Clarifying the dynamic interrelation of conflicts between the work and home domain and counterproductive work behaviour

This study investigates the daily relationship between experiencing home–work conflict (HWC) and an employee’s performance of counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) directed towards the individual (CWBI) and CWB directed towards the organization (CWBO). Moreover, we examine whether these relationships are buffered by family supportive supervisor behaviour. Finally, we investigate whether CWBs directed towards the individual and the organization are related to feelings of work–home conflict (WHC). We examined the daily diary data using multilevel path analyses. We found support for a significant positive relation between HWC and same as well as next-day CWB enacted towards the individual, and same-day CWB directed towards the organization. General levels of family supportive supervisor behaviour buffered an employee’s daily relationship between experiencing HWC and enacting counterproductive work behaviour towards the individual, and are directly and negatively related with enacting CWB towards the individual and the organization. Furthermore, daily CWB enacted towards the individual was significantly positive, whereas CWB enacted towards the organization was significantly negatively related to WHC. Future research would benefit from examining buffering effects on the resource-depleting relationship between counterproductive work behaviour enacted towards the individual and WHC.     

Psychosocial impacts of communal conflicts in a sample of secondary school youths from two conflict communities in south east Nigeria

In Nigeria, communal conflicts arise due to misunderstanding from ownership of land for farming, oil deposits, solid minerals or water for fishing activities. It may also arise in defence of community pride and properties or even in defence of the people involved in the conflict. The General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12), The Short Screening Scale for Post traumatic stress disorder, The Generalized Anxiety Disorder Scale (GAD-7) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-2) were used to assess psychosocial impacts of communal conflicts among 560 secondary school youths from two communities in south east Nigeria. Result revealed various forms of psychosocial impacts of communal conflicts among the youths.     

The Impact of PREP Training on Marital Conflicts Reduction: A Randomized Controlled Trial With Iranian Distressed Couples

The purpose of this study was to examine the efficacy of the Prevention and Relationship Education Program (PREP) training on marital conflict and marital satisfaction among a sample of distressed couples in Iran. The research procedure was experimental with a pretest, posttest, and follow-up design, including a control group. The sample included 76 volunteer couples among a sample of distressed couples who were randomly selected and assigned to the experimental or control group. They completed demographic questions, the Marital Conflicts questionnaire, and a revised Marital Satisfaction Inventory in pretest, posttest and at the 1-year follow-up. Results showed that PREP training effectively led to decreased marital conflict and improvement of marital satisfaction of couples at posttest and at the 1-year follow-up. The result of covariance analysis showed significant differences between the experimental and the control groups' marital conflict and marital satisfaction at posttest and at the 1-year follow-up.     

集体主义-个体主义文化视角下工作-家庭关系差异分析

工作-家庭关系研究是组织与管理心理学中研究的热点议题,社会文化因素是工作-家庭关系研究中的重要影响因素。本文在分析已有相关文献的基础之上,总结发现:个体主义文化下的员工工作和家庭之间的关系对等并且领域之间界限明晰,而集体主义文化下个体的工作-家庭之间的关系并非完全对等,且员工的工作和家庭之间存在更多联结。如何在现有的工作-家庭关系研究的基础上明晰适合我国文化背景的研究理论以及挖掘能够体现我国工作-家庭关系特征的研究主题是今后研究的方向与任务。     

When criticism is ineffective: The case of historical trauma and unsupportive allies

Three studies examined the effect of historical trauma reminders and criticism from international allies on attitudes toward current conflicts. In Study 1, Israeli participants (N = 116) were primed with the Holocaust, and read either that the U.S. President Obama supports Israel's right to defend itself and attack Iran, or that he opposes such action. Then, support for preemptive violence was assessed. Study 2 (N = 133) replicated this design, comparing inclusive and exclusive framings of the Holocaust. Study 3 (N = 478), examined the effect of Holocaust reminders and criticism from the European Union on attitudes toward militant policies against Palestinians. All three studies found that Holocaust primes juxtaposed with international criticism increased support for aggression, especially under exclusive framings of the Holocaust. Study 3, however, found this effect only among left‐wing participants. These findings indicate that when historical trauma is salient, international criticism may be ineffective and may even backfire.     

