesis of sense and meaning, the idea of a world view, language game, logic, and grammar internal to each context, the constitution of the religious context, and the grammar of God proper to that context. In the second part I present my appreciative critical reflection by arguing that the conception of context and language game must be made more dialectical, that the grammar of God needs more systematic metaphysical analysis, and that a greater sense of the radical transcendence of God over a language game is necessary in order to avoid reductionism always inherent in any contextual approach.     

An n-Player Semantic Game for an n + 1-Valued Logic

First we show that the classical two-player semantic game actually corresponds to a three-valued logic. Then we generalize this result and give an n-player semantic game for an n + 1-valued logic with n binary connectives, each associated with a player. We prove that player i has a winning strategy in game if and only if the truth value of is t _i in the model M, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and none of the players has a winning strategy in if and only if the truth value of is t ₀ in M.     

基于时间投入——专注度双维核心模型的高中生学业勤奋度研究

为避免单维评估存在高估或者低估学生学业勤奋表现的不足,以学业勤奋度研究的"时间(行为)投入"和"专注度"两种取向为基础,提出了高中生学业勤奋度的时间(行为)投入—专注度双维核心模型,并考察386名高中生在该模型上的分布特点,进而检验其应用效果。结果表明:(1)以学业勤奋度的双维核心模型为基础,将学生分为四组,并且这四组学生在时间投入和专注度上的差异表现为:在时间投入上,高时间投入的两个组学生的时间投入水平较高,低时间投入两个组学生的时间投入水平较低;在专注度上的分布也是如此。这说明本研究的分组是有效的。(2)模型能够有效将高中生分组,其中高时间投入—低专注度组所占比例最大(30.4%),其次为低时间投入—低专注度组(28.6%),再次是低时间投入—高专注度组(23.6%),高时间投入—高专注度组所占比例最小(17.4%)。(3)模型在不同总体学业成绩和语文、数学、英语等单科成绩上的分组效应均显著,同时拥有高学习时间(行为)投入和高专注度的高中生具有最佳的总体和单科学业成绩。因此,学业勤奋度的学习时间(行为)投入—专注度模型具有良好的应用效果。     

医改的逻辑与利益集团的阳光博弈——兼谈美国医疗保障制度演进中的博弈规则

医疗体制改革本质上是社会公共财富的再分配,伦理上涉及社会公正与正义,经济与管理上涉及各个阶层、利益集团的逐利博弈和理性之间的平衡张力。通过对美国20世纪60年代以来医疗保障立法过程中各个利益集团的交锋和妥协,尤其是代表美国医师利益的美国医学会在历次医疗保障立法程序中的诉求,揭示医疗制度改革的社会化流程,方案的精心设计是最重要的,当要取得社会共识,必须开放利益集团的"公堂博弈""舆论争锋"的空间,以便为后续实施提供良好的社会心理的土壤。     

Covenants and reputations

In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive violator characterizes an equilibrium of the repeated Covenant Game. These folk theorems establish that for certain ideal settings Hobbes’ and Hume’s arguments against offensively violating covenants are compelling. However, these ideal settings presuppose that the community has certain mechanisms that generate common knowledge of the identities of those with whom one should perform. I analyze the results of computer simulations of the interactions in a community whose members must rely upon private communication alone. The computer simulation data show that in this community, reputation effects cannot effectively deter members from offensively violating covenants. I conclude that Hobbes’ and Hume’s warnings against offensive violation are compelling only on condition that the community is sufficiently structured to generate common knowledge among its members. I also conclude that even in such structured communities, the Humean strategy is not the uniquely “correct” policy.