Fairweather and ESID: Contemporary Impact and a Legacy for the Twenty-First Century

This paper illustrates how the articles in this special issue demonstrate the central values, research, and action principles inherent in Fairweather's ESID model. The programs described in these articles address earlier social problems in new forms (e.g., previously, institutionalized mentally ill patients and now, the homeless mentally ill) and new issues (e.g., HIV prevention). Dissemination of innovative programs is abundant, but only recently has research begun in earnest to study the critical processes of dissemination. Moreover, Fairweather has pointed us in important, but yet unrealized directions for how to pursue a theory of social change on the basis of ecological concepts, innovative research methods and data analytic techniques, and salient change agent behaviors and principles.     

Modality-general benefit of eye-closure on the retrieval of intentionally learned information

The beneficial effect of eye-closure during retrieval was demonstrated in many studies addressing eyewitness memory or memory of episodic events. Fewer studies examined the effect concerning the intentional learning of verbal information. Furthermore, the question of whether the eye-closure effect is modality-specific, boosting visual memory only, or modality-general, boosting also other forms of memory (e.g., auditory memory), is still open. These issues were addressed in the present study. Participants (N = 129) were asked to study aurally and visually presented lists of unrelated nouns (within-subjects). During free recall, participants either kept their eyes open or closed their eyes (between-subjects). Eye-closure resulted in better free recall than keeping the eyes open. Importantly, this effect emerged for both visually and aurally presented word lists, suggesting that the effect of closing the eyes is rather modality-general. The results are discussed with respect to limitations of previous studies and practical implications.     

小学学习成绩优生与差生有意遗忘中抑制能力的发展研究

有意遗忘是一种探讨个体抑制能力发展的新的记忆研究的实验范式。本研究以单字为实验材料,被试为小学二、四、六年级共90名学生,每个年级的学生按学习成绩好和差分别选取15人。实验结果为:1、小学生有意遗忘中的认知抑制能力是发展的;2、小学生有意遗忘中的认知抑制能力具有明显的个体差异,各年级小学生中学习成绩好的学生抑制能力强,学习成绩差的学生抑制能力弱。     

对我国儿童肾移植发展的思考与建议

肾移植是儿童终末期肾衰最重要的替代治疗手段。国内数家大的移植中心儿童肾移植长期存活率已接近国外先进水平,但我国肾移植患儿总数较少,主要原因是经费不足和供体缺乏。为推动儿童肾移植的发展,建议建立国家医疗救助制度,鼓励亲属活体肾脏捐献,严格掌握适应证,合理使用免疫抑制剂,加强多中心协作,建立移植随访网络。     

Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics

We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.     

When to (or not to) trust intelligent machines: Insights from an evolutionary game theory analysis of trust in repeated games

The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems, and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Consequently, users take the risk that such agents act in ways opposed to the users’ preferences or goals. It is often argued that people use trust as a cognitive shortcut to reduce the complexity of such interactions. Here we formalise this by using the methods of evolutionary game theory to study the viability of trust-based strategies in repeated games. These are reciprocal strategies that cooperate as long as the other player is observed to be cooperating. Unlike classic reciprocal strategies, once mutual cooperation has been observed for a threshold number of rounds they stop checking their co-player’s behaviour every round, and instead only check it with some probability. By doing so, they reduce the opportunity cost of verifying whether the action of their co-player was actually cooperative. We demonstrate that these trust-based strategies can outcompete strategies that are always conditional, such as Tit-for-Tat, when the opportunity cost is non-negligible. We argue that this cost is likely to be greater when the interaction is between people and intelligent agents, because of the reduced transparency of the agent. Consequently, we expect people to use trust-based strategies more frequently in interactions with intelligent agents. Our results provide new, important insights into the design of mechanisms for facilitating interactions between humans and intelligent agents, where trust is an essential factor.     

The elements of emotion

I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion (IRT). In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three pieces of content: representations of (1) the emoter’s body, (2) something in the world, and (3) a relevance relation between the objects of these first two pieces of content. I describe four general advantages I think the IRT offers. Finally, in Section 3, I elucidate and defend my account by contrasting it with another, similar proposal: Barlassina and Newen’s Impure Somatic Theory. In so doing, I explain two additional advantages of my view: first, it supports a unified explanation of all types of emotional response; and second, it offers the best framework for explaining how the representational contents of an emotion are integrated.     

The Power of a “Maverick” in Collaborative Problem Solving: An Experimental Investigation of Individual Perspective‐Taking Within a Group

Integrating different perspectives is a sophisticated strategy for developing constructive interactions in collaborative problem solving. However, cognitive aspects such as individuals’ knowledge and bias often obscure group consensus and produce conflict. This study investigated collaborative problem solving, focusing on a group member interacting with another member having a different perspective (a “maverick”). It was predicted that mavericks might mitigate disadvantages and facilitate perspective taking during problem solving. Thus, 344 university students participated in two laboratory‐based experiments by engaging in a simple rule‐discovery task that raised conflicts among perspectives. They interacted with virtual partners whose conversations were controlled by multiple conversational agents. Results show that when participants interacted with a maverick during the task, they were able to take others’ perspectives and integrate different perspectives to solve the problem. Moreover, when participants interacted in groups with a positive mood, groups with a maverick outperformed groups having several perspectives.     

What is special about indexical attitudes?

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.