Categories of Historical Thought

This paper argues that the identity of history as a discipline derives from its distinctive combination of intellectual assumptions, or categories. Many of these categories are shared with other fields of thought, including science, literature, and common sense, but in history are understood in a unique way. This paper first examines the general notion of categories of historical understanding, then scrutinises some of the specific categories suggested by classic authors on the philosophy of history such as Dilthey and Collingwood. More recent works by Goldstein, Oakeshott, Bevir, and Tucker are treated as contributions to the same discussion. It concludes that the various categories these writers have proposed are neither trivial nor incompatible and that when collated they do indeed compose a framework capable of characterising historical thought.

Bewitchment, biology, or both: the co-existence of natural and supernatural explanatory frameworks across development

Three studies examined the co-existence of natural and supernatural explanations for illness and disease transmission, from a developmental perspective. The participants (5-, 7-, 11-, and 15-year-olds and adults; N = 366) were drawn from 2 Sesotho-speaking South African communities, where Western biomedical and traditional healing frameworks were both available. Results indicated that, although biological explanations for illness were endorsed at high levels, witchcraft was also often endorsed. More important, bewitchment explanations were neither the result of ignorance nor replaced by biological explanations. Instead, both natural and supernatural explanations were used to explain the same phenomena, and bewitchment explanations were highest among adults. Taken together, these data provide insight into how diverse, culturally constructed belief systems about illness co-exist across development.     

Understanding mortality and the life of the ancestors in rural madagascar

Across two studies, a wide age range of participants was interviewed about the nature of death. All participants were living in rural Madagascar in a community where ancestral beliefs and practices are widespread. In Study 1, children (8–17 years) and adults (19–71 years) were asked whether bodily and mental processes continue after death. The death in question was presented in the context of a narrative that focused either on the corpse or on the ancestral practices associated with the afterlife. Participants aged 8 years and older claimed that death brings an end to most bodily and mental processes. Nevertheless, particularly in the context of the religious narrative, they claimed that certain mental processes continue even after death. This assertion of an afterlife was more evident among adults than children, especially with respect to cognitive processes, such as knowing and remembering. In Study 2, 5- and 7-year-olds were asked similar questions in connection with the death of a bird and a person. Seven-year-olds consistently claimed that bodily and mental processes cease at death, whereas 5-year-olds were unsystematic in their replies. Together, the two studies replicate and extend findings obtained with Western children showing that, in the course of development, different conceptions of death are elaborated—a biological conception in which death terminates living processes and a religious conception in which death marks the beginning of a new form of spiritual existence.     

Children's equivalence judgments: Crossmapping effects

Preschoolers made numerical comparisons between sets with varying degrees of shared surface similarity. When surface similarity was pitted against numerical equivalence (i.e., crossmapping), children made fewer number matches than when surface similarity was neutral (i.e, all sets contained the same objects). Only children who understood the number words for the target sets performed above chance in the crossmapping condition. These findings are consistent with previous research on children's non-numerical comparisons (e.g., [Rattermann, M. J., & Gentner, D. (1998). The effect of language on similarity: The use of relational labels improves young children's performance in a mapping task. In K. Holyoak, D. Gentner, & B. Kokinov (Eds.), Advances in analogy research: Integration of theory and data from cognitive, computational, and neural sciences (pp. 274–282). Sofia: New Bulgarian University; Smith, L. B. (1993). The concept of same. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 24 (pp. 215–252). New York: Academic Press]) and suggest that the same mechanisms may underlie numerical development.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism,Phenomenal Concepts,and the Epistemic Gap

Type B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of our phenomenal concepts, those concepts of our experiential states acquired through introspection. This view was once regarded as a promising response to anti-physicalist arguments that maintain that an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical concepts entails that phenomenal and physical properties are distinct. More recently, however, many physicalists have lost confidence in the view, and have proposed less promising defences of physicalism—or have become outright sceptical about its prospects. I argue here that these physicalists have underestimated the resources of Type B physicalism and are thereby retreating too quickly—or fighting battles that have already been won.     

The flexibility of association between temporal concepts and physical space in the Japanese language

Previous studies have indicated that temporal concepts such as the past and future are associated with horizontal (left–right) space. This association has been interpreted as reflecting left‐to‐right writing systems. The Japanese language, however, is written both horizontally and vertically and, when texts are presented vertically, the sequence of columns runs from right to left. This study examines whether the associations between time and space are changed by the direction of the character strings using a word categorization task. Consistent with previous studies, response times and error rates indicated left‐past and right‐future associations when participants read words presented horizontally. On the other hand, response times indicated the opposite (i.e., left‐future and right‐past associations) when participants read words presented vertically. These results suggest that temporal concepts are not associated with one's body or physical space in an inflexible manner, but rather the associations can flexibly change through experience.     

Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator's intention in naming and what's really what

Daily experience is filled with objects that have been created by humans to serve specific purposes. For such objects, the very act of creation may be a key element of how people understand them. But exactly how does creator's intention matter? We evaluated its contribution to two forms of categorization: the name selected for an artifact, and intuitions about what an artifact "really" is. To contrast the possibility that intention serves as an essence (Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29; Bloom, P. (1998). Theories of artifact categorization. Cognition, 66, 87-93.) determining an artifact's name with the possibility that it matters through its relevance to discourse goals, participants in three experiments read scenarios about people interacting with an artifact and then judged the suitability of different names for it. The intention of the creator was of differing degrees of relevance to the communication, and the relevance of other aspects of the entity varied in a complementary fashion. We found that name selection was altered by the communicative goals of a situation, and name choice was most consistent with creator's intention when the situation made intention relevant to achieving those goals. In a fourth experiment, we used the same scenarios to test the possibility that intention serves as an essence determining intuitions about what an object "really" is. The impact of creator's intention was modulated by the discourse context. These findings suggest that creator's intention influences both name choice and intuitions about what something "really" is by virtue of its impact on how communicative goals are best realized.     

Concept empiricism: a methodological critique

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.