“Intrinsically” or just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

When openness to experience and conscientiousness affect continuous learning: A mediating role of intrinsic motivation and a moderating role of occupation1

Research on the effects of personality on work behaviors has adopted either the motivational meditation perspective or the person‐situation interaction perspective. This study attempted to integrate both of the perspectives in a single causal model. Specifically, using data collected from systems engineers and car salespeople in Japan, we investigated the mediating role of intrinsic motivation in the links from openness and conscientiousness to continuous learning, and the moderating role of occupation on the mediation mechanism. The results indicated that, for systems engineers, the effects of those personality traits on continuous learning were completely mediated via intrinsic motivation. For car salespeople, however, the trait effects on the outcome variable are direct, rather than transmitted through intrinsic motivation. The meanings of the findings and directions for future research are discussed.     

Life aspirations,personality traits and subjective well‐being in a Spanish sample

This study examines the relationships between intrinsic/extrinsic aspirations and subjective well‐being (SWB; positive affect, negative affect, satisfaction with life) in a sample of 583 Spanish adults. Firstly, the results showed that high scores for SWB are related to high scores for intrinsic aspirations and, to a lesser extent, to low scores for extrinsic aspirations; it was also found that intrinsic aspirations are mainly related to positive indicators of well‐being, whereas extrinsic aspirations are mainly associated with negative indicators. Secondly, the study also enabled exploration of the links between the domains of the Five‐Factor Model and aspirations; thirdly, the results showed that intrinsic/extrinsic aspirations predict SWB beyond the Five Factors. The results demonstrate the importance of studying the content of human aspirations for understanding psychological health. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Generational differences in American students’ reasons for going to college, 1971–2014: The rise of extrinsic motives

ABSTRACT

We examined generational differences in reasons for attending college among a nationally representative sample of college students (N = 8 million) entering college between 1971–2014. We validated the items on reasons for attending college against an established measure of extrinsic and intrinsic values among college students in 2014 (n = 189). Millennials (in college 2000s–2010s) and Generation X (1980s–1990s) valued extrinsic reasons for going to college (“to make more money”) more, and anti-extrinsic reasons (“to gain a general education and appreciation of ideas”) less than Boomers when they were the same age in the 1960s–1970s. Extrinsic reasons for going to college were higher in years with more income inequality, college enrollment, and extrinsic values. These results mirror previous research finding generational increases in extrinsic values begun by GenX and continued by Millennials, suggesting that more recent generations are more likely to favor extrinsic values in their decision-making.     

The Potentiality of the Embryo and the Somatic Cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to possess—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.     

Does sport have intrinsic value?

This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004 Mcfee, Graham. 2004. Sport, Rules and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sports, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007 Morgan, William J. 2007. Caring, final ends and sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1(1): 7–21. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with regard to the role of sport as a moral laboratory.     

Caring,final ends and sports

In this essay I argue that sports at their best qualify as final ends, that is, as ends whose value is such that they ground not only the practices whose ends they are, but everything else we do as human agents. The argument I provide to support my thesis is derived from Harry Frankfurt's provocative work on the importance of the things we care about, more specifically, on his claim that it is by virtue of caring about things and practices, really caring about them – even loving them – we are able to regard and treat them as final ends. Sports, I claim, are paradigmatic examples of practices cared about and loved in these deep ways, and as such deserve to be considered, rather than dismissed because of their supposed triviality, as one of those ends around which a life most worth living can be legitimately forged.     

Finding the Lost Sheep: A Panel Study of Business Students' Intrinsic Religiosity,Machiavellianism, and Unethical Behavior Intentions

This research investigates 266 business students' panel data across 4 time periods and tests a theoretical model involving intrinsic religiosity, the love of money (Time 1), Machiavellianism (Time 2), and propensity to engage in unethical behaviors (PUB; Times 3 and 4). There was a short ethics intervention between Times 3 and 4. We identified good apples and bad apples using the PUB measure collected at Time 4. From Time 3 to Time 4, good apples became more ethical, whereas bad apples became less ethical after the ethics intervention. Moreover, for the whole sample, intrinsic religiosity deterred unethical intentions not only directly but also indirectly through the absence of Machiavellianism. Before the ethics intervention, intrinsic religiosity curbed unethical intention directly for good apples but indirectly for bad apples. After the intervention, only the indirect effect was significant for bad apples. Intrinsic religiosity offers us hope to open the hearts of the lost sheep and bring them home. Research results were discussed in light of this study's theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions; Judeo-Christian ethics and values; challenging roles of educators and executives in educating Gen-Yers; creating a sea change of the ethical social norm in schools, organizations, and society, or ethical community building, and promoting ethical behavior; and future directions for research.     

The compression block technique

Remembering the distance or end-location of an interpolated movement interfered equally with the retention of criterion movement end-location. Interpolated distances were recalled less well than interpolated locations. These results were interpreted as evidence of capacity interference rather than structural interference with a visual/kinesthetic integrated store.     

Experimental test of a planning intervention for forming a ‘higher order’ health-habit

Abstract

Objective: Habit-formation interventions may help individuals initiate and maintain behaviour change. This paper proposes and empirically tests the idea that it is possible for individuals to form ‘higher-order habits’, or behaviours that can be executed in more than one way, and still be habitual.

Design: Participants (N?=?82) were healthy adults randomly assigned to an action-and-coping-planning intervention for forming a ‘higher-order habit’ of filling half of their dinner plates with fruits and vegetables or a control condition. Key measures were collected at baseline and 1, 2 and 3 weeks post-baseline. Participants submitted 3 pictures per week of their dinner plates via snapchat/email.

Main Outcome Measures: Intrinsic motivation, habit strength and behavioural frequency for filling half their dinner plates with fruits and vegetables.

Results: Intervention participants reported significantly greater habit strength at each follow-up time point. Controls did show some degree of habit formation, despite not fully forming a habit. Behavioural automaticity increased despite consuming a variety of fruits/vegetables; results did not depend on participants’ intrinsic motivation to consume fruits/vegetables.

Conclusion: It may be possible for individuals to form ‘higher-order’ habits, which may be particularly important in health contexts, in which many target behaviours are complex and can be seen as higher-order.