Validity and Necessity

In this paper I argue against the commonly received view that Kripke’s formal Possible World Semantics (PWS) reflects the adoption of a metaphysical interpretation of the modal operators. I consider in detail Kripke’s three main innovations vis-à-vis Carnap’s PWS: a new view of the worlds, variable domains of quantification, and the adoption of a notion of universal validity. I argue that all these changes are driven by the natural technical development of the model theory and its related notion of validity: they are dictated by merely formal considerations, not interpretive concerns. I conclude that Kripke’s model theoretic semantics does not induce a metaphysical reading of necessity, and is formally adequate independently of the specific interpretation of the modal operators.     

Conditional Excluded Middle in Systems of Consequential Implication

It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius' Thesis (WBT, opposite conditionals are not both true). In the system CI.0 of consequential implication, which is intertranslatable with the modal logic KT, WBT is a theorem, so it is natural to ask which instances of CEM are derivable. We also investigate the systems CIw and CI of consequential implication, corresponding to the modal logics K and KD respectively, with occasional remarks about stronger systems. While unrestricted CEM produces modal collapse in all these systems, CEM restricted to contingent formulas yields the Alt2 axiom (semantically, each world can see at most two worlds), which corresponds to the symmetry of consequential implication. It is proved that in all the main systems considered, a given instance of CEM is derivable if and only if the result of replacing consequential implication by the material biconditional in one or other of its disjuncts is provable. Several related results are also proved. The methods of the paper are those of propositional modal logic as applied to a special sort of conditional.     

Some Useful 16-Valued Logics: How a Computer Network Should Think

In Belnaps useful 4-valued logic, the set 2={T,F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4=(2)={,{T},{F},{T,F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16=(4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR₂ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN₃ with an information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEEN₃ coincide with the logic of FOUR₂, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arielis and Avrons notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research.Dedicated to Nuel D. Belnap on the occasion of his 75th Birthday     

On the Referential Indeterminacy of Logical and Mathematical Concepts

Hartry Field has recently examined the question whether our logical and mathematical concepts are referentially indeterminate. In his view, (1) certain logical notions, such as second-order quantification, are indeterminate, but (2) important mathematical notions, such as the notion of finiteness, are not (they are determinate). In this paper, I assess Fields analysis, and argue that claims (1) and (2) turn out to be inconsistent. After all, given that the notion of finiteness can only be adequately characterized in pure second-order logic, if Field is right in claiming that second-order quantification is indeterminate (see (1)), it follows that finiteness is also indeterminate (contrary to (2)). After arguing that Field is committed to these claims, I provide a diagnosis of why this inconsistency emerged, and I suggest an alternative, consistent picture of the relationship between logical and mathematical indeterminacy.     

Some Results on Modal Axiomatization and Definability for Topological Spaces

We consider two topological interpretations of the modal diamond—as the closure operator (C-semantics) and as the derived set operator (d-semantics). We call the logics arising from these interpretations C-logics and d-logics, respectively. We axiomatize a number of subclasses of the class of nodec spaces with respect to both semantics, and characterize exactly which of these classes are modally definable. It is demonstrated that the d-semantics is more expressive than the C-semantics. In particular, we show that the d-logics of the six classes of spaces considered in the paper are pairwise distinct, while the C-logics of some of them coincide. Mathematics Subject Classifications (2000): 03B45, 54G99. Presented by Michael Zakharyaschev     

-autonomous Lattices

-autonomous lattices are the algebraic exponentials and without additive constants. In this paper, we investigate the structure theory of this variety and some of its subvarieties, as well as its relationships with other classes of algebras.     

A Proof System for Classical Logic

An operation on inferential rules, called H-operation, is used to minimize the axiom basis for classical logic.     

All Finitely Axiomatizable Tense Logics of Linear Time Flows Are CoNP-complete

We prove that all finitely axiomatizable tense logics with temporal operators for ‘always in the future’ and ‘always in the past’ and determined by linear fows time are coNP-complete. It follows, for example, that all tense logics containing a density axiom of the form ■ⁿ⁺¹_F p → ⁿ_F p, for some n ≥ 0, are coNP-complete. Additionally, we prove coNP-completeness of all ∩-irreducible tense logics. As these classes of tense logics contain many Kripke incomplete bimodal logics, we obtain many natural examples of Kripke incomplete normal bimodal logics which are nevertheless coNP-complete.     

Two notions of compactness in Gödel logics

Compactness is an important property of classical propositional logic. It can be defined in two equivalent ways. The first one states that simultaneous satisfiability of an infinite set of formulae is equivalent to the satisfiability of all its finite subsets. The second one states that if a set of formulae entails a formula, then there is a finite subset entailing this formula as well.In propositional many-valued logic, we have different degrees of satisfiability and different possible definitions of entailment, hence the questions of compactness is more complex. In this paper we will deal with compactness of Gödel, Gödel_Δ, and Gödel_～ logics.There are several results (all for the countable set of propositional variables) concerning the compactness (based on satisfiability) of these logic by Cintula and Navara, and the question of compactness (based on entailment) for Gödel logic was fully answered by Baaz and Zach (see papers [3] and [2]).In this paper we give a nearly complete answer to the problem of compactness based on both concepts for all three logics and for an arbitrary cardinality of the set of propositional variables. Finally, we show a tight correspondence between these two concepts