依恋类型对主动遗忘的影响

成人依恋可以在依恋回避和依恋焦虑两个维度进行分析。不安全依恋的个体在依恋关系中持续感受到一种不安全感,因此个体往往采用心理防御策略来摆脱这种不安全感。对于许多不愉快的事件,个体常常也会采用类似的防御策略进行抑制,以减少自身的消极体验。主动遗忘是指个体有意识地避免回想某一目标对象而导致的遗忘现象,其可能与高回避个体的停用策略十分相似。为探讨对于依恋相关的记忆内容,高回避个体是否能够成功进行主动遗忘以规避负面情绪,或是防御失败引起依恋系统激活,反而更多回忆起相关记忆内容,本实验采用Think/No-Think(TNT)范式进行研究,以依恋相关故事作为对被试的依恋启动操作,设计了2(启动:依恋启动vs.依恋未启动)×3(主动遗忘:Think vs.No-Think vs.Baseline)×2(依恋维度得分:高vs低)混合设计研究不同依恋类型主动遗忘能力的影响。实验结果显示,TNT操作与回避类型与启动操作的交互作用显著,高依恋回避个体在受到依恋相关启动时表现出优秀的主动遗忘能力,而在未受到启动时则不能有效地遗忘依恋相关负性词对; 而低依恋回避个体则表现相反,在受到启动材料威胁时无法成功主动遗忘,而在未受启动条件下可以成功遗忘要求内容。对于不同焦虑类型的被试来说,其主动遗忘能力与启动操作无关,高焦虑类型被试表现出更强的主动遗忘能力,并从依恋内部工作模型角度进行了分析。     

The effect of the dominance of an in-vehicle agent’s voice on driver situation awareness,emotion regulation,and trust: A simulated lab study of manual and automated driving

As in-vehicle voice agents increase in popularity, related research is extending to how voice messages can affect the driver’s cognitive and emotional states. Accordingly, we investigated how in-vehicle agent (IVA) voice dominance and driving automation can affect the driver’s situation awareness (SA), emotion regulation (ER), and trust. To this end, a lab-based experiment was conducted with a medium-fidelity driving simulator using actor-recorded voice agents. Twenty-two female and nineteen male driver-licensed participants were recruited to drive simulated vehicles with voice agents and evaluated. The results demonstrated that compared with the dominant voice, the agent with a submissive voice significantly increased ER in both manual and automated driving. Furthermore, the submissive voice significantly increased trust in automated driving compared with the dominant agent. Cross and synergistic interaction effects exist between voice dominance and driving automation in SA and ER, respectively. This study revealed that both the content of the messages of the IVAs and their voice characteristics are essential for modulating the driver’s SA, ER, and trust in driving. It is expected that larger-scale future studies with simulation or on a real road would increase the validity of this study.     

Side-effect actions,acting for a reason,and acting intentionally

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open.     

Intentional action first

The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make once it is no longer taken to be a target for reductive analysis, in explaining other, non-intentional kinds of action and voluntariness.     

Intentional and Non-Intentional Assessments of Emotion Experiences: Comparisons of Old and New Measures

In two studies, we compared intentional and non-intentional measures of emotional well-being in terms of reliability and validity. In the first study, we expanded on the findings of ?im?ek (2011 ?im?ek, Ö. F. (2011). An Intentional Model of Emotional Well-Being: The Development and Initial Validation of a Measure of Subjective Well-Being. Journal of Happiness Studies, 12, 421–442. [Google Scholar]) by showing that an intentional measure of emotional well-being, namely the Emotional Well-Being Scale, accounted for unique variance in both negative and positive mental health indicators above and beyond the variance accounted for by Larsen and Diener's Scales (1992), which measures all dimensions of affect circumplex. The correlated traits-correlated uniqueness model results showed that the original-intentional version of the Emotional Well-Being Scale explained more variance in the measurement model than the non-intentional version. The second study showed that the results were similar for the intentional vs. non-intentional versions of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (Watson, Clark &; Tellegen, 1988 Watson, D., Clark, L. A., &; Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063–1070. [Google Scholar]). The intentional version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedules accounted for more variance in the criteria than the non-intentional version.     

Incidental and intentional visual memory: What memories are and are not affected by encoding tasks?

Prior research into the impact of encoding tasks on visual memory (Castelhano & Henderson, 2005) indicated that incidental and intentional encoding tasks led to similar memory performance. The current study investigated whether different encoding tasks impacted visual memories equally for all types of objects in a conjunction search (e.g., targets, colour distractors, object category distractors, or distractors unrelated to the target). In sequences of pictures, participants searched for prespecified targets (e.g., green apple; Experiment 1), memorized all objects (Experiment 2), searched for specified targets while memorizing all objects (Experiment 3), searched for postidentified targets (Experiment 4), or memorized all objects with one object prespecified (Experiment 5). Encoding task significantly improved visual memory for targets and led to worse memory for unrelated distractors, but did not influence visual memory of distractors that were related to the target's colour or object category. The differential influence of encoding task indicates that the relative importance of the object both positively and negatively influences the memory retained.     

Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [(2003). “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [(2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630–641; (2014). “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.” Mind & Language 29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In this paper, I put Hindriks’ account to test through two new studies, the results of which suggest that Hindriks’ account should be rejected. However, I argue that the key conceptual insight behind Hindriks’ account can still be saved and integrated in future accounts of Knobe’s results.     

内生意图性抑制:自我控制研究的新视角

行为抑制的"停止信号"多来自内生意图行为"是否做"决策过程最后时刻内生性否定指示(即内生意图性抑制),而非环境提前设定。因无法用行为指标(错误率、反应时)评估,需将"自由选择"范式结合f MRI、EEG等技术测量与之相关的脑神经、自主神经生理特点;此外,范式中加入的刺激阈下启动、情绪信息影响了内生意图性抑制的加工过程。未来从三个方面拓展研究:(1)明确背内侧额叶皮质的心理机制;(2)探索人格特质的影响;(3)"停止信号"内生日常化。     

施动感研究的意向捆绑范式述评

施动感是自我意识的一个重要部分。意向捆绑即人的动作及动作的感觉结果两者的时间点主观上被感知为相互靠近的现象,为研究人类的施动感提供了一个重要的测量手段。本文综述意向捆绑的实验范式和认知机制,发现目前线索整合理论能最好的解释意向捆绑现象。意向捆绑的范式可以用于临床疾病和跨文化的研究。今后还应深入研究意向捆绑机制及意向捆绑与施动感的关系。     

大学生职业价值观：手段与目的

大学生职业价值观研究随着大学生就业问题的加剧变得日趋重要。通过25例深度访谈、60例开放式问卷调查和813例各类大学生调查,建立了大学生职业价值观的四因子的目的性职业价值观和六因子手段性职业价值观模型。并据此编制了大学生目的性职业价值观和手段性职业价值观量表。验证性因素分析结果验证了模型假设高度拟合,同时也证明了目的性价值观对手段性职业价值观所具有的影响。