Habermas in the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an Experimental Setting

This study outlines a new paradigm for the investigation of the effects of deliberation on political decisions. Specifically, it uses the ultimatum game as a situation in which the opportunity to deliberate and the placement of this opportunity are experimentally manipulated. Structural factors, such as the players' roles and their ability to vote on the proposal being offered, are also manipulated as a basis for comparison. Two outcomes are examined: the games' allocations, and players' perceptions of fairness. After controlling for structural factors, deliberative opportunity creates a more equitable distribution of money and enhances fairness perceptions. However, these results hold only when such an opportunity occurs before the proposal stage. Deliberative opportunity after the proposal stage has no discernible impact. A survey of participants found that their personal characteristics and political predispositions influence perceptions of fairness for proposers, but not for acceptors. These findings demonstrate the potential benefits of deliberation while highlighting the importance of the nature of its implementation in determining its level of success.     

Behavioral contrast in a two-option analogue task of financial decision making

The effects of an alternative course of action on sustained escalation and persistence in the face of failure was investigated using a computerized stock investment task. Subjects invested in "stock" in two "markets" that yielded returns according to two-component multiple variable-interval schedules. Both markets yielded equal but intermittent return rates during the first phase. In the second phase, one market ceased to yield returns, while the return rate for the other market was unchanged. During the second phase, behavioral contrast effects were evident. Investing in the market that ceased to yield returns dropped precipitously, and investing in the unchanged market increased significantly. Although the behavior may be economically "irrational," it is predictable from the matching law and shows that interactions among a history of intermittent returns in a course of action, current return rate, and currently available alternative courses of action are important determinants of persisting in, or withdrawing from, a failing course of action.     

医改的逻辑与利益集团的阳光博弈——兼谈美国医疗保障制度演进中的博弈规则

医疗体制改革本质上是社会公共财富的再分配,伦理上涉及社会公正与正义,经济与管理上涉及各个阶层、利益集团的逐利博弈和理性之间的平衡张力。通过对美国20世纪60年代以来医疗保障立法过程中各个利益集团的交锋和妥协,尤其是代表美国医师利益的美国医学会在历次医疗保障立法程序中的诉求,揭示医疗制度改革的社会化流程,方案的精心设计是最重要的,当要取得社会共识,必须开放利益集团的"公堂博弈""舆论争锋"的空间,以便为后续实施提供良好的社会心理的土壤。     

STACKING THE DECK: TEACHING SOCIAL SKILLS TO RETARDED ADULTS WITH A MODIFIED TABLE GAME

This study developed and evaluated a social skills training program for institutionalized mildly or moderately retarded and dually diagnosed individuals. Social skills were conceptualized as requiring an action or reaction within six skill areas: compliments, social interactions, politeness, criticism, social confrontation, and questions/answers. The program taught social skills using a commercially available table game, Sorry, and a specially designed card deck. Each card represented one of the skill areas and was designed to train either an actor or reactor response. The program featured response specific feedback, self-monitoring, individualized reinforcers, and individualized performance criterion levels. A multiple baseline across two groups (N = 3 per group) revealed that the game contingencies increased social skills in all targeted areas. After training, the subjects displayed their newly learned skills at or above their trained levels in two different settings with novel persons present. Although untargeted, the complexity of the subjects' responses increased across conditions, since there was a steady increase in the number of words they used per response. The program appears to be a viable means of training social skills since it uses standardized training procedures, requires only one facilitator, and is in itself a social situation that may encourage interactions with peers, cooperation, competition, and politeness.     

动态两难对策中信息反馈方式对合作行为的影响

本研究着重探讨了多人动态对策情景中信息反馈方式和群体认同度对合作行为变化的影响。结果表明,集体反馈比个人反馈更能促进被试的合作行为,而群体认同度对合作行为的影响不显著;在集体反馈条件下,合作行为在各轮次问的随机波动较大,但在三个决策阶段问较为稳定;个人反馈条件下,合作行为在各轮次问的随机波动较小,但在三阶段问呈现出不对称的“U”型变化趋势。研究认为,建立在反馈信息基础上的决策学习使合作行为的动态变化具有策略性和适应性。     

Books Recently Received

Abstract

Social comparisons in a real intergroup context involving Anglophones and Francophones from Quebec, Canada, were examined. Three hypotheses were proposed: A variety of potential comparisons arise in an intergroup context, three different motivations for social comparison in an intergroup situation (reality testing, group enhancement, equity appeal) are associated with predictably different targets for comparison, and social comparisons are linked to feelings and actions. Some support for all three hypotheses was found. We suggest that the major dilemmas confronting social comparison theory could be approached more effectively if researchers studying comparisons at the individual level and those interested in intergroup comparisons worked more in concert.     

It takes two: Honesty–Humility and Agreeableness differentially predict active versus reactive cooperation

Recently, similar six-factor solutions have emerged in lexical studies across languages, giving rise to the HEXACO model of personality. As a core extension of its most well-known predecessor, the five-factor model, the HEXACO model distinguishes between two factors predicting complimentary aspects of prosocial behavior or, more specifically, reciprocal altruism: Honesty–Humility (the tendency toward active cooperation, i.e. non-exploitation) and Agreeableness (the tendency toward reactive cooperation, i.e. non-retaliation). However, this dissociation has not yet been tested to its full extent. To this end, we herein present re-analyses of published studies (N = 1090), showing that Honesty–Humility, but not Agreeableness, indeed predicts active cooperation. More importantly, in a new experiment (N = 410), we found a pattern of two concurrent selective associations, supporting the theoretical distinction between the two factors: Honesty–Humility (but not Agreeableness) predicted active cooperation (non-exploitation in the dictator game), whereas Agreeableness (but not Honesty–Humility) was linked to reactive cooperation (non-retaliation in the ultimatum game).     

How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times

We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini‐ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross‐validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts any positive offer; two groups process primarily the objective properties of the allocations (fairness and kindness) and need more time the more properties need to be examined; and a fourth group, which takes more time than the others, appears to take into account what they would have proposed had they been put in the role of the proposer. We discuss implications of this joint decision–response time analysis. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Influence of Abnormal Sex Differences in Life Expectancy on National Happiness

Countries with better health, as indexed by life expectancy, score higher on subjective well-being (SWB). It was predicted that deviations from the average sex difference in life expectancy (reflecting reproductive competition among males and discrimination against females) would be inversely related to happiness. Regression analysis of SWB for 178 countries found that deviations from the average sex difference in life expectancy were predictive of unhappiness controlling for life expectancy, national wealth, and income inequality. Countries with a relative scarcity of female children (used as an index of parental bias) were less happy. Societies in which there is an undue burden on the health and survival of either sex are thus unhappy ones due to gender-specific disadvantage and associated gender conflict.