Reasons or rationalizations: The role of principles in the moral dumbfounding paradigm

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Participants in that research (see Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015), who endorsed either reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non-significance. We argue that endorsing a reason is not sufficient evidence that a judgment is grounded in that reason. Stronger evidence should additionally account for (a) articulating a given reason and (b) consistently applying the reason in different situations. Building on this, we develop revised exclusion criteria across three studies. Study 1 included an open-ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of harm-based or norm-based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Studies 2 and 3 included a further three questions relating to harm-based reasons specifically, assessing the consistency with which people apply harm-based reasons across differing contexts. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm-based reasons, and evidence for dumbfounding was found.     

Effects of the range and frequency of vibrations on the momentary riding comfort evaluation of a railway vehicle

When trains pass level-crossings, turnouts, and rail joints, they are momentarily subjected to extreme vibrations. In railway engineering, evaluation of the riding comfort under such occasional vibrations is called the momentary riding comfort evaluation, as distinct from the long-term evaluation, which addresses the riding comfort of passengers for certain lengths of train operation. In order to identify the effective vibrational characteristics of the momentary evaluation, an experiment was performed with a riding comfort simulator. Ten adult subjects for each condition, 80 in total, participated in the experiment. The effects of differences in the range of stimuli, frequency of each stimulus, and scores on a rating scale of discomfort were studied. Differences in the range and frequency affected the evaluation such that subjects tended to make a relative judgment on discomfort. They made almost an absolute judgment when the rating scale was well defined, with a small number of categories.     

"Moralism" and the Gender Gap: Judgments of Political Ethics in Japan

This article investigates whether women are, as many claim, "moralists"—that is, moral and ethical standard-setters who seek clean politics and have strict standards for public officials. An analysis of data from the 1996 Japanese Elections and Democracy Study survey and from 18 focus groups conducted in 1996 indicates that women in Japan are not moralists. As elsewhere, there is a gender gap in Japan on "issue preference sets," with women favoring a "care" agenda, but women assign political ethics less importance than do men, even though women are more likely to see adverse effects from political corruption. Studying people's judgments of four ethics scenarios reveals minimal gender gaps; controlling for education and age, women's judgments overall are less, not more, strict than men's. Among women, age is a better predictor of moralism than education; older women are stricter than younger women on political ethics. This is attributed to gender-based differences in moral reasoning: Japanese women and men both rely heavily on a "relation-based" frame (which is situation-specific and requires extensive social information), but gender stratification patterns create information inequalities. Younger women lack social information necessary for judging political misconduct, whereas older women overcome the information deficit through life experience.     

The Axiology of Moral Experience

This paper clarifies the nature of moral experience, examines its evidential role in supporting moral judgments, and argues that moral experiences can be among the things having intrinsic value. Moral experience is compared with aesthetic experience and contrasted with its close relative, non-moral experience combined with moral beliefs. The concluding sections explore the case for the organicity of intrinsic value and the kind of role such value can play in grounding moral obligation.     

Modern health worries – the dark side of spirituality?

Modern health worries (MHWs) are widespread in modern societies. MHWs were connected to both negative and positive psychological characteristics in previous studies. The study aimed to investigate the relationships among intuitive‐experiential information processing style, spirituality, MHWs, and psychological well‐being. Members of the Hungarian Skeptic Society (N = 128), individuals committed to astrology (N = 601), and people from a non‐representative community sample (N = 554) completed questionnaires assessing intuitive‐experiential information processing style, spirituality, modern health worries (MHWs), and psychological well‐being. Astrologers showed higher levels of spirituality, intuitive‐experiential thinking, and modern health worries than individuals from the community sample; and skeptics scored even lower than the latter group with respect to all three constructs. Within the community sample, medium level connections between measures of spirituality and the experiential thinking style, and weak to medium level correlations between spirituality and MHWs were found. The connection between MHWs and experiential thinking style was completely mediated by spirituality. Individuals with higher levels of spirituality are particularly vulnerable to overgeneralized messages on health related risks. Official communication of potential risks based on rational scientific reasoning is not appropriate to persuade them as it has no impact on the intuitive‐experiential system.     

The “Epidemic” of Cheating Depends on Its Definition: A Critique of Inferring the Moral Quality of “Cheating in Any Form”

The incidence and moral implications of cheating depend on how it is defined and measured. Research that defines and operationalizes cheating as an inventory of acts, that is, “cheating in any form,” has often fueled concern that cheating is reaching “epidemic proportions.” Such inventory measures appear, however, to conflate moral and administrative conceptions of the problem. Inasmuch as the immorality of behavior is a function of moral judgment, academic misconduct is immoral only when it is intentional, and the greatest moral weight should be ascribed to violations that students judge to be the most “serious.”     

Psychopathy and internalism

Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits.     

Cognitive adaptation and its consequences: a test of cognitive continuum theory

Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) is an adaptive theory of human judgement and posits a continuum of cognitive modes anchored by intuition and analysis. The theory specifies surface and depth task characteristics that are likely to induce cognitive modes at different points along the cognitive continuum. The current study manipulated both the surface (information representation) and depth (task structure) characteristics of a multiple‐cue integration threat assessment task. The surface manipulation influenced cognitive mode in the predicted direction with an iconic information display inducing a more intuitive mode than a numeric information display. The depth manipulation influenced cognitive mode in a pattern not predicted by CCT. Results indicate this difference was due to a combination of task complexity and participant satisfacing. As predicted, analysis produced a more leptokurtic error distribution than intuition. Task achievement was a function of the extent to which participants demonstrated an analytic cognitive mode index, and not a function of correspondence, as predicted. This difference was likely due to the quantitative nature of the task manipulations. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

This paper re‐examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time‐pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an ‘affect heuristic’ which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Seek and ye shall find: test results are what you hypothesize they are

Expert clinicians were given batteries of psychodiagnostic test results (Rorschach, TAT, Draw-A-Person, Bender-Gestalt, Wechsler) to analyze. For half, a battery came along with a suggestion that the person suffers from Borderline Personality disorder, and for half, that battery was accompanied by a suggestion that he suffers from Paranoid Personality disorder. In Study 1, the suggestion was made indirectly, through a background story that preceded the test results. In Study 2, the suggestion was made directly, by the instructions given. The experts saw in the tests what they hypothesized to be there. In particular, the target diagnoses were rated higher when they were hypothesized than when they were not. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.