Modest sociality and the distinctiveness of intention

Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential “postdictive” explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.     

On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action

To investigate whether conscious judgments of movement onset are based solely on pre-movement signals (i.e., premotor or efference copy signals) or whether sensory feedback (i.e., reafferent) signals also play a role, participants judged the onset of finger and toe movements that were either active (i.e., self initiated) or passive (i.e., initiated by the experimenter). Conscious judgments were made by reporting the position of a rotating clock hand presented on a computer screen and were then compared to the actual measured time of movement onset. In line with previous studies, judgment errors were found to be anticipatory for both finger and toe movements. There was a significant difference between judgment errors for active and passive movements, with judgments of active movements being more anticipatory than judgments of passive movements. This is consistent with a pre-movement (from here on referred to as an “efferent”) account of action awareness because premotor and efference copy signals are only present in active movements, whereas the main source of movement information in passive movements is sensory feedback which is subject to time delays of conduction (and hence predicts later judgment times for passive movements). However, judgments of active toe movement onset time were less anticipatory than judgments of active finger movement onset time. This pattern of results is not consistent with a pure efferent account of conscious awareness of action onset - as this account predicts more anticipatory judgments for toe movements compared to finger movements. Instead, the data support the idea that conscious judgments of movement onset are based on efferent (i.e., premotor, efference copy) and reafferent (i.e., feedback from the movement) components.     

When Walking Makes Perception Better

ABSTRACT— When we move, the visual world moves toward us. That is, self-motion normally produces visual signals (flow) that tell us about our own motion. But these signals are distorted by our motion: Visual flow actually appears slower while we are moving than it does when we are stationary and our surroundings move past us. Although for many years these kinds of distortions have been interpreted as a suppression of flow to promote the perception of a stable world, current research has shown that these shifts in perceived visual speed may have an important function in measuring our own self-motion. Specifically, by slowing down the apparent rate of visual flow during self-motion, our visual system is able to perceive differences between actual and expected flow more precisely. This is useful in the control of action.     

Tool use as a way to assess cognition: how do captive chimpanzees handle the weight of the hammer when cracking a nut?

Tool use in apes has been considered a landmark in cognition. However, while most studies concentrate on mental operations, there are very few studies of apes’ cognition as expressed in manual skills. This paper proposes theoretical and methodological considerations on movement analysis as a way of assessing primate cognition. We argue that a privileged way of appraising the characteristics of the cognitive abilities involved in tool use lies at the functional level. This implies that we focus on how the action proceeds, and more precisely, on how the functional characteristics of the task are generated. To support our view, we present the results of an experiment with five captive chimpanzees investigating the way how chimpanzees adapt to hammers of various weights while cracking nuts. The movement performed in the hammering task is analyzed in terms of energy production. Results show that chimpanzees mobilise passive as well as active forces to perform the compliant movement, that is, they modulate the dynamics of the arm/tool system. A comparison between chimpanzees suggests that experience contributes to this skill. The results suggest that in tool use, movements are not key per se, but only in as much as they express underlying cognitive processes. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

群际情绪理论及其研究

群际情绪理论认为, 群际情绪是当个体认同某一社会群体, 群体成为自我的一部分时, 个体对内群体和外群体的情绪体验。群际情绪借用社会认同方法, 采用集体自我的概念作为其理论的源点, 认知评价、情绪、行为倾向是群际理论的三件套; 群际水平的情绪不同于个体水平的情绪; 群际情绪取决于群体认同水平; 群际情绪弥散于整个群体; 群际情绪有助于激发和调节群内、群际态度和行为。新近的研究也为群际理论提供了一定的证据, 群际情绪理论为消解偏见和改善群际关系提供了一个崭新的框架。     

汉语婴儿词汇学习的注意偏好

婴儿的动、名词词类学习存在跨文化差异,但是很少研究从注意偏好角度解释这类差异。本研究利用习惯化范式考察汉语婴儿在6-8个月和17-19个月时对事件中人物,动作和物体的区分。结果发现,6-8个月的婴儿仅能区分动作变化,对人物和物体无法区分,而17-19个月的婴儿对三类变化均可以区分。本研究提供了婴儿早期注意偏好发展的实验依据,同时为儿童早期单词获得提供了新的理论基础。     

THE FALSE PROMISE OF QUANTUM MECHANICS

The causal indeterminacy suggested by quantum mechanics has led to its being the centerpiece of several proposals for divine action that does not contradict natural laws. However, even if the theoretical concerns about the reality of causal indeterminacy are ignored, quantum‐level divine action fails to resolve the problem of ongoing, responsive divine activity. This is because most quantum‐level actions require a significant period of time in order to reach macroscopic levels whether via chaotic amplification or complete divine control of quantum events. Therefore, quantum‐level divine action either requires divine foreknowledge of purportedly free or random events or imposes such limitations on divine actions that they become late, potentially impotent, and confused. I argue that the theological problem of divine action remains; even at its most promising, quantum mechanics offers insufficient resolution. This failure suggests a reexamination of the assumptions that God is temporal and lacks foreknowledge of future contingencies.     

Determinants of Attitudes toward Affirmative Action in a Swiss Sample

162 Swiss employees were surveyed to assess knowledge of and attitudes toward different types of affirmative action programs (AAPs) for women. Findings show that knowledge of AAPs was limited and AAPs were most frequently associated with child care measures. Attitudes toward opportunity enhancement programs, especially toward child care, were more positive than toward preferential selection and positive discriminatory programs. Women held more positive attitudes toward AAPs. However, for some attitudes, gender differences were entirely mediated by symbolic prejudice toward working women. Independently of gender, symbolic prejudice was a key predictor of all attitudes. Measures of self-view (self-esteem and gender self-concept) were largely unrelated to attitudes toward AAPs. Implications for research and organizations are discussed.

从历史的角度论中医的科学性

先讨论了科学哲学对科学与伪科学的分界标准,从历史角度论述了中医对理性道路的选择,中医第一使命与中国古代科技文化背景对其发展道路的塑造,与近现代科技背景下对中医的伪科学诘难,认为中医虽非严格意义的科学,但不能对其贴上附加贬义的伪科学标签,中医是理性和具备科学精神的,应正确看待其探索角度与思路的价值.