大学生压力事件与网络游戏成瘾:逃避动机的中介效应*

以472名男大学生网络游戏玩家为被试,考察了压力事件、网络游戏逃避动机和网络游戏成瘾的关系。结果发现:(1)大学生压力事件、网络游戏逃避动机和成瘾之间存在显著正相关。(2)压力事件除了对网络游戏成瘾有直接影响,还通过网络游戏逃避动机的中介作用对网络游戏成瘾产生间接影响。     

Computerized tabletop games as a form of a video game training for old-old

This research aimed at investigating the utility of a computerized version of a cognitively stimulating activity as a video game intervention for elderly. The study focused on the effect of a 6-week extensive practice intervention on aspects of cognitive functioning (vigilance, working memory (WM), inhibition, reasoning) of old-old participants (N = 29), randomly assigned to trained or active control group. The difference between groups was in the content of the extended video game practice – cognitively complex card game for trained and computerized version of a simple dice-game of chance for control participants. A pretest, posttest and a 4-month follow-up measurement was conducted. Results revealed improvements in both groups, except for improved reasoning found only in trained participants. These results suggest that: (1) improvements are dependent on the complexity of the program, (2) cognitively stimulating activity are a valid training procedure for old-old, (3) novelty of computer use is an important factor in determining training efficacy.     

人情与公正的抉择:社会距离对第三方干预的影响

第三方干预(third-party intervention)是一种重要的利他行为,它包括惩罚和补偿两种措施。本研究结合情境性问卷与实验法,采用修改后的独裁者博弈范式(Dictator Game,DG),让被试作为第三方对朋友或者陌生人的不公平行为进行干预,考察社会距离对第三方干预的影响。研究发现:(1)对于朋友提出的不公平方案,个体对其的惩罚轻于陌生人,而对第二方(无权者)的补偿没有显著差异。(2)个体对朋友的不公平提议的公平性判断高于陌生人,但提议引发的情绪体验没有显著差异。上述结果表明,社会距离可能通过影响个体对不公平行为的公平感知,进而影响其第三方干预行为。     

Should Versus Want: On the Relative Contribution of Injunctive Norms and Preferences on Trust Decisions

Despite much research on the determinants of trust among strangers, its mechanisms are understood only rudimentarily. Recently, it has been proposed that people trust strangers because they believe they should, thus complying with an injunctive norm even if it conflicts with their preferences. However, given the boldness of this claim and in light of independent arguments and earlier findings that suggest otherwise, the hypothesis requires critical scrutiny. Thus, we tested whether the decision to trust (in the trust game) is indeed more strongly driven by what people think they should entrust rather than what they want to entrust in two studies. We consistently found a stronger influence of “want” than of “should” on trust decisions even when controlling for the fairness aspect inherent in the trust game. Thus, our findings speak against a predominant role of injunctive norms for trust behavior and confirm that the latter is mostly driven by preferences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A motivational perspective on punishment in social dilemmas

In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research.     

Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity

There is ample experimental evidence showing that people have a strong preference for equity in wealth allocation and social interaction. Although the behavior of gain sharing and responses to (un)fairness in allocation of wealth has been extensively investigated in studies employing economic exchange games, few studies have focused on how people respond to an unfair division of loss between individuals. In this study we developed a new variant of the ultimatum game and examined the participants' reactions to (un)fairness in both gain and loss sharing. Results from three experiments showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were generally higher in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, participants were inclined to associate loss with “unfair” and gain with “fair”, with stronger associations leading to higher rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, in subjective rating, unfair offers were perceived as being more unfair in the loss than in the gain domain. These results demonstrate an increased demand for fairness under adversity and the importance of justice in liability sharing.     

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.     

Lex talionis: Testosterone and the law of retaliation

Research examining both the organizing and activating effects of testosterone in one-shot bargaining contexts has been vexed by inconsistencies. Some research finds that high-testosterone men are more likely to reject unfair offers in an ultimatum game and exogenous administration of testosterone to men leads to less generous offers. In contrast, other research finds that higher prenatal exposure to testosterone predicts more generous dictator game offers and administering testosterone to women leads to more generous ultimatum game offers. The current research seeks to resolve these inconsistencies by examining how the organizing effects of testosterone affect bargaining behavior. Because testosterone is associated with status seeking and concerns with social reputation, we hypothesized that testosterone would predict aggressive bargaining but only after provocation. Two studies found that prenatal testosterone exposure, as measured by 2D:4D ratio, led to aggressive responses for both males and females, but only after they received unfair offers. Furthermore, perceptions of fairness violations moderated but did not mediate the effect of testosterone on retributional responding. These results suggest that the organizing effects of testosterone have consistent effects on bargaining behavior for both males and females but its predictive ability requires some form of provocation to emerge.     

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

In the standard one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner’s Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models.     

Regional differences in brain volume predict the acquisition of skill in a complex real-time strategy videogame

Previous studies have found that differences in brain volume among older adults predict performance in laboratory tasks of executive control, memory, and motor learning. In the present study we asked whether regional differences in brain volume as assessed by the application of a voxel-based morphometry technique on high resolution MRI would also be useful in predicting the acquisition of skill in complex tasks, such as strategy-based video games. Twenty older adults were trained for over 20 h to play Rise of Nations, a complex real-time strategy game. These adults showed substantial improvements over the training period in game performance. MRI scans obtained prior to training revealed that the volume of a number of brain regions, which have been previously associated with subsets of the trained skills, predicted a substantial amount of variance in learning on the complex game. Thus, regional differences in brain volume can predict learning in complex tasks that entail the use of a variety of perceptual, cognitive and motor processes.