The Crucial Importance of Nancey Murphy’s Deployment of Lakatos’s Methodology for Theology and Science

Russell's paper explores the astonishing fruitfulness of Nancey Murphy’s use of Imre Lakatos’s philosophy of science in the field of “theology and science.” Murphy’s work can be used to choose between competing theologies according to the theologians’ willingness to engage with science, their ability to continue the engagement as scientific theories change, and their ability to make empirical predictions based on this engagement. Topics range from creation and cosmology, the “cosmic Christ”, and non-interventionist objective divine action in quantum mechanics and evolution. Russell has followed Murphy’s lead and used Lakatos to place theology and science into “creative mutual interaction” (CMI).     

Swedish Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (SAAQ): a psychometric evaluation

Psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance are equivalent (with somewhat different connotations) concepts and refer to an unwillingness to remain in contact with particular private events. This concept is most often measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) and is strongly related to psychopathology and behavioral effectiveness. In this study, the preliminary psychometric properties of the Swedish version of the AAQ-II (Swedish Acceptance and Action Questionnaire—SAAQ) are presented. The study is done in two steps. In the first step, the 10-item version of the AAQ-II is investigated through principal component analysis (n = 147). Secondly, due to problems with the component structure, the instrument is reduced to a six-item version and its validity and internal consistency are investigated (n = 154). The six-item version shows good concurrent and convergent validity as well as satisfying internal consistency (α = .85). Furthermore, the Swedish six-item version of the AAQ-II showed one strong component. Test–retest reliability was satisfactory (r = .80; n = 228). In future research, predictive and external validity would be important to investigate in order to further ensure that the SAAQ is a useful measure for clinical research. In conclusion, the SAAQ has satisfactory psychometric properties, but more data need to be gathered to further explore the possibilities for the instruments in Swedish contexts.     

The promise of qualitative inquiry for positive psychology: Diversifying methods

Abstract

This article offers a corrective for positive psychology, viewing qualitative methods as a paradigm of equal value to quantitative methods for psychologists interested in better understanding human strengths. Gergen, Josselson, and Freeman’s framework for qualitative psychology in general, along with other qualitative theory, will be utilized as a basis for application to positive psychology in particular. Qualitative inquiry’s potential for enriching positive psychology will be described, noting several qualitative research approaches. Then, the role of qualitative psychology in promoting the flourishing of positive psychology will be examined, discussing implications for theoretical advancements, building community, and enhancing psychology through interdisciplinarity. Finally, the possibility for qualitative methods in positive psychology to build relationships between academia and society will be explored; in particular, the nature of this collaboration, and the communication of positive psychology to the public will be noted. The conclusion notes how such potentials may be realized given current realities.     

集体行动参与双路径模型再分析：来自现实与网络行动情境的检验

为探明中国文化背景下,Simon等人(1998)提出的集体行动参与双路径模型的适用性,以及现实和网络情境下行动参与心理机制的异同,本研究以“中日撞船事件”为考察蓝本向天津市431名大学生被试进行调查研究,结果发现：国家认同和工具理性动机对集体行动倾向的影响独立且显著,但两路径在内部动机上有汇聚;现实和网络两种行动情境下的整合模型对行动倾向的解释率为37%和44%。结论：中国式集体行动表现为内部驱力作用下的集体主义理性特征。     

群际情绪理论及其研究

群际情绪理论认为, 群际情绪是当个体认同某一社会群体, 群体成为自我的一部分时, 个体对内群体和外群体的情绪体验。群际情绪借用社会认同方法, 采用集体自我的概念作为其理论的源点, 认知评价、情绪、行为倾向是群际理论的三件套; 群际水平的情绪不同于个体水平的情绪; 群际情绪取决于群体认同水平; 群际情绪弥散于整个群体; 群际情绪有助于激发和调节群内、群际态度和行为。新近的研究也为群际理论提供了一定的证据, 群际情绪理论为消解偏见和改善群际关系提供了一个崭新的框架。     

Tool use as a way to assess cognition: how do captive chimpanzees handle the weight of the hammer when cracking a nut?

Tool use in apes has been considered a landmark in cognition. However, while most studies concentrate on mental operations, there are very few studies of apes’ cognition as expressed in manual skills. This paper proposes theoretical and methodological considerations on movement analysis as a way of assessing primate cognition. We argue that a privileged way of appraising the characteristics of the cognitive abilities involved in tool use lies at the functional level. This implies that we focus on how the action proceeds, and more precisely, on how the functional characteristics of the task are generated. To support our view, we present the results of an experiment with five captive chimpanzees investigating the way how chimpanzees adapt to hammers of various weights while cracking nuts. The movement performed in the hammering task is analyzed in terms of energy production. Results show that chimpanzees mobilise passive as well as active forces to perform the compliant movement, that is, they modulate the dynamics of the arm/tool system. A comparison between chimpanzees suggests that experience contributes to this skill. The results suggest that in tool use, movements are not key per se, but only in as much as they express underlying cognitive processes. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

When Walking Makes Perception Better

ABSTRACT— When we move, the visual world moves toward us. That is, self-motion normally produces visual signals (flow) that tell us about our own motion. But these signals are distorted by our motion: Visual flow actually appears slower while we are moving than it does when we are stationary and our surroundings move past us. Although for many years these kinds of distortions have been interpreted as a suppression of flow to promote the perception of a stable world, current research has shown that these shifts in perceived visual speed may have an important function in measuring our own self-motion. Specifically, by slowing down the apparent rate of visual flow during self-motion, our visual system is able to perceive differences between actual and expected flow more precisely. This is useful in the control of action.     

Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention

Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential “postdictive” explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.