Impact de la motivation autodéterminée et de l’engagement affectif sur l’intention de rester : une étude chez les militaires

Conducted within the Canadian Forces (N=652), this study explores the role of self-determined motivation and affective commitment in relation to personnel retention within the military. Three groupings of variables are used in order to shed light on the mechanisms underlying personnel retention: a) distal antecedents (i.e. leadership styles), b) proximal antecedents (i.e. group cohesion and work climate) and c) mediators (i.e. self-determined motivation and affective commitment). Illustrated through a structural model, results demonstrate the existence of a partial mediator effect from affective commitment in the relationship between self-determined motivation and intention to stay. These findings are discussed in regards of their implications from theoretical and practical perspectives.     

So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.     

Solving distant analogies reduces belief-based responding in transitive inference

ABSTRACT

Previous research demonstrated that relational processing in transitive inference problems can be disrupted by belief-based content. Given the premises, The horse is larger than the goat, and The goat is larger than the elephant, accepting the valid conclusion, The horse is larger than the elephant suggests use of relational processing whereas accepting the invalid conclusion The elephant is larger than the horse indicates belief-based responding. This research examined whether solving analogies influenced participants’ reliance on belief-based or relational processing. Participants generated solutions to either distant analogies (e.g. nose:scent::antenna: ______) or near analogies (e.g. nose:scent::tongue:______) before evaluating the conclusions of transitive inference problems that were valid (V) or invalid (I) and believable (B), unbelievable (U) or neutral (N). Solving distant analogies eliminated belief-based responding (possibly reflecting improved inhibitory control) and facilitated relational responding on VU problems.     

Natural Selection and Design: Comments on Michael Ruse's New Book

Is the adaptive complexity of living organisms the result of evolutionary processes alone? or does it give evidence of intentional design? Michael Ruse appears to argue that we can have it either way. As a scientist I find the argument from design unnecessary. Yet it has great appeal to humans, whose behavior is largely intentional and who look for patterns in events and for the intentions that may have produced them.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

小学生工作记忆与推理关系的实验研究

本实验以视觉同时呈现,在形近、音近、义近三种干扰下以再认方法和瑞文渐进推理测验探讨了小学生年级、性别、工作记忆与推理的关系。发现(I)小学生工作记忆与推理能力相关显著。(2)工作记忆和推理能力在小学阶段不存在性别差异。(3)年级和工作记忆是影响小学生推理能力的重要因素,但年级因素对推理能力的作用较工作记忆大。     

Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences

Social perceivers have been shown to draw spontaneous trait inferences (STI’s) about the behavior of an actor as well as spontaneous situational inferences (SSI’s) about the situation the actor is in. In two studies, we examined inferences about behaviors that allow for both an STI and an SSI. In Experiment 1, using a probe recognition paradigm, we found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s. In Experiment 2, using a relearning paradigm, we again found activation of both STI’s and SSI’s, regardless of temporarily activated processing goals. Results are discussed in light of three-stage models of the process of social inference.     

文本阅读中简单推理情境下的信息整合

研究采用动窗技术探讨了文本阅读中需要简单推理情境下的信息整合发生的时机。本研究通过三个实验证明了在需要简单推理情境下的文本阅读中 ,需要推理的信息整合是即时发生的 ,而不是经过追溯才发生 ,在这种情况下支持文本阅读的更新追随假设理论。同时本研究发现文本阅读中协调性整合不是以词为单位的。     

10‐month‐old infants’ inference of invisible agent: Distinction in causality between object motion and human action1

Abstract: Two habituation experiments investigated 10‐month‐old infants’ interpretation of events where a stationary object began to move without any visible causes. During habituation, infants saw that an object partly hidden by an occluder began to move away from the occluder. Then, they were tested with three test events without the occluder: the ?rst event showed a hand pushing the object, the second event showed a hand failing to touch the object, and the last event had no agent. The objects were a ball in Experiment 1, and a person in Experiment 2. The test event that the infants looked at for the shortest duration in Experiment 1 was where the hand pushed the ball, whereas they looked at the three test events almost equal amounts of time in Experiment 2. These results indicate that 10‐month‐old infants responded to the events in terms of causality and could infer the presence of the agent behind the occluder only when they saw the habituation event featuring the ball.     

Why Higher Working Memory Capacity May Help You Learn: Sampling,Search, and Degrees of Approximation

Algorithms for approximate Bayesian inference, such as those based on sampling (i.e., Monte Carlo methods), provide a natural source of models of how people may deal with uncertainty with limited cognitive resources. Here, we consider the idea that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) may be usefully modeled in terms of the number of samples, or “particles,” available to perform inference. To test this idea, we focus on two recent experiments that report positive associations between WMC and two distinct aspects of categorization performance: the ability to learn novel categories, and the ability to switch between different categorization strategies (“knowledge restructuring”). In favor of the idea of modeling WMC as a number of particles, we show that a single model can reproduce both experimental results by varying the number of particles—increasing the number of particles leads to both faster category learning and improved strategy‐switching. Furthermore, when we fit the model to individual participants, we found a positive association between WMC and best‐fit number of particles for strategy switching. However, no association between WMC and best‐fit number of particles was found for category learning. These results are discussed in the context of the general challenge of disentangling the contributions of different potential sources of behavioral variability.