Adaptive memory: longevity and learning intentionality of the animacy effect

The animacy effect—the finding that animates are better remembered than inanimates—is proving to be a robust empirical phenomenon. Considering the adaptiveness of the animate advantage, one might expect it to remain after long retention intervals and also to be present irrespectively of an intention to learn. The present study explores these two aspects. Different groups of participants learned (intentional learning) or rated the pleasantness (incidental learning) of animate and inanimate words; memory was tested immediately or after a 48?h delay. A significant animacy effect was obtained after both retention intervals and in both learning conditions. Two significant interactions revealed a larger animacy effect, as well as a larger effect of the retention interval, when learning was incidental. Our findings reinforce the robustness of the animacy effect and provide some insight into possible proximate mechanisms of the effect.     

THE DIVINE CONJECTURES: A CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF HUMAN ORIGINS AND DESTINY

Six “divine conjectures” frame the place of Theóne (The One to Whom we pray) in the creation of our universe and for its continuing development in five subsequent stages into a loving universe. The first stage, the cosmological universe, establishes the laws of nature, understood by scientists as the “standard model”. The second stage introduces life and death into the universe by a process we are only now beginning to understand. Stage 3 requires certain life forms to become conscious with a subset of those life‐forms acquiring language that results in that subset becoming self‐conscious. The next stage, Conjecture 4, identifies certain persons who become addicted to learning in their unrelenting effort to learn as much of what can be known as possible. The fifth conjecture requires individual persons to act as agents of Theóne in achieving Conjecture 6—a universe that is both loving and lawful. During the course of the exposition subsidiary discussions of the concepts of conjecture and hypothesis explicate the function of each in the advancement of knowledge and understanding. There are brief discussions of prayer and purpose in relation to the Divine.     

Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.     

临床指征优先谨慎使用抗菌药物

抗菌药物是临床广泛应用的一类药物。根据卫生部全国医院感染监测网监测结果,我国临床抗菌药物使用率较高。抗菌药物压力是细菌产生耐药性最重要的原因。对于临床谨慎使用抗菌药物来说,知晓和掌握使用指征是非常重要的,在任何情况任何时候,指征是优先考虑的。抗茵药物使用指征包括治疗性用药指征和预防性用药指征,尤其是预防用药方面。本文讨论抗菌药物应用指征,包括感染诊断与治疗性用药的关系、手术前预防性使用抗菌药物预防手术部位、内科患者预防性使用抗菌药物指征与药物选择等。     

Formal modeling and analysis of cognitive agent behavior

From an external perspective, cognitive agent behavior can be described by specifying (temporal) correlations of a certain complexity between stimuli (input states) and (re)actions (output states) of the agent. From an internal perspective the agent's dynamics can be characterized by direct (causal) temporal relations between internal and mental states of the agent. The latter type of specifications can be represented in a relatively simple, executable format, which enables different types of analysis of the agent's behavior. In particular, simulations of the agent's behavior under different (environmental) circumstances can be explored. Furthermore, by applying verification techniques, automated analysis of the consequences of the agent's behavior can be carried out. To enable such types of analysis when only given an external behavioral specification, this has to be transformed first into some type of executable format. An automated procedure for such a transformation is proposed in this paper. The application of the transformation procedure is demonstrated for a number of cases, showing examples of the types of analysis as mentioned for different forms of behavior.     

材料性质对有意遗忘影响的实验研究

以大学生为被试 ,采用字表方式 ,探讨了词语和图片两种材料下的有意遗忘。结果发现 :①被试在词语和图片两种材料下的有意遗忘没有显著差异 ;②对于词语材料 ,被试既对指示记忆的项目进行了更加精细的编码 ,又对指示遗忘的项目产生了抑制 ;③对于图片材料 ,被试只对指示遗忘的项目产生了提取抑制 ,而没有对指示记忆的项目进行有意复述。     

PERSONS AND THE EXTENDED-MIND THESIS

The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist.     

Experimentation on humans and nonhumans

In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.     

Ethical considerations in the testing of biopharmaceuticals for adventitious agents

Safety testing of biological pharmaceuticals is often carried out by contract testing laboratories which perform these tests on behalf of the drug’s developer. These laboratories are confronted with a number of ethical issues related to selling their services, maintaining confidentiality, and the handling of results. This paper outlines these issues, and, by way of illustration, discusses how one such laboratory addresses them.     

Phenomenal intentionality: reductionism vs. primitivism

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between phenomenal properties and intentional properties. In recent years a number of philosophers have argued that intentional properties are sometimes necessitated by phenomenal properties, but have not explained why or how. Exceptions can be found in the work of Katalin Farkas and Farid Masrour, who develop versions of reductionism regarding phenomenally-necessitated intentionality (or ‘phenomenal intentionality’). I raise two objections to reductive theories of the sort they develop. Then I propose a version of primitivism regarding phenomenal intentionality. I argue that primitivism avoids the pitfalls of reductionism while promising broad explanatory payoffs.