责任归因对“做效应”的调控及其ERP证据

“做效应(action effect)”是指决策中由“做(action)”与“不做(inaction)”行为引起的相同决策后果, 却诱发了不同强度的情绪体验。本研究使用ANSIE量表筛选了责任归因不同倾向的两类被试(极端内控者、极端外控者), 运用ERP技术, 在一项简单赌博实验任务中考察了这两类被试的“做效应”差异及其电生理证据, 旨在探讨责任归因对“做效应”的调控作用。行为结果表明, 无论结果输赢, 极端内控被试的“做”与“不做”行为结果诱发的情绪强度和责任感强度都没有差异, 而极端外控被试的“做”行为诱发的情绪强度和责任感强度都比“不做”行为诱发的明显大; 脑电结果表明, 在FRN和P300上, 极端内控被试的“做”与“不做”行为诱发的FRN和P300波幅之间都没有差异, 而极端外控被试的“做”行为诱发的这两种脑电成分波幅都比“不做”诱发的较大。简言之, “做效应”在极端内控被试身上表现不明显, 而在极端外控被试身上表现明显。“做效应”很可能是由于个体对不同行为导致的相同决策后果的责任归因不同引起的。     

Talking About a Universalist World

The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form.     

Break philosophy through internally

This paper contrasts and illustrates two types of breakthroughs in philosophy; i.e., external and internal ones. Both are made possible through its application to a newfield. In the external breakthrough, a new field is discovered by such factors without philosophy as encounters with different traditions of thought and advance in technology. In the internal one, a new field is brought into attention by critical examination of one or another assumption within philosophy that has once dismissed the field as too trivial or insignificant to be its proper subject. Based on this distinction, a research guideline for philosophy is proposed that one must always seek the possibility of its internal breakthrough. It is also suggested that the philosophy of science and epistemology can be innovated internally when they are applied to a new field, that is, statistics. Finally the distinction between pure and applied philosophy is reinterpreted in the light of the internal breakthrough.     

Not Everything is Possible

This paper makes a point about the interpretation of the simplestquantified modal logic, that is, quantified modal logic witha single domain. It is commonly assumed that the domain in questionis to be understood as the set of all possibile objects. Thepoint of the paper is that this assumption is misguided.     

Coefficients Alpha,Beta, Omega,and the glb: Comments on Sijtsma

There are three fundamental problems in Sijtsma (Psychometrika, 2008): (1) contrary to the name, the glb is not the greatest lower bound of reliability but rather is systematically less than ω _t (McDonald, Test theory: A unified treatment, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1999), (2) we agree with Sijtsma that when considering how well a test measures one concept, α is not appropriate, but recommend ω _t rather than the glb, and (3) the end user needs procedures that are readily available in open source software.     

On the Use,the Misuse,and the Very Limited Usefulness of Cronbach’s Alpha

This discussion paper argues that both the use of Cronbach’s alpha as a reliability estimate and as a measure of internal consistency suffer from major problems. First, alpha always has a value, which cannot be equal to the test score’s reliability given the interitem covariance matrix and the usual assumptions about measurement error. Second, in practice, alpha is used more often as a measure of the test’s internal consistency than as an estimate of reliability. However, it can be shown easily that alpha is unrelated to the internal structure of the test. It is further discussed that statistics based on a single test administration do not convey much information about the accuracy of individuals’ test performance. The paper ends with a list of conclusions about the usefulness of alpha.     

Preference for impossible figures in 4-month-olds

Can infants use interposition and line junction cues to infer three-dimensional (3D) structure? Previous work has shown that in a task that required 4-month-olds to discriminate between static two-dimensional (2D) pictures of possible and impossible cubes, infants exhibited a spontaneous preference for displays of the impossible cube but left open the question of whether they did so on the basis of purely local “critical regions” or whether they were able to employ more global clues. Here infants were presented with possible and impossible cubes in which the strictly local cues that could have derived from exterior binding contours were deleted. Results showed that infants were still able to discriminate possible cubes from impossible cubes, suggesting that longer looking infants are sensitive to global properties and that the capacity to integrate pictorial information to perceive aspects of global 3D shape may develop earlier than demonstrated previously using reaching tasks.     

Consequences of schematism

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?).     

现实治疗法的新进展——选择理论述评

选择理论是威廉·格拉瑟（William Glasser）应用现实治疗法的过程中发展的新理论,取代“控制理论”成为现实治疗法所有工作的基础和核心理论。其主要观点是：人一生所做的都是综合行为,人唯一能够选择的是自己的行为。选择理论修正了基本需要、优质世界、综合行为等概念和内涵,强调内部控制,强调人的选择,否认心理疾病,重视关系的作用。文章介绍了选择理论产生的历程,阐述了它的主要内容以及在咨询中的应用,最后结合中国文化及咨询经验对其进行评价