Why We Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True: An Answer to Stephen Stich?

Do we really care whether our beliefs are true? Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer: Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is “a consistently negative” one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user’s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.     

“Intrinsically” or just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

汉语元音对声调感知边界的影响

本项研究基于现代汉语普通话声调感知具有范畴性这一结论(Wang, 1976), 以普通话中6个单元音(/a//?//F//i//u//y/, 即拼音a、o、e、i、u、ü)阴平(T1)到阳平(T2)调的连续统(continuum)为实验语料, 用专业语音学软件Praat合成连续统语音样本, 对20名平均年龄为22.90岁的普通话母语者进行声调感知实验, 即让被试对所听刺激进行T1或T2的二选一鉴别测试(identification test), 从而探究单元音的内在音高(intrinsic pitch)与声调感知边界(boundary)的关系。本文借鉴Wang (1976)和Peng等(2010)对元音/i/声调连续统的合成方法, 使声调感知研究拓展到普通话中除/i/之外的其他5个单元音, 对以上两项研究起到一定的对照作用。研究发现, 元音会对T1到T2的声调范畴感知边界位置产生影响, 低元音/a/的内在音高较低, 其边界位置亦始终低于其他元音, 且具有显著性差异, 实验结果证明, 内在音高会对感知边界产生影响, 从而支持了Ohala和Eukel (1976)的“舌位拉伸”假说。     

促进工作动机的有效路径:自我决定理论的观点

自我决定理论是关于人类行为的动机理论。本文通过分析阐述了自我决定理论的哲学基础,从有机辩证的视角梳理了自我决定理论的基本思想,并对组织背景中以自我决定理论为指导框架的工作动机研究进行了综述,结论认为满足胜任、关系和自主三种心理需要的组织环境因素是增加内部动机并促进外部动机的内化,进而促进员工的工作绩效与心理健康的有效路径。     

Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will

There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude.     

教师教学自主性问卷的编制与修订

研究提出了中小学教师教学自主性的结构构想,并编制了教学自主性问卷。通过387名教师的初测和1222名教师的正式测试,对该问卷进行分析和修订,结果表明该问卷具有良好的项目区分度、信度和效度。根据验证性因素分析确立了教学自主性的七因素结构,包括自发性、目的性、责任性、独立性、胜任性、自省性和自控性。     

"心理发展与教育"的新认识——写在首届"中学和高校的趋势、机遇和挑战——教育家的会议"之后

心理发展和教育的关系涉及到如何从学生心理发展的角度出发,选择适宜的教育模式问题,它是当代发展心理学与教育心理学的一个重要课题。首届"中学和高校的趋势、机遇和挑战——教育家的会议"从自我同一感和道德教育、心理的连续型发展与教育衔接、内隐学习与实践教育出发,就心理发展和教育间的关系提出了一些全新的理解,为解决中等教育实践中的多个问题提供了宝贵的建议。     

情绪耗竭对建言行为的U型影响——内在动机的调节作用

基于资源保存理论,通过201名员工及其直接上级的配对样本,探讨了中国组织背景下员工情绪耗竭对其促进性建言与抑制性建言的非线性影响及其边界条件。研究结果表明,情绪耗竭对促进性建言与抑制性建言有显著的U型影响。与抑制性建言相比,情绪耗竭对促进型建言的U型影响更强。内在动机显著调节了情绪耗竭对促进性建言的U型影响,对于低内在动机的员工而言,情绪耗竭对促进性建言的U型影响更明显。     

中学生内在生活目标与主观幸福感的关系:基本心理需求的中介作用

为探究中学生内在生活目标、基本心理需求与主观幸福感的关系,采用内在生活目标量表、基本心理需求量表和主观幸福感量表对885名中学生进行问卷调查.结果表明:(1)男生的基本心理需求得分显著高于女生,独生子女的基本心理需求得分、主观幸福感得分显著高于非独生子女;(2)中学生内在生活目标、基本心理需求及主观幸福感两两均呈显著正...     

Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value

Whether or not intrinsic valueis additively measurable is often thought todepend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore'sprinciple of organic unities. I argue that thetruth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additivemeasurement. However, there are other veryplausible evaluative claims that are moredifficult to combine with the additivity ofintrinsic value. A plausible theory of the goodshould allow that there are certain kinds ofstates of affairs whose intrinsic value cannotbe outweighed by any number of states ofcertain other, less valuable, kinds. Such``non-trade-off' cannot reasonably be explainedin terms of organic unities, and it can bereconciled with the additivity thesis only ifwe are prepared to give up some traditionalclaims about the nature of intrinsic value.