Empirical and modeling study of emotional state dynamics in social videogame paradigms

The objective of this work was to study the dynamics of human emotional states in the process of social interaction in a virtual environment. The previously developed for this purpose prototypes of the virtual actor (NPC) and its virtual environment simulator “Teleport” underwent significant re-design and modification. The experimental platform was re-implemented and used in experiments with college student participants, combining electromyography, emotion recognition in facial recordings and model-based game log analysis in a social videogame paradigm. Participants interacted with two virtual actors implemented based on the eBICA cognitive architecture (Samsonovich, 2013, 2018). Positive correlations were found between eBICA model predictions and participant affects extracted from their facial expressions and facial muscle activity. Affective dynamics of social phenomena, such as the establishment of partnership or an act of betrayal, were characterized and found consistent with the model predictions. Other findings include a gradually developing emotional reaction, possibly due to the integration of appraisals of game events. Overall, obtained results confirm the eBICA model, suggesting its further extension and refinement.     

Effects of ethanol withdrawal on muricidal behavior

When naive rats of our colony were individually housed for 1 month with free access to laboratory chow and water as drinking fluid, 6% exhibited muricidal behavior. When naive rats of the same colony were similarly housed but received ethanol 20% in water as the sole source of drinking fluid (ll.5 g ethanol/kg/day), the percentage of killer rats was the same. However, when the rats were housed in similar conditions and submitted to a 1-day ethanol withdrawal, the percentage of muricidal rats increased to 25%. Ethanol intake in the same conditions as described above did not change muricidal behavior of spontaneous killers and did not induce killing behavior in nonkiller animals. GABA-mimetic agents administered IP blocked ethanol withdrawal-induced killing behavior as well as spontaneous muricidal activity.     

A real‐world rational agent: unifying old and new AI

Explanations of cognitive processes provided by traditional artificial intelligence were based on the notion of the knowledge level. This perspective has been challenged by new AI that proposes an approach based on embodied systems that interact with the real‐world. We demonstrate that these two views can be unified. Our argument is based on the assumption that knowledge level explanations can be defined in the context of Bayesian theory while the goals of new AI are captured by using a well established robot based model of learning and problem solving, called Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC). In our analysis we consider random foraging and we prove that minor modifications of the DAC architecture renders a model that is equivalent to a Bayesian analysis of this task. Subsequently, we compare this enhanced, “rational,” model to its “non‐rational” predecessor and a further control condition using both simulated and real robots, in a variety of environments. Our results show that the changes made to the DAC architecture, in order to unify the perspectives of old and new AI, also lead to a significant improvement in random foraging.     

A working memory model improves cognitive control in agents and robots

Cognition entails those mental processes enabling understanding the current situation through senses, experience, and thought, and supporting the acquisition of new knowledge. A fundamental contribution in cognition is offered by the working memory, that is a small, short-term memory containing and protecting from interference goal-relevant pieces of information. Grounding our work on biological and neuroscientific studies, we modeled and implemented working memory processes in a software model, IDRA-WM, that can simultaneously act as short-term memory and actions generator, thanks to the use of a reinforcement-driven mechanism for chunk selection. Moreover our system integrates the functions of the working memory with a basic action planner. We tested the model with robot relevant tasks to assess whether the proposed solution can learn to solve a problem on the basis of a delayed reward. The experimental results indicate that IDRA-WM is able to solve even those tasks that do not provide immediate reward after an action.     

特质推理的神经机制:来自脑成像的证据

特质推理一直是社会认知研究的重要主题,它包括有意图的特质推理和自发特质推理。随着社会认知神经科学蓬勃发展,研究者开始探讨二者的神经机制。fMRI研究表明,特质推理期间主要大脑活动定位于mPFC和TPJ这两个广泛脑区,有意图和自发特质推理分别更多地激活mPFC与TPJ。ERP研究发现,P300是特质推理期间与不一致信息探测和解决过程相关的EEG成分,有意图和自发特质推理在时间进程上大多同步,却激活了不同脑区。总之,当前已积累了较多可信的脑成像证据,从社会认知神经科学的视角探讨特质推理的神经机制是未来较有前途的一个方向。     

蓄意创伤受害者的创伤后应激障碍症状及影响因素分析

目的:研究蓄意创伤受害者的PTSD症状及影响因素。方法:采用事件冲击问卷、创伤经历揭露问卷、受害人认可问卷和攻击描述问卷等测查工具对163名蓄意创伤受害者进行调查。结果:(1)蓄意创伤受害者的PTSD三大症状之间相关显著,且方差分析结果差异显著,闯入性症状>回避症状>高警觉症状;(2)创伤严重程度与PTSD三大症状的相关显著;(3)创伤揭露中情绪反应对PTSD三大症状都有显著的预测作用;(4)社会认可度中的一般性排斥对PTSD三大症状都有显著的预测作用。结论:蓄意创伤受害者有着较强的PTSD症状,且以闯入性症状最为严重,回避和高警觉症状次之;创伤的严重程度、揭露时的情绪反应和社会认可度中的一般性排斥等都对蓄意创伤受害者的PTSD症状有影响作用。     

The Effectiveness of Argumentative Strategies

In this article, I further analyze the notion of the effectiveness of argumentative strategies, introduced in Jovičić, 2001. The most relevant achievements of the theories of reasonable discussion and the theories of persuasion are called to mind with the aim of explaining the mechanism of the argumentative effectiveness. As a result, a procedure for evaluating the effectiveness of argumentative strategies is suggested.     

Actions and accidents

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential that it represents its effect.     

Thinking,Acting, Considering

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show (1) that such examples are not easily resisted; (2) that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and (3) that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through?     

Do We Decide Intentionally?

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.