Cultural conceptions of a bereavement-related illness in a South African indigenous community

This study explored cultural conceptions of a bereavement-related illness among elderly (aged 34–85yrs) Northern Sotho-speaking people in Limpopo province. The participants (n = 14, females = 50%, mean age = 59 years, SD: 13.7 years) were purposively selected and interviewed using in-depth interviews. Data were analysed using Hycner’s adapted phenomenological method. Three themes emerged from the analysis: debilitating and life-threatening symptoms of the illness; aetiology explained by ritual taboo violations; and management of the illness through ritual cleansing. The cleansing process incorporates the administration of traditional herbs. The findings suggest bereavement-related illness in an African cultural community to be explained by their cultural concept of distress understandings.     

Auditory spatial concepts in blind football experts

ObjectivesWe compared the spatial concepts given to sounds' directions by blind football players with both blind non-athletes and sighted individuals.MethodParticipants verbally described the directions of sounds around them by using predefined spatial concept labels, under two blocked conditions: 1) facing front, 2) pointing with the hand towards the stimulus.ResultsBlind football players categorized the directions more precisely (i.e., they used simple labels for describing the cardinal directions and combined labels for the intermediate ones) than the other groups, and their categorization was less sensitive to the response conditions than blind non-athletes. Sighted participants' categorization was similar to previous studies, in which the front and back regions were generally more precisely described than the sides, where simple labels were often used for describing directions around the absolute left and right.ConclusionsThe differences in conceptual categorization of sound directions are a) in sighted individuals, influenced by the representation of the visual space b) in blind individuals, influenced by the level of expertise in action and locomotion based on non-visual information, which can be increased by auditive stimulation provided by blind football training.     

Conceptual engineering for mathematical concepts

In this paper I investigate how conceptual engineering applies to mathematical concepts in particular. I begin with a discussion of Waismann’s notion of open texture, and compare it to Shapiro’s modern usage of the term. Next I set out the position taken by Lakatos which sees mathematical concepts as dynamic and open to improvement and development, arguing that Waismann’s open texture applies to mathematical concepts too. With the perspective of mathematics as open-textured, I make the case that this allows us to deploy the tools of conceptual engineering in mathematics. I will examine Cappelen’s recent argument that there are no conceptual safe spaces and consider whether mathematics constitutes a counterexample. I argue that it does not, drawing on Haslanger’s distinction between manifest and operative concepts, and applying this in a novel way to set-theoretic foundations. I then set out some of the questions that need to be engaged with to establish mathematics as involving a kind of conceptual engineering. I finish with a case study of how the tools of conceptual engineering will give us a way to progress in the debate between advocates of the Universe view and the Multiverse view in set theory.     

Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism,Phenomenal Concepts,and the Epistemic Gap

Type B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of our phenomenal concepts, those concepts of our experiential states acquired through introspection. This view was once regarded as a promising response to anti-physicalist arguments that maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical concepts entails that phenomenal and physical properties are distinct. More recently, however, many physicalists have lost confidence in the view, and have proposed less promising defences of physicalism—or have become outright sceptical about its prospects. I argue here that these physicalists have underestimated the resources of Type B physicalism and are thereby retreating too quickly—or fighting battles that have already been won.     

The flexibility of association between temporal concepts and physical space in the Japanese language

Previous studies have indicated that temporal concepts such as the past and future are associated with horizontal (left–right) space. This association has been interpreted as reflecting left‐to‐right writing systems. The Japanese language, however, is written both horizontally and vertically and, when texts are presented vertically, the sequence of columns runs from right to left. This study examines whether the associations between time and space are changed by the direction of the character strings using a word categorization task. Consistent with previous studies, response times and error rates indicated left‐past and right‐future associations when participants read words presented horizontally. On the other hand, response times indicated the opposite (i.e., left‐future and right‐past associations) when participants read words presented vertically. These results suggest that temporal concepts are not associated with one's body or physical space in an inflexible manner, but rather the associations can flexibly change through experience.     

自我同一性与相关概念的辨析

自我同一性是一个多层次、多维度的心理学概念．这一概念自提出后就面临着概念澄清的问题．尤其是与相关概念的边界划分问题。因此．要把握自我同一性的概念就需要对与自我同一性相关联的概念进行辨析。这主要涉及到(1)自我与同一性;(2)自我同一性与自我概念;(3)自我同一性与个人同一性、角色同一性和社会同一性。     

Against Teleological Essentialism

In two recent papers, Rose and Nichols present evidence in favor of the view that humans represent category essences in terms of a telos, such as honey-making, and not in terms of scientific essences, such as bee DNA. Here, I challenge their interpretation of the evidence and show that it is directly predicted by the main theory they seek to undermine. I argue that their results can be explained as instances of diagnostic reasoning about scientific essences.     

Response to Ranganathan

This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence).     

Representante-representativo,représentant-représentation,ideational representative: Which one is a Freudian concept? On the translation of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz in Spanish,French and English1

The Freudian expression Vorstellungsrepräsentanz ( Freud, 1915b, 1915c ), which is rendered in the Standard Edition as ideational representative, is commonly translated in Spanish as representante-representativo and in French as représentant-représentation, among other renderings. An interdisciplinary conceptual inquiry, which applies linguistic semantics to the evaluation of the available Spanish and French renderings, concludes that this compound expression should be translated in these languages as representante ideativo and représentant idéatif, respectively, renderings which happen to correspond to Strachey’s translation into English in the SE. In contrast to most Spanish and French translations, this proposal conforms to the semantic principle of compositionality. On the one hand, it provides a suitable translation of the two parts of the compound. Thus it renders Vorstellung as idea, with the classical meaning of image or mental representation, which can be traced back to Hume’s empiricist philosophy, and it renders Repräsentanz as representative, with the meaning of delegate. On the other hand, its linguistic form preserves the attributive meaning relationship which exists between both concepts in the original German expression. Against the background of these semantic considerations, a theoretical question concerning Freudian metapsychology is discussed: the drive has a psychic representative, but is there a (mental) representation of the drive?