The Implications of Two Conceptions of Happiness (Hedonic Enjoyment and Eudaimonia) for the Understanding of Intrinsic Motivation

The distinction between hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia was evaluated in three data sets involving use of the Personally Expressive Activities Questionnaire—Standard Form (PEAQ-S) with college student samples (n > 200 in each sample). Indices of these two conceptions of happiness were strongly and reliably related across the three samples. Differences between these two conceptions of happiness were evaluated in two ways. First, we examined and compared correlations of hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia with variables related to intrinsic motivation. Zero-order correlations involving hedonic enjoyment were significantly stronger with respect to measures of self-determination and interest than were the corresponding correlations involving feelings of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia). In contrast, correlations involving eudaimonia were significantly stronger with measures of the balance of challenges and skills, self-realization values, effort, and importance than were the corresponding correlations with hedonic enjoyment. Second, we empirically distinguished between activities for which both hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia are present (intrinsically motivated activities) and activities for which hedonic enjoyment alone is present (hedonically enjoyed activities). Intrinsically motivated activities were judged to be significantly higher with respect to measures of the balance of challenges and skills, self-realization values, effort, importance, interest, and flow experiences. No differences between the two categories of activities were found for self-determination and the frequency with which activities were performed. Given these distinguishable patterns in the two conceptions of happiness, a reconceptualization for the understanding of intrinsic motivation is proposed.     

Living well: a self-determination theory perspective on eudaimonia

This article distinguishes between hedonic and eudaimonic approaches to wellness, with the former focusing on the outcome of happiness or pleasure and the latter focusing not so much on outcomes as on the process of living well. We present a model of eudaimonia that is based in self-determination theory, arguing that eudaimonic living can be characterized in terms of four motivational concepts: (1) pursuing intrinsic goals and values for their own sake, including personal growth, relationships, community, and health, rather than extrinsic goals and values, such as wealth, fame, image, and power; (2) behaving in autonomous, volitional, or consensual ways, rather than heteronomous or controlled ways; (3) being mindful and acting with a sense of awareness; and (4) behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In fact, we theorize that the first three of these aspects of eudaimonic living have their positive effects of psychological and physical wellness because they facilitate satisfaction of these basic, universal psychological needs. Studies indicate that people high in eudaimonic living tend to behave in more prosocial ways, thus benefiting the collective as well as themselves, and that conditions both within the family and in society more generally contribute toward strengthening versus diminishing the degree to which people live eudaimonic lives.     

即刻学习判断的系列位置效应：内外部线索的影响

为了检验即刻学习判断对内外部线索的敏感性,实验一被试为22名高中生,材料为三列含15个词语的清单,先逐个呈现词语系列位置信息,被试在学习前进行即刻学习判断,结果发现学习判断有显著首因效应,表明学习判断对系列位置信息这一外部线索比较敏感。实验二被试为20名高中生,先逐个呈现词语系列位置信息,被试在学习后进行即刻学习判断,结果发现学习判断同样有显著首因效应,表明学习判断对内部线索的敏感性并未强于外部线索。     

物质奖励对内在动机的侵蚀效应

物质奖励制度在现实生活中无处不在, 但物质奖励能够激发人们的工作热情吗？依据认知评价理论, 奖励具有信息和控制两种因素, 前者有助于内在动机的维持, 后者则会损害内在动机, 即有侵蚀效应。这种侵蚀效应已经为众多研究所证明。对此效应的深入研究发现, 在不同情形下, 侵蚀效应的大小受到奖励条件设置、竞争情形、个体的归因倾向、反馈信息、自主选择空间等因素的影响。近年来神经学研究则进一步观察到侵蚀效应的神经表征与机制。     

