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161.
Previous research has shown that some types of judgments are influenced by the results of an explanation‐seeking comprehension process. The present experiments investigated novice investors' stock price forecasts and investment decisions. Information presented in a narrative story order was hypothesized to promote the construction of a coherent mental representation that would affect how information was interpreted and subsequently used to predict stock price changes. The results showed that outcome information had a distinctively high impact, but only when the information was read in story order. These results imply that presentation order affects the mental representation of evidence relevant to the forecast, and the form of that mental representation moderates the impact of individual pieces of information on the ultimate judgment. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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163.
万慧进 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2006,27(3):31-32
人体实验是一种特殊的交易活动。信息不完备与不对称、交易制度监督漏洞都使卫生研究机构在交易博弈中处于优势地位。集体机会主义行为是导致违规人体实验的重要因素。对违规人体实验的宽容在一定程度上怂恿了这种行为。从健全制度、完善法治、加强教育等方面提出了对策。 相似文献
164.
Jason Dana Daylian M. Cain Robyn M. Dawes 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2006,100(2):193-201
We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to “exit” a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a “private” dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers’ beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers’ beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include “psychological” payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function. 相似文献
165.
Prashant Parikh 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2006,35(4):349-391
This paper extends Parikh’s earlier work in semantics with games of partial information and attempts to derive and represent the full content of an utterance from first principles. It also discusses various ways in which this content may be indeterminate. 相似文献
166.
Jan Keil Sonja Perren Andrea Schlesier‐Michel Fabio Sticca Susan Sierau Annette M. Klein Nikolaus Steinbeis Kai von Klitzing Lars O. White 《Developmental science》2019,22(3)
Human cooperative behavior has long been thought to decline under adversity. However, studies have primarily examined perceived patterns of cooperation, with little eye to actual cooperative behavior embedded within social interaction. Game‐theoretical paradigms can help close this gap by unpacking subtle differences in how cooperation unfolds during initial encounters. This study is the first to use a child‐appropriate, virtual, public goods game to study actual cooperative behavior in 329 participants aged 9–16 years with histories of maltreatment (n = 99) and no maltreatment (n = 230) while controlling for psychiatric symptoms. Unlike work on perceived patterns of cooperation, we found that maltreated participants actually contribute more resources to a public good during peer interaction than their nonmaltreated counterparts. This effect was robust when controlling for psychiatric symptoms and peer problems as well as demographic variables. We conclude that maltreatment may engender a hyper‐cooperative strategy to minimize the odds of hostility and preserve positive interaction during initial encounters. This, however, comes at the cost of potential exploitation by others. 相似文献
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168.
Jacob Kraemer Tebes 《American journal of community psychology》2019,63(3-4):472-475
This special issue addresses a neglected but important topic in our field: strengthening the child‐ and youth‐serving workforce. Investing in this workforce should be a national priority because considerable evidence has shown that investments in early childhood education and development, particularly in low‐resource contexts, that are reinforced through skills‐based programs in adolescence and adulthood, have beneficial impacts throughout life. Investing in quality child‐ and youth‐serving programs also has the additional benefit of creating a productive and capable future workforce. The editors and authors of the special issue should be commended for producing the first special issue on this topic in our field or in related fields, one that is long overdue. Articles in this issue survey the landscape of an amorphous and complex area of practice and research and describe key challenges for the field. In this commentary, I offer organizing frameworks to characterize the child‐ and youth‐serving workforce, note emerging issues when addressing specific challenges, and identify areas for future research. 相似文献
169.
We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic
aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient
transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate
to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive
logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, suffices to produce efficiency in information transfer. 相似文献
170.
爱荷华博弈任务(IGT)是一项检查情感性决策机制的常用实验范式。据此, Damasio等人提出了躯体标记假设(SMH)解释情绪影响决策的神经生理机制。近期, 大量研究在IGT究竟是模糊决策还是风险决策、与情绪和认知的关系、与工作记忆和陈述性记忆的关系以及IGT的神经网络与分子遗传机制等方面积累了丰富资料。结果显示, IGT加工的早期由模糊决策主导, 情绪性躯体信号对引导决策选项的偏好可能起关键作用, 后期则倾向是一种风险决策, 认知评价和预期对选项偏向逐渐占优势; IGT与工作记忆的加工成分有相互重叠, 也需陈述性记忆的参与; IGT的加工不仅依赖于杏仁核、腹内侧前额皮层、眶额皮层等组成的情绪脑网络的活动, 还与背外侧前额皮层、海马、腹侧纹状体、岛叶皮层、辅助运动前区、扣带回皮层等许多脑区的活动有关; COMT和5-HTT的基因多态性会调节IGT相关的决策加工。总之, IGT是一项需要多重神经系统协同活动的决策加工任务, 且模糊与风险决策可能具有不同的遗传基础。 相似文献