Political Action in Conflict and Nonconflict Regions in Indonesia: The Role of Religious and National Identifications

This study examined the relationship between group identification and political action in Indonesia. We made four contributions to the literature. First, we studied political action on behalf of religious groups and examined the role of religious identification alone and in combination with national identification. Second, we analyzed political action in a non‐Western country where social cleavages occur primarily along religious lines and where a conflict and nonconflict region can be studied. Third, we compared Muslims and Christians, whose majority and minority status varies across the two regions, and fourth, we investigated both normative and nonnormative forms of political action (protest and violence). In line with the dual‐identification model of politicization, we found that religious identification increased support for protest (but not violence) in the conflict region only and particularly among high national identifiers. In the nonconflict region, religious identification was not related to violence, and it was related to lower support for protest among high national identifiers. The patterns were largely similar for Muslims and Christians, but some differences were found depending on the majority‐minority status. We conclude that particularities of the intergroup context should be taken into consideration when studying politicization.     

Support for Self‐Censorship Among Israelis as a Barrier to Resolving the Israeli‐Palestinian Conflict

Self‐censorship, defined as an “act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in the absence of formal obstacles” often serves as a barrier to resolving intractable conflicts. Specifically, in order to protect the group, and in absence of objective constraints such as institutionalized censorship, individuals practice self‐censorship and support its practice by other society members. This prevents free flow and transparency of information, within a society, regarding the conflict and the adversary. In an attempt to investigate the factors that contribute to the functioning of self‐censorship as a sociopsychological barrier to conflict resolution, a longitudinal study was conducted among a large sample of Jews in Israel. The survey was administered in three waves: a few months before, during, and a few months after Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip. The findings showed that armed confrontation can increase support for self‐censorship. In addition, the findings revealed that personal characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, siege mentality) predicted support for self‐censorship, which, in turn, mediated the effect of personal characteristics on support for negotiations and for providing humanitarian aid. The theoretical as well as the applied implications of the findings are discussed.     

The Effect of Perspective‐Giving on Postconflict Reconciliation. An Experimental Approach

Discussion groups are a promising tool for bridging the divide between former conflict antagonists. However, such groups do not always produce the desired outcome of improved attitudes, even when they meet the conditions generally seen as favoring positive interaction. In this article, we examine specific discussion protocols that mitigate polarization risks while fostering reconciliation. Using a randomized, controlled design, we formed a pool of 429 ex‐combatants and members of conflict‐affected communities in Colombia. Participants were asked to join heterogeneous groups and discuss their proposals for the future of Colombia. Overall, community members improved their attitudes towards ex‐combatants significantly, while ex‐combatants’ attitudes toward community members do not tend to polarize. Those participants who were randomly assigned to a perspective‐giving treatment protocol (where they were asked to refer to their personal experience and perspective) consistently improved their intergroup attitudes towards ex‐combatants, and by a proportionally higher percentage than those taking part under argumentation and no‐treatment control conditions.     

Explaining White Opposition to Black Political Leadership: The Role of Fear of Racial Favoritism

Despite the election of America's first Black president, most non‐Hispanic Whites continue to oppose Black political leadership. The conventional explanation for White opposition is sheer racial prejudice, yet the available empirical evidence for this theory is inconsistent. I test an alternative theory that Whites perceive Black political leaders as a threat to their group's interests. Using a new survey measure and nationally representative panel data covering the 2008, 2010, and 2012 U.S. elections, I find that a majority of Whites perceive Black elected officials as likely to favor Blacks over Whites. Moreover, fear of racial favoritism predicts support for Barack Obama in both cross‐sectional models and fixed‐effects models of within‐person change, controlling for negative racial stereotypes. I replicate these findings using a separate cross‐sectional survey fielded after the 2014 election that controls for racial resentment. Collectively, these results suggest that perceptions of conflicting group interests—and not just prejudice—drive White opposition to Black political leadership.