Resolving the Paradox of Phenomenology through Kant's Aesthetics: Between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze

Commentators have claimed that the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze converge upon a spatial field of sensation which is prior to representation. This essay will contest these readings by showing that, for Deleuze, the pre-representational spatial field of intensity is fundamentally split from thought. This “gap” between sensation and thought is, for Deleuze, fundamentally temporal, in that thought is continually open and passive to being violated and transformed by the sensible and the sensible is continually being pushed beyond itself by a certain kind of thought. This violent exchange across the gap between thought and sensibility is found, by Deleuze, in Kant's notion of the aesthetic idea. On the contrary, for Merleau-Ponty, Kant's aesthetics imply a non-conceptual “ground” shared by both thought and sensibility. By contrasting these two readings of Kant's aesthetics, this paper reveals the basic divergence between the philosophies of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty.     

语言表达方式对科学概念语义提取时间的影响

研究语言表达方式对科学概念语义提取的影响。结果表明,科学概念也具有一定的典型性效应。在词的快速分类和句子证实作业中,名称中有上属标记有利于概念的语义提取。     

Learning and memory facilitate predictive tracking in 4-month-olds

We investigated 4-month-olds’ oculomotor anticipations when viewing occlusion stimuli consisting of a small target that moved back and forth repetitively while the center of its trajectory was occluded by a rectangular screen. We examined performance under five conditions. In the baseline condition, infants produced few predictive relative to reactive eye movements. In the full training condition, anticipations were increased in frequency following prior exposure to a target moving along a fully visible trajectory. The delay condition tested the effects of training after a 30-min interval elapsed between training and test, resulting in a return to baseline performance. However, the training effect was reinstated in the reminder condition following another brief exposure to the training stimulus prior to test. Finally, in the brief training condition, we found that the brief exposure alone was insufficient to induce the training effect. Results are interpreted in the context of learning from short-term experience and long-term memory.     

Analyzing feature distinctiveness in the processing of living and non-living concepts in Alzheimer’s disease

The conceptual structure account (CSA) is a model specifying the role of the living and non-living domain dichotomy in the structure of semantic memory. According to this model, feature distinctiveness and the perceptual–functional inter-correlation of concepts are assumed to play a major role in impairing the ability to discriminate between living and non-living concepts in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). The hypothesis was tested in this study by using naming and sorting tasks traditionally considered as assessing distinctiveness, and a property verification task where distinctiveness and perceptual–functional inter-correlation were objectively controlled against norms especially created for this purpose. Alzheimer’s patients (n = 59) with minimal, mild or moderate dementia and normal elderly adults (n = 31) participated in the study. Overall, the findings did not support the CSA predictions. They revealed a distinctiveness effect on response accuracy with shared features dominating distinctive features regardless of domain. They also revealed more difficulties in the tasks involving effortful processes. The results stress the need to consider both cognitive demands of tasks and structural aspects of knowledge in the evaluation of semantic memory in AD.     

Representation of principled connections: a window onto the formal aspect of common sense conception

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. Recent research suggests that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g., DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g., having four legs for dogs) but not other properties (t-properties; e.g., being brown for dogs). Principled connections differ from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections license (i) the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess their k-properties, (ii) formal explanations (i.e., explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is), and (iii) normative expectations concerning the presence of k-properties in tokens of the type. The present paper investigates the hypothesis that representing principled connections requires representing properties as aspects of being the relevant kind of thing (Aspect Hypothesis). Experiment 1 provides a direct test of the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 provide indirect tests of the Aspect Hypothesis. All three experiments provide support for the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiment 4 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the manner in which formal explanations are licensed by principled connections. Finally, Experiment 5 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the nature of the normative expectations licensed by principled connections. Together these results provide strong evidence for the idea that representing principled connections involves representing a property as being an aspect of being a given kind of thing. The results also help clarify the manner in which formal explanation differs from other modes of explanation. Finally, the results of the experiments are used to motivate a proposal concerning the formal structure of the conceptual representations implicated by principled connections. This structure provides a domain-general way of structuring our concepts and embodies the perspective we take when we think and talk of things as being instances of a kind.     

The phenomenology of negation

Negation is a fundamental component of communication (no-answers), cognition (logical negation), perception (different color), attitude (dislike), emotion (hatred), and volition (disagreement). Its many uses make it difficult to provide an integrated definition of the concept. The aim of this paper is to show that an integrated definition of the concept can be arrived at by means of a phenomenological method structuring it into three general essences labelled lack, otherness and obstruction.

IPSEITY,ALTERITY, AND COMMUNITY: THE TRI‐UNITY OF MAYA THERAPEUTIC HEALING

Taking K'iche’ Maya therapeutic consultations in Guatemala as its focus, this essay explores some astonishing indigenous accounts of “healing‐at‐a‐distance” and “pain passing” between healers and wellness‐seekers. Rather than exoticizing or dismissing such reports, we attempt to understand what it means to conceive of the bodily boundaries of healers and wellness‐seekers (self and other) as sympathetically defiable and transgressable in healing. Within the moral space of K'iche’ healing, when one cares to feel, if one dares to feel with another or others, the experiential space between healer and wellness‐seeker is transformed as the alterity (otherness) of what is felt and who feels becomes (through a sympathy in ipseity) but one thing. I argue that Maya therapeutic healing may be seen as a tri‐unity, involving a movement from an enfolded illness experience (alterity) to an unfolding sickness experience (ipseity), passing through empathy until participants together arrive at sympathy (community) to experience healing.     

Children's Understanding of the Natural Numbers’ Structure

When young children attempt to locate numbers along a number line, they show logarithmic (or other compressive) placement. For example, the distance between “5” and “10” is larger than the distance between “75” and “80.” This has often been explained by assuming that children have a logarithmically scaled mental representation of number (e.g., Berteletti, Lucangeli, Piazza, Dehaene, & Zorzi, 2010 ; Siegler & Opfer, 2003 ). However, several investigators have questioned this argument (e.g., Barth & Paladino, 2011 ; Cantlon, Cordes, Libertus, & Brannon, 2009 ; Cohen & Blanc‐Goldhammer, 2011 ). We show here that children prefer linear number lines over logarithmic lines when they do not have to deal with the meanings of individual numerals (i.e., number symbols, such as “5” or “80”). In Experiments 1 and 2, when 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds choose between number lines in a forced‐choice task, they prefer linear to logarithmic and exponential displays. However, this preference does not persist when Experiment 3 presents the same lines without reference to numbers, and children simply choose which line they like best. In Experiments 4 and 5, children position beads on a number line to indicate how the integers 1–100 are arranged. The bead placement of 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds is better fit by a linear than by a logarithmic model. We argue that previous results from the number‐line task may depend on strategies specific to the task.     

Frege Puzzles and Mental Files

This paper proposes a novel conception of mental files, aimed at addressing Frege puzzles. Classical Frege puzzles involve ignorance and discovery of identity. These may be addressed by accounting for a more basic way for identity to figure in thought—the treatment of beliefs by the believer as being about the same thing. This manifests itself in rational inferences that presuppose the identity of what the beliefs are about. Mental files help to provide a functional characterization of a mind capable of this presupposition, but more must be said to show how it may be rational. I argue that this can be done by drawing out the way in which mental files interact with a thinker's motivational states and so come to have normative functional properties. I show how this theory works better than some other treatments of mental files.