A user’s guide to the evolutionary argument against naturalism

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating, and cannot be rationally accepted. I distinguish between two different ways of understanding this argument, which I call the "probabilistic inference conception", and the "process characteristic conception". I argue that the former is what critics of the argument usually presuppose, whereas most critical responses fail when one assumes the latter conception. To illustrate this, I examine three standard objections to Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism: the Perspiration Objection, the Tu Quoque Objection, and the "Why Can't the Naturalist Just Add a Little Something?" Objection. I show that Plantinga's own responses to these objections fail, and propose counterexamples to his first two principles of defeat. I then go on to construct more adequate responses to these objections, using the distinctions I develop in the first part of the paper.     

Epistemic instrumentalism,exceeding our grasp

In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp.     

Gaze following among toddlers

Children's cooperative activities with their peers become markedly coordinated during the 3rd year of life. During these activities, the child needs to follow his/her peers’ gaze to objects, and look at the same objects to initiate coordinated action. Since 3-year-olds’ ability to follow their peers’ gaze has not been studied, we experimentally investigated this in our study. In the experimental trials, an experimenter induced a child (looker) to look at a doll on display, and observed the reaction of another child (follower) who was in front of the looker (and not looking at the doll). In the control trials, the experimenter displayed the doll in an identical manner when the follower was alone. The followers followed the gaze of the lookers, looking at the doll in approximately 90% of the experimental trials, compared with 20% of the control trials. These results indicate that 3-year-olds can follow their peers’ gaze.     

Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: an epistemological review

Binocular rivalry occurs when the eyes are presented with different stimuli and subjective perception alternates between them. Though recent years have seen a number of models of this phenomenon, the mechanisms behind binocular rivalry are still debated and we still lack a principled understanding of why a cognitive system such as the brain should exhibit this striking kind of behaviour. Furthermore, psychophysical and neurophysiological (single cell and imaging) studies of rivalry are not unequivocal and have proven difficult to reconcile within one framework. This review takes an epistemological approach to rivalry that considers the brain as engaged in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference about the causes of its sensory input. We describe a simple empirical Bayesian framework, implemented with predictive coding, which seems capable of explaining binocular rivalry and reconciling many findings. The core of the explanation is that selection of one stimulus, and subsequent alternation between stimuli in rivalry occur when: (i) there is no single model or hypothesis about the causes in the environment that enjoys both high likelihood and high prior probability and (ii) when one stimulus dominates, the bottom-up, driving signal for that stimulus is explained away while, crucially, the bottom-up signal for the suppressed stimulus is not, and remains as an unexplained but explainable prediction error signal. This induces instability in perceptual dynamics that can give rise to perceptual transitions or alternations during rivalry.     

Taking a closer look: On the operation of nonconscious impression formation

In this article, we analyzed the information processing that underlies nonconscious impression formation. In the first experiment, the nonconscious activation of the impression formation goal led to a faster analysis of the trait implications of behaviors, compared with a control group. In Experiment 2, participants who were nonconsciously primed with an impression formation goal were more likely than those in a control condition to form associations in memory between behaviors and implied traits. In Experiment 3, nonconsciously primed participants were more sensitive than those in a control condition to whether inconsistent trait information was relevant or irrelevant to the actor’s disposition. Moreover, in Experiments 2 and 3, those with a nonconscious goal showed just as much evidence of impression formation as those who were consciously and intentionally trying to form an impression. Implications for nonconscious goal-pursuit and impression formation are discussed.     

Using category structures to test iterated learning as a method for identifying inductive biases

Many of the problems studied in cognitive science are inductive problems, requiring people to evaluate hypotheses in the light of data. The key to solving these problems successfully is having the right inductive biases—assumptions about the world that make it possible to choose between hypotheses that are equally consistent with the observed data. This article explores a novel experimental method for identifying the biases that guide human inductive inferences. The idea behind this method is simple: This article uses the responses produced by a participant on one trial to generate the stimuli that either they or another participant will see on the next. A formal analysis of this "iterated learning" procedure, based on the assumption that the learners are Bayesian agents, predicts that it should reveal the inductive biases of these learners, as expressed in a prior probability distribution over hypotheses. This article presents a series of experiments using stimuli based on a well-studied set of category structures, demonstrating that iterated learning can be used to reveal the inductive biases of human learners.     

中国城区青少年对广告价值的评价:前因和后果

通过对北京市7所中学366名学生的调查,探讨了青少年对广告价值的评价以及何种因素影响青少年对广告价值的评价,广告价值的评价是否会进一步影响其决策等问题。运用AMOS 4.0建立结构方程模型对研究假设进行检验,结果表明：（1）青少年对广告价值的评价直接影响到他们的决策意图;（2）在探讨广告价值的影响因素时发现,对广告的知觉因素（信息性和娱乐性）和青少年对广告以及广告商的社会认知（观看广告的社会动机和对广告劝服技巧的认识）对广告价值的影响作用也十分显著,信息性、娱乐性与社会动机都对广告价值产生积极影响,而对广告劝服技巧的认识则对广告价值产生显著的负面影响     

理解私人意图与交际意图的ERP证据

已有的意图理解神经成像研究大多关注理解单一个体私人意图的脑功能定位, 而较少涉及两个或更多人的社会性交际意图, 大脑区分私人意图和交际意图的动态时间过程尚不清楚。本研究记录了16名健康被试理解三种不同意图任务时的脑电成分。三种意图分别为: 1)私人意图; 2)交际意图; 3)物理意图。电生理学结果表明在大脑顶区, 私人意图的N250的峰值显著大于交际意图和物理意图。在晚期阶段(300~600 ms), 交际意图的晚期正成分(LPC)的平均波幅要显著大于私人意图和物理意图。在400~600 ms时, 私人意图的LPC的平均波幅要显著大于物理意图。本研究为理解私人意图和交际意图的动态加工过程提供了神经电生理学的初步证据。     

感知价值、满意度与继续使用意向—基于3G用户的实证研究

本文考察感知价值、满意度对继续使用意向的作用机理。基于相关理论与实证研究,我们首先提出3G用户继续使用意向概念模型与研究假设,然后通过实证研究对假设进行检验。研究结果表明感知价值和满意度决定继续使用意向。满意度是继续使用意向最强的预测因子。感知有用性和感知使用成本既直接作用于继续使用意向,也通过满意度间接作用于继续使用意向。感知易用性和感知形象提升直接作用于继续使用意向,而不需要通过满意度的中介作用。