Cortisol,stress, and attentional bias toward threat

Abstract

Attentional bias toward threatening stimuli is a central characteristic of anxiety and acute stress. Recent small-scale studies have provided divergent perspectives on the association between the stress hormone cortisol and attentional bias toward threat cues. In a larger sample size than previous studies, we examined this association by investigating the impact of cortisol on attentional bias in two studies using a psychological stressor (N=35) and a physical stressor (N=65), respectively. Attentional bias and salivary cortisol were measured prior to and following the administration of a stressful task designed to increase cortisol levels. Results across these studies were equivocal relative to the association between baseline cortisol and baseline attentional bias. In addition, the association between acute change in cortisol and change in attentional bias appeared to differ as a function of the presence or absence of psychological stress. There was a trend toward a stronger negative association between acute cortisol change and attentional bias change among women relative to men. These results imply that the association between cortisol and attentional bias may be moderated by additional factors, such as gender or presence of stress.     

Childhood Emotional Abuse and Psychological Distress in Gay and Bisexual Men

Despite the high prevalence of childhood emotional abuse (CEA) and adult psychological distress (depression and anxiety) among gay and bisexual men (GBM), there is little research examining the relationships among these variables. This study examined internalized homophobia (IH) as a mediator between CEA and psychological distress in a sample of 286 GBM. Controlling for demographics and childhood sexual and physical abuse, CEA was associated with self-report and clinician-administered measures of psychological distress. Concern about stigma of being gay mediated the relationship between CEA and psychological distress. Internalized antigay attitudes might be important in the relationship between CEA and adult psychological distress. Clinicians might address negative beliefs about the self as a GBM that could be exacerbated due to CEA.     

Internalized Homophobia and Intimate Partner Violence in Young Adult Women’s Same-Sex Relationships

This study examined the relationship between intimate partner violence (IPV), internalized homophobia, and psychological maladjustment in a convenience sample of young adult women. Rates of psychological and physical abuse in women’s same-sex relationships were shown to be commensurate to previously reported rates of violence in the IPV literature; rates of sexual coercion were also ascertained. A relationship was found between Moral and Religious Attitudes Toward Lesbianism (MRATL), a dimension of internalized homophobia, and the perpetration of sexual coercion. As expected, internalized homophobia was connected to psychological maladjustment. In addition, both the perpetration of psychological aggression and physical violence were associated with emotional instability. The study findings are discussed within the current body of literature on IPV.     

Ethics in Publication

Summary

This article highlights ethical issues in publication. It addresses the provenance of ideas, problems with joint authorship, plagiarism, and the practice of duplicate submission of material for publication. Confidentiality and privacy matters, and the protection of human subjects in publication of research and clinical case studies are also discussed. The article further examines biases in literature reviews, and in the biased selection of one's best results for publication, intentional misinterpretation of data and the slanting of discussion, summary, and conclusions. Finally, the article deals with ethical problems that can arise in the publication of sponsored research, and the ethical responsibilities of editors and readers.     

Removing the own-race bias in face recognition by attentional shift using fixation crosses to diagnostic features: An eye-tracking study

Hills and Lewis (2011) have demonstrated that the own-race bias in face recognition can be reduced or even removed by guiding participants' attention and potentially eye movements to the most diagnostic visual features. Using the same old/new recognition paradigm as Hills and Lewis, we recorded Black and White participants' eye movements whilst viewing Black and White faces following fixation crosses that preceded the bridge of the nose (between the eyes) or the tip of the nose. White faces were more accurately recognized when following high fixation crosses (that preceded the bridge of the nose) than when following low fixation crosses. The converse was true for Black faces. These effects were independent of participant race. The fixation crosses attracted the first fixation but had less effect on other eye-tracking measures. Furthermore, the location of the first fixation was predictive of recognition accuracy. These results are consistent with an attentional allocation model of the own-race bias in face recognition and highlight the importance of the first fixation for face perception (cf. Hsiao & Cottrell, 2008).     

Eccentricity biases of object categories are evident in visual working memory

In high-order object areas, face-selective areas prefer centrally presented stimuli, whereas building-selective areas prefer peripherally presented stimuli (Levy et al., 2001). We investigated whether this eccentricity bias was also evident in visual working memory. In Experiment 1, we found that working memory performance for faces decreased towards the periphery while the performance for buildings remained unchanged across different eccentricities. To rule out the possibility that lower level features influence these results, we manipulated the spatial frequency of faces and buildings (Experiment 2) and the spatial layout information of the buildings (Experiment 3). In both of the experiments, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, even when these lower level features of stimuli were controlled. Consistent with previous findings, the current results suggest that each object category is processed in a different manner depending on the eccentricity. This eccentricity bias is likely the result of how the high-order object areas represent different object categories.     

The other-species effect in human perceptions of sexual dimorphism using human and macaque faces

Humans are better able to discriminate among human faces than faces of other species. This difference in perceptual discrimination is known as the “other-species effect”. Models of perception have posited that the ultimate functional significance of the other-species effect is a higher discrimination capability within an organism's most familiar and salient stimulus set while attenuating the ability to discriminate amongst unfamiliar stimuli. Here, human participants made masculinity judgements of human and macaque faces manipulated based on either human or macaque sexual dimorphism. Humans were more accurate at identifying masculine/feminine faces in species-congruent than species-incongruent transforms in both human and macaque faces. We observed an other-species effect whereby accuracy (correctly judging masculinized faces as more masculine) was highest for own-species faces. We also found that both men and women were better at judging the sex-typicality of male faces than female faces, regardless of the species of the face or the species of the manipulation. Our findings demonstrate an other-species effect for the perception of sex-typicality among human raters.     

Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult

Three studies examine the influence of varying the difficulty of reasoning on the extent of belief bias, while minimising the possibility that the manipulation would influence the way participants approach the task. Specifically, reasoning difficulty was manipulated by making variations in problem content, while maintaining all other aspects of the problems constant. In Study 1, 191 participants were presented with consistent and conflict problems varying in two levels of difficulty. The results showed a significant influence of problem difficulty on the extent of the belief bias, such that the effect of belief was more pronounced for difficult problems. This effect was stronger in Study 2 (73 participants) where the difference in the difficulty of the problems was purposely accentuated. The results of both studies stress the importance of controlling for problem difficulty when studying belief bias. Study 3 examined one consequence of this, i.e., the classic belief vs. logic interaction could be eliminated by manipulating problem difficulty. Theoretical implications for dual-process accounts of belief bias are also discussed.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.