The Sixteen Strivings for God

Abstract. A psychological theory of religious experiences, sensitivity theory, is proposed. Whereas other theories maintain that religious motivation is about a few overarching desires, sensitivity theory provides a multifaceted analysis consistent with the diversity, richness, and individuality of religious experiences. Sixteen basic desires show the psychological foundations of meaningful experience. Each basic desire is embraced by every person, but to different extents. How we prioritize the basic desires expresses our individuality and influences our attraction to various religious images and activities. Each basic desire is associated with a basic goal and a unique joy, such as love, self‐worth, relaxation, or strength. We do not seek to experience joys infinitely; we regulate joys, in accordance with our core values, to sixteen balance points (sensitivities) that vary based on individuality. Religions help persons of faith regulate the sixteen basic joys by providing some images that strengthen joyful experiences and others that weaken them. We can strengthen our experience of self‐ worth, for example, by contemplating God in the image of savior; we can weaken our experience of self‐worth by contemplating original sin. The theory of sixteen basic desires is testable scientifically and suggests such philosophical concepts as value‐based happiness.     

Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate in Environmental Ethics

Abstract: Robert Elliot claims that the metaethical distinction between subjectivism and objectivism is unimportant in environmental ethics. He argues that because a sufficiently sophisticated subjectivist can accommodate all the intrinsic value an objectivist can, even in apparently problematic situations where humans either do not exist or do not have the relevant values, and because metaethical commitments fail to have any normative or motivational impact on rational debate, it makes no difference whether an environmental ethicist is a subjectivist or an objectivist. Elliot's dismissal, however, is unjustified. As it turns out, objectivists argue differently from the way subjectivists do, are motivated differently from the way subjectivists are, and are able to make a greater range of intrinsic value claims than subjectivists are. If Elliot's arguments have any appeal at all, it is only because he blurs the fundamental metaethical distinction in the first place and defends a subjectivism so objectivist that it is almost unrecognizable as subjectivism.     

The Pursuit of Epistemic Good

Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint.     

Flow Versus Life Satisfaction: A Projective Use of Cartoons to Illustrate the Difference Between the Evaluation Approach and the Intrinsic Motivation Approach to Subjective Quality of Life

In this paper, differences between life satisfaction and intrinsic motivation (flow) are addressed. Theories are presented on evaluation, flow and openness to experience. Data from a Norwegian panel study are analyzed by means of structural equation modeling. Young adults (n = 264) participated in a projective study with cartoon frames showing Donald Duck in challenging situations. Measures of satisfaction with life and the personality trait of openness to experience were added to the analysis. Subjects scoring high on openness rated Donald Duck's feelings as positive. A slightly opposing tendency was found for persons scoring high on satisfaction with life. The results are discussed with reference to the philosophical distinction between hedonism and eudaemonia.     

I Will Put My Law in Their Minds: Social Control and Cheating Behavior Among Catholics and Protestants

Catholics and Protestants differ in terms of social autonomy versus heteronomy. We propose that the regulation of behavior in accordance with social norms depends on the social control exercised by an authority for Catholics more than it does for Protestants. Two experiments measured cheating behavior (the transgression of a social norm) as a function of the religious group (Protestant vs. Catholic) and social control (with vs. without). Catholics were found to be more responsive to social control, that is, to cheat less when social control was salient, whereas Protestants' behavior did not depend on this dimension. In Study 2, intrinsic‐extrinsic religiousness was found to mediate this difference. Results are discussed in the context of the effects of public policies based on social control.     

A quantitative review of overjustification effects in persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities

The overjustification hypothesis suggests that extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic rewards are common in strengthening behavior in persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities; we examined overjustification effects in this context. A literature search yielded 65 data sets permitting comparison of responding during an initial no‐reinforcement phase to a subsequent no‐reinforcement phase, separated by a reinforcement phase. We used effect sizes to compare response levels in these two no‐reinforcement phases. Overall, the mean effect size did not differ from zero; levels in the second no‐reinforcement phase were equally likely to be higher or lower than in the first. However, in contrast to the overjustification hypothesis, levels were higher in the second no‐reinforcement phase when comparing the single no‐reinforcement sessions immediately before and after reinforcement. Outcomes consistent with the overjustification hypothesis were somewhat more likely when the target behavior occurred at relatively higher levels prior to reinforcement.