When causality shapes the experience of time: Evidence for temporal binding in young children

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time—the so‐called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non‐causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ     

ABC-EBDI: An affective framework for BDI agents

The aim of this work is to improve the modelling of intelligent agents that reproduce realistic human behavior. BDI frameworks have been successfully used in this context and have evolved in recent years into EBDI frameworks, in which affective aspects are considered. In this work, an affective EBDI framework named ABC-EBDI is presented. The proposal integrates a well-known psychotherapeutic model, the ABC model, combined with other affective theories, to support the modeling of the agents’ behavioral and affective responses in a unifying and realistic manner. The distinguishing feature of the proposed framework is the classification of the agent’s cognitive-affective process as either rational or irrational. This process will lead to functional emotions and adaptive conduct in the first case and dysfunctional emotions and maladaptive behaviors in the second. The framework models affect by taking into account emotions, mood and personality. It also models human conduct regarding not only actions, but also the way those actions are expressed. A prototype has been implemented based on a bad news scenario and a first evaluation with users has been carried out with promising results.     

Cultural group perception enhances sense of agency in a multicultural society

Group, which involves collective actions for achieving shared goals, can be conceptually understood as an important source of agency and control. The current research investigated whether group identity salience can enhance sense of agency within the individual. Specifically, we examined whether an activated cultural group identity, through presenting different types of cultural photographs in a predictable way, would facilitate people's sense of agency by using an implicit method, namely, intentional binding effect paradigm. Experiment 1a found that an activated cultural group identity enhanced the sense of agency. Next, Experiment 1b replicated the findings by recruiting a different ethnic group in the same society. Experiment 2 explored what may affect the intensity of induced sense of agency and found that perceived representativeness of the presented cultural stimuli was positively correlated with the intensity of induced sense of agency. Finally, Experiment 3 explored whether ethnic minority and majority groups would demonstrate different intensity of agency when their cultural identity was activated. The results showed that the sense of agency induced by the mainstream cultural stimuli was greater than that induced by the foreign cultural photographs. These patterns were not different between the two ethnic groups. Taken together, these findings reflected the dynamic nature of cultural identity construction in a multicultural society.     

抗菌药物的围手术期预防性应用

手术部位感染在所有医院感染中占第三位,大肠埃希菌、金黄色葡萄球菌、铜绿假单胞菌、表皮葡萄球菌和肠球菌属是主要病原菌,是外科临床十分关心的问题,围手术期预防使用抗菌药物能降低外科部位感染的发生率。在围手术期使用抗菌药物中,应针对不同部位的手术以及可能的病原体以及本院或本地区病原体药物的敏感性选择抗菌药物,同时应注意给要时间应在手术前30min-1h静脉使用足量抗菌药物,以保持抗菌药物的有效浓度覆盖整个手术过程。预防手术部位感染同时应关注其他综合性预防措施。     

Towards a theory of intention revision

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties.     

On Behalf of J. S. Mill's ‘Assumption of Infallibility’ Argument

According to the Cambridge Platonist Henry More, individual ‘spirits’ – the souls of humans and non-human animals – are extended but cannot be physically divided. His contemporaries and recent commentators have charged that More has never given an explication of the grounds on which the indivisibility of spirits is based. In this article, I suggest that exploring the usage that More makes of the analogy between spirits and light could go some way towards providing such an explication. More compares the relation between spirit and matter to the relation that, according to Aristotelian theories of light, holds between ‘intentional species’ and matter. I will argue that the purpose of his comparison is to highlight that both intentional species and spirits are existentially independent from matter. The existential independence of intentional species from matter expresses itself in the fact that light is not moved through the motion of the illuminated body. The existential independence of spirits from matter expresses itself in the fact that when a body that is coextensive with a spirit is divided, the spirit is not thereby divided but rather contracts into the remaining living organism.     

Adaptation of Neuromuscular Synergies During Intentional Constraints of Space-Time Relationships in Human Gait

Tight frequency-to-amplitude relationships are observed in spontaneous human steady gait. They can be modified, if required; that flexibility forms a fundamental basis of the intentional adaptive capabilities of locomotion. In the present experiments, the processes underlying that flexibility were investigated at both the level of joint kinematics and the level of neuromuscular synergies. Subjects (N = 4) walked at the same speed either with a preferred or a nonpreferred frequency-to-amplitude relationship (i.e., constrained, short steps at a high frequency [COS condition] or constrained, long steps at a low frequency [COL condition]); their swing and stance phases were separately analyzed. In the COS condition, increases in EMG activity were specifically required during the swing phase. In the COL condition, several muscles required increases in EMG activity during the stance phase, but decreases of the hamstring muscles were needed during the swing phase. Whereas, in preferred walking, modification of the frequency affects the EMG patterns globally (the gain increasing with the frequency in both the stance and swing phases), the present results show that changing the frequency in a constrained manner either affects the swing phase specifically or affects both phases, but in the opposite direction. That finding indicates mat a separate control is needed in both the swing and the stance phases.     

The self‐choice effects on memory and individual differences in emotional intelligence

The present study examined the self‐choice effects on intentional memory and the relation between individual differences in emotional intelligence, and the size of the self‐choice effects. Word pairs were supplied to the participants in either a self‐choice or forced‐choice condition. In the self‐choice condition the participants were asked to choose one of the words that elicited more pleasant or more unpleasant episodes, and to remember the chosen word. In the forced‐choice condition one of the paired words was underlined to signify that it was the word to remember. For participants who chose a word that elicited more pleasant episodes, self‐choice effects were observed in pleasant‐pleasant and pleasant‐unpleasant word pairs. However, for participants who were asked to choose a word that elicited more unpleasant episodes, the effects were found in unpleasant‐unpleasant and pleasant‐unpleasant word pairs. The size of the self‐choice effects was determined by the level of emotional intelligence.     

Pre´cis of Heidegger,Language, and World-disclosure

It is argued that Heidegger should be seen as something of a Kantian Idealist. Like Kant, Heidegger distinguishes two standpoints (transcendental and empirical) which we can occupy when we ask the question whether natural things depend on us. He agrees with Kant that from the empirical or human standpoint we are justified in saying that natural things do not depend on us. But in contrast with Kant, Heidegger argues that from the transcendental standpoint we can say neither that natural things do depend on us, nor that they do not. His reasons for saying this, however, represent an attempt to rework both Kant's temporal idealism and his temporal interpretation of the concept of an object (which shows up in Heidegger as a temporal interpretation of being). Heidegger suggests that Kant was led astray into a transcendental idealism about natural entities, because he did not understand the implications of transcendental idealism about being.     

Rule Following,Error Theory and Eliminativism

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to the contrary, non-eliminativist error theory does not provide a plausible vehicle for understanding the ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical paradox about rule-following developed in Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.