What are you hiding? Initial validation of the reaction time-based searching concealed information test

The reaction time-based concealed information test (RT-CIT) has been used to judge the veracity of an examinees claim to be naïve by using RTs to test for recognition of relevant details. Here, we explore the validity of the RT-CIT to generate new knowledge about the incident—the searching CIT. In a mock terrorism study (n = 60) the RT-CIT not only allowed to link suspects to known crime details, but also allowed to reveal new crime details well above chance. A simulation study confirms the potential of the searching RT-CIT and identifies conditions under which it performs best. We used an archival dataset that met these conditions (high CIT effect, large number of item repetitions), and found better item classification performance than in the mock terrorism study. The searching RT-CIT could be a new, promising investigative tool to reveal new (e.g., crime) details to the investigative party.     

Knowing your heart and your mind: The relationships between metamemory and interoception

Humans experience a unified self that integrates our mental lives and physical bodies, but many studies focus on isolated domains of self-knowledge. We tested the hypothesis that knowledge of one’s mind and body are related by examining metamemory and interoception. We evaluated two dimensions of metamemory and interoception: subjective beliefs and the accuracy of those beliefs compared to objective criteria. We first demonstrated, in two studies, that metamemory beliefs were positively correlated with interoceptive beliefs, and this was not due to domain-general confidence. Finally, we showed that individuals with better metamemory accuracy also had better interoceptive accuracy. Taken together, these findings suggest a common mechanism subserving knowledge of our cognitive and bodily states.     

Dynamic binding of identity and location information: a serial model of multiple identity tracking

Tracking of multiple moving objects is commonly assumed to be carried out by a fixed-capacity parallel mechanism. The present study proposes a serial model (MOMIT) to explain performance accuracy in the maintenance of multiple moving objects with distinct identities. A serial refresh mechanism is postulated, which makes recourse to continuous attention switching, a capacity-limited episodic buffer for identity-location bindings, indexed location information stored in the visuospatial short-term memory, and an active role of long-term memory. As identity-location bindings are refreshed serially, a location error is inherent for all other targets except the focally attended one. The magnitude of this location error is a key factor in predicting tracking accuracy. MOMIT’s predictions were supported by the data of five experiments: performance accuracy decreased as a function of target set-size, speed, and familiarity. A mathematical version of MOMIT fitted nicely to the observed data with plausible parameter estimates for the binding capacity and refresh time.     

Perfectionism and efficiency: Accuracy,response bias,and invested time in proof-reading performance

Investigating problem-solving performance, Ishida, H. (2005). College students’ perfectionism and task-strategy inefficience: Why their efforts go unrewarded? Japanese Journal of Social Psychology, 20, 208–215. Found high levels of perfectionism were associated with lower efficiency. Aiming to replicate and further explore this finding, the present study investigated how two dimensions of perfectionism (high standards, discrepancy between expectations and performance) predicted efficiency in proof-reading performance. N = 96 students completed a proof-reading task involving the detection of spelling, grammar, and format errors. When error-detection performance was subjected to signal detection analysis, high standards correlated positively with the number of incorrectly detected errors (false alarms). Moreover, when task-completion time was taken into account, high standards were negatively correlated with efficiency (accuracy/time). In comparison, discrepancy correlated negatively with the number of correctly detected errors (hits) and positively with a conservative response bias. The findings show that perfectionistic standards are associated with reduced efficiency demonstrating the importance of considering invested time, errors, and response bias when investigating the relationship between perfectionism and performance.     

Scene structure enhances change detection

Theories of objects recognition, scene perception, and neural representation of scenes imply that jumbling a coherent scene should reduce change detection. However, evidence from the change detection literature questions whether jumbling affects change detection. The experiments reported here demonstrate that jumbling does, in fact, reduce change detection. In Experiments 1 and 2, change detection was better for normal scenes than for jumbled scenes. In Experiment 3, inversion failed to interfere with change detection, demonstrating that the disruption of surface and object continuity inherent to jumbling is responsible for reduced change detection. These findings provide a crucial commonality between change detection research and theories of scene perception and neural representation. We also discuss why previous research may have failed to find effects of jumbling.     

错误意识判断对ADHD儿童错误觉察的影响特点

将GO/NO-GO任务范式和错误意识判断范式相结合,对21名ADHD儿童,27名正常儿童,在错误监控中的错误觉察水平进行考察,结果表明:1)ADHD儿童能够正常觉察到自己的错误反应;2)错误意识判断任务诱发出ADHD儿童的错误延迟效应,这种作用,既是因为该任务能够刺激ADHD儿童的有意觉察,又因为该任务无形中增加了GO/NO-GO任务中的刺激间隔时间。该结果表明,增加刺激间隔时间,可能会促使ADHD儿童改变错误后的反应策略,对错误反应进行错误调节,提高其错误监控水平。     

Challenging Design: How Best to Account for the World as It Really Is

Evolutionary psychology and intelligent‐design theory both need to be able to account for the empirical world, or the world as it is. This essay is an attempt to clarify the challenges these theories need to meet, if the relevant empirical findings are replicable. There is evidence of change in the biological world and of modularity of mind, and there is a growing body of work that finds evolutionary theory a convincing and fruitful account of the “design” of the mind. Three major empirical findings within evolutionary psychology are presented and discussed. The author claims that Cartesian dualism, as it is usually meant within psychology—a split between body and mind—is false, but that Descartes' original division between body and soul has not been challenged and is not challenged by the evidence that the mind is also a biological entity. The article concludes that the convergence of theology and science is to be found in the onus to discover the truth about the world as it really is, and this calls for an ability on both parts to account for the empirical world.     

Threat captures attention but does not affect learning of contextual regularities

Some of the stimulus features that guide visual attention are abstract properties of objects such as potential threat to one's survival, whereas others are complex configurations such as visual contexts that are learned through past experiences. The present study investigated the two functions that guide visual attention, threat detection and learning of contextual regularities, in visual search. Search arrays contained images of threat and non-threat objects, and their locations were fixed on some trials but random on other trials. Although they were irrelevant to the visual search task, threat objects facilitated attention capture and impaired attention disengagement. Search time improved for fixed configurations more than for random configurations, reflecting learning of visual contexts. Nevertheless, threat detection had little influence on learning of the contextual regularities. The results suggest that factors guiding visual attention are different from factors that influence learning to guide visual attention.     

What makes delusions pathological?

Bortolotti argues that we cannot distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs in virtue of their epistemic features alone. Although her arguments are convincing, her analysis leaves an important question unanswered: What makes delusions pathological? In this paper I set out to answer this question by arguing that the pathological character of delusions arises from an executive dysfunction in a subject’s ability to detect relevance in the environment. I further suggest that this dysfunction derives from an underlying emotional imbalance—one that leads delusional subjects to regard some contextual elements as deeply puzzling or highly significant.