Quiet Eye Duration,Expertise, and Task Complexity in Near and Far Aiming Tasks

Skilled (n = 12) and less skilled (n = 12) billiards players participated in 2 experiments in which the relationship between quiet eye duration, expertise, and task complexity was examined in a near and a far aiming task. Quiet eye was defined as the final fixation on the target prior to the initiation of movement. In Experiment 1, skilled performers exhibited longer fixations on the target (quiet eye) during the preparation phase of the action than their less skilled counterparts did. Quiet eye duration increased as a function of shot difficulty and was proportionally longer on successful than on unsuccessful shots for both groups of participants. In Experiment 2, participants executed shots under 3 different time-constrained conditions in which quiet eye periods were experimentally manipulated. Shorter quiet eye periods resulted in poorer performance, irrespective of participant skill level. The authors argue that quiet eye duration represents a critical period for movement programming in the aiming response.     

Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action?

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action.     

Object processing for action across childhood

Human adults process and select the opportunities for action in their environment rapidly, efficiently, and effortlessly. While several studies have revealed substantial improvements in object recognition skills, motor abilities, and control over the motor system during late childhood, surprisingly little is known about how object processing for action develops during this period. This study addresses this issue by investigating how the ability to ignore actions potentiated by a familiar utensil develops between ages 6 and 10 years. It is the first study to demonstrate that (1) the mechanisms that transform a graspable visual stimulus into an object‐appropriate motor response are in place by the sixth year of life and (2) graspable features of an object can facilitate and interfere with manual responses in an adult‐like manner by this age. The results suggest that there may be distinct developmental trajectories for the ability to ignore motor responses triggered by visual affordances and the stimulus response compatibility effects typically assessed with Simon tasks.     

The Study of Global Solutions: A Postmodern Systems Thinking View of Grounded Theory/Grounded Action

The grounded theory research method embodies a crucial element of postmodernist thinking due to its aversion to theory verification and its ability to imbue analysts with the power to discover theory. These processes closely mirror systems thinking because they allow for holistic examination. Postmodern systems thinking combines the worldview of postmodernism with systems thinking, creating a mechanism that is both respectful to the variations of human interaction and the need for “de-compartmentalizing” complex systems. The postmodern systems thinking framework united with grounded action research could be a potent approach for the dissemination of localized, culture-specific ideas in countries susceptible to Western hegemony.     

Principles of coparticipant inquiry: An introductory outline and implications for therapeutic action

Abstract

Historically, two paradigms have been dominant in clinical psychoanalysis: the classical paradigm, which views the impersonal analyst as objective mirror, and the interpersonal/relational model, which views the analyst as intersubjective participant-observer. An evolutionary shift in psychoanalytic consciousness has, however, been quietly taking place, giving rise to coparticipant inquiry, a third paradigm that integrates the individualistic emphasis of classical theory and the social focus of participant-observation, avoiding the reductionism of each. This new perspective, which is rooted in the radical teachings and clinical experiments of Sandor Ferenczi, represents a significant shift in analytic theory and has major clinical implications. This essay articulates the seven guiding principles of coparticipant inquiry and reviews its contribution to the psychoanalytic theory of therapeutic action. The curative process of reconstructive new experience in the analytic situation, referred to as the “living through” process, is seen to subtend curative change, for both patient and analyst. The inherent mutuality and bi-directionality of this beneficial “living through” process is examined in both its direct and its dialectic coparticipatory aspects.     

Naturalizing the space of reasons

Given the Sellarsian distinction between the space of causes and the space of reasons, the naturalist seeks to articulate how these two spaces are unproblematically related. In Mind and World () John McDowell suggests that such a naturalism can be achieved by pointing out that we work our way into the space of reasons by the process of upbringing he calls Bildung. ‘The resulting habits of thought and action’, writes McDowell, ‘are second nature’ (p. 84). In this paper I expose one implication of this remark, namely, that Bildung naturalism requires a conception of a type of action which is at once rational and habitual. Current orthodoxies in the philosophy of action prevent these two features from easily co‐existing. Whilst various reconciliations are possible, I argue that only one keeps Bildung naturalism intact. This, however, commits the naturalist to a conception of reasons more radically external than any to be found in current literature, according to which the agent need have no conception of what her reasons are at the time of acting. This is what I call acting in the dark of reasons. One upshot for McDowell is that this conception of reasons may be in tension with some of his other claims.     

社会服务实践对中学生公民行动意向的影响——社会服务观念的中介作用

本研究对6203名参与过不同形式的社会服务实践的中学生进行调查,考察了中学生参与社会服务实践的现状及其对公民行动意向的影响机制。结果发现:(1)我国中学社会服务实践的质量各维度差异较大,内外调控、深化与拓展、课程关联和自主性得分依次显著降低。(2)中学生参与的社会服务实践在城乡、学校类型、年级上存在显著差异,学校类型和年级的交互作用显著。城市、示范学校、低年级的学生参与的社会服务实践的质量较好,示范学校的优势主要体现在低年级阶段。(3)中学生的社会服务实践经历影响其公民行动意向,而社会服务观念在其中起到部分中介作用。高质量的社会服务实践经历有助于改进中学生的社会服务观念,进而增强其公民行动意向。     

Evolutionary Theologies and Divine Action1

Abstract

Two challenges loom large for efforts to develop a theology of evolution. The first is the problem of purpose: can evolutionary processes, in which chance plays so prominent a role, be understood as the context of God's purposive action? The second is the problem of the pervasiveness of suffering and death in evolution. To the extent that we succeed in responding to the first difficulty by giving an account of how God's purposes are enacted in the history of life, we deepen the conundrum about God's relation to natural evils. In particular, if we embrace evolution as God's clever way of making life make itself, we will find it difficult to sustain the classical theological claim that death is a disruptive interloper in God's good creation.     

Al-Ghazali's Use of the Terms “Necessity” and “Habit” in his Theory of Natural Causality

The present article aims at analyzing the terms “necessity” (Al-darura) and “habit” (al-āda) in al-Ghazali's (1058?–?1111) theory of natural causality (Al-Sbābiah al-Tabī'īa) by answering the following question: Why does Al-Ghazali use term “habit” and negation of “necessity” with regard to natural Causality? Al-Ghazali denies causal necessity that links cause and effect since this relationship does not draw on logical rules that make it necessary. This, however, does not mean that he denies the existence of a causal relationship between things, as he recognizes its existence. He, however, denies the necessity of that relationship, as he claims that the source of causal necessity stems from a psychological emotion rather than from being inherent in things themselves. Al-Ghazali also attempts to base causal necessity on “habit” by claiming that the similarity of event A as cause and event B as effect stems from observation, repetition and the sequencing of natural phenomena. Al-Ghazali, then, endeavors to prove that science is based on expectation and assumption that draws on observation, the senses, and repetition and does not consider it as constant and absolute.