Seeing is not enough: manipulating choice options causes focusing and preference change in multiattribute risky decision‐making

We show that preferences depend on the attributes that can be directly manipulated when people need to integrate multiple sources of information because direct manipulation causes focusing bias. This effect appears even when all relevant information is simultaneously and explicitly presented at the time the decisions are made. Participants decided how much to save, what investment risk to take and observed the future financial consequences in terms of the mean and variability of the expected retirement income. Participants who manipulated only the future income distribution saved more and took less risk. This effect disappears when the risk‐related variables are removed, which indicates that task complexity is a mediator of such focusing effects. A more balanced trade‐off between the choice attributes was selected when all attributes were manipulated. However, when there is a dichotomy between manipulating versus observing choice attributes, then decisions were based mostly on the manipulated attributes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

网络游戏成瘾:沉浸的影响及其作用机制

本研究以491名男大学生为被试,考察了沉浸对网络游戏成瘾的影响、沉浸的前因变量和相关作用机制。结果发现:(1)网络游戏中的沉浸与网络游戏成瘾呈显著正相关,与控制、挑战呈显著正相关;挑战和控制与网络游戏成瘾呈显著正相关。(2)挑战通过沉浸的完全中介作用对网络游戏成瘾产生影响,挑战对网络游戏成瘾没有直接效应;控制除了通过沉浸的部分中介作用对网络游戏成瘾产生影响,还对网络游戏成瘾有直接效应。     

亲缘利他的不对称性：进化视角的分析

内含适应性理论是进化生物学和进化心理学中最重要的理论之一。该理论假设, 个体的亲属是其适应性的载体, 但亲属们的价值有所不同。大量研究发现, 亲属的利他行为表现出不对称性, 即遗传相关系数相同的亲属表现出不同的利他倾向。如祖父母对孙辈的投资中, 外祖母往往投入最多, 外祖父和祖母次之, 祖父投入最少。研究者用内含适应性理论来解释这种亲缘利他差异, 进而提出了“父亲身份不确定性”等具体的进化假设。未来研究中, 国内研究者应在正确理解内含适应性理论的基础上, 更多关注亲缘利他的不对称性, 采用多种数据采集方法和统一的评定指标。     

自恋与决策的研究现状及展望

目前, 自恋与决策的研究主要依托实验室任务进行, 涉及赌博、投资和管理等领域的决策行为。大部分研究结果表明, 自恋者在上述实验任务中都表现出明显的决策偏差与风险决策, 但也有研究证实了某些情境下其决策的有效性。自恋与决策的理论模型主要包括人格特质模型、自我调节模型、归因模型与趋近回避模型等, 未来研究应注意方法的改进、自恋的积极功能、情绪的作用以及文化的影响。     

高功能孤独症儿童的合作行为

合作行为是一种重要的亲社会行为, 对儿童的社会适应具有重要意义, 而孤独症儿童的典型特征是社会功能存在缺陷, 从而导致合作行为的缺乏。以往研究未能就孤独症儿童在不同合作任务类型中的表现做出区分, 本研究采用经典的囚徒困境博弈和合作性工具任务比较了6~12岁的高功能孤独症儿童和正常发展儿童在不同任务中的合作行为。结果显示高功能孤独症儿童和正常儿童在囚徒困境中的合作行为没有显著差异, 然而, 他们在工具性任务中表现出比正常儿童更低水平的合作行为。这说明高功能孤独症儿童在对认知能力有不同要求的合作任务中的表现不同。     

初中生内疚情绪体验的发展及其对公平行为的影响

为探讨初中生内疚情绪体验的发展特点及其对公平行为的影响,研究1采用自编的初中生内疚情绪体验情境问卷,对335名七、八、九年级初中生的内疚情绪体验特点进行测查,研究2采用独裁者博弈游戏研究范式,考察了120名初中生的内疚情绪体验对不同情境中公平行为的影响,结果表明：初中生的内疚情绪体验随年级的增长而降低,且在性别、他人评价、情境类型以及情境类型与他人评价的交互作用上存在显著差异。在内疚情绪唤醒状态下,初中生在两人情境中分配给搭档的代币数显著高于分配给自己的代币数;初中生在三人情境中分配代币的数量依次从分配给搭档、自己和第三人而递减,但与控制组没有显著差异。研究说明初中生的内疚情绪体验对两人情境中的公平行为有积极影响,而对三人情境中的公平行为没有显著影响。     

网络游戏成瘾者注意焦点转换功能的特异性损伤研究

网络游戏成瘾对人类认知功能的损伤日益成为研究焦点之一。采用注意焦点转换任务,分别要求网络游戏成瘾被试与正常被试在工作记忆的语音环内、视空画板内及语音环——视空画板间进行注意焦点转换,然后比较两组被试在各转换任务中转换代价的差异,来探讨网络游戏成瘾者的注意焦点转换功能是否受损以及受损的特征。结果发现网络游戏成瘾组被试在视空画板内进行注意焦点转换时比对照组被试表现出更大的转换代价,而在其他两种转换任务中则没有发现组间差异。此结果表明网络游戏成瘾者的注意转换功能受到特异性损伤。     

AN EVOLUTIONARY CRITIQUE OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR CONCEPT

Abstract The created co‐creator theology states that human beings have the purpose of creating the most wholesome future possible for our species and the global ecosystem. I evaluate the human aspect of this theology by asking whether it is possible for human beings to do this. Do we have sufficient knowledge? Can we be motivated to do what is necessary to create a wholesome future for ourselves and our planet? We do not at present have sufficient knowledge, but there is reason to believe that with further scientific research we will be able to acquire it. The more difficult question is whether we can be motivated to cooperate on the scale necessary to fulfill this purpose. Evolutionary theories of human sociality, altruism, and cooperation are reviewed. I conclude that it is possible for human beings to fulfill the purpose defined for us by the created cocreator concept, but doing this will not be easy.     

Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Actions in a repeated game can in principle depend on all previous outcomes. Given this vast policy space, human players may often be forced to use heuristics that base actions on incomplete information, such as the outcomes of only the most recent trials. Here it is proven that such bounded rationality is often fully rational, in that the optimal policy based on some limited information about the game's history will be universally optimal (i.e., within the full policy space), provided that one's opponents are restricted to using this same information. It is then shown how this result allows explicit calculation of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) for any repeated or stochastic game. The technique is applied to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for the case of 1-back memory. Two classes of SPEs are derived, which exhibit varying degrees of (individually rational) cooperation as a result of repeated interaction.