The influence of speaker gaze on listener comprehension: Contrasting visual versus intentional accounts

Previous research has shown that listeners follow speaker gaze to mentioned objects in a shared environment to ground referring expressions, both for human and robot speakers. What is less clear is whether the benefit of speaker gaze is due to the inference of referential intentions (Staudte and Crocker, 2011) or simply the (reflexive) shifts in visual attention. That is, is gaze special in how it affects simultaneous utterance comprehension? In four eye-tracking studies we directly contrast speech-aligned speaker gaze of a virtual agent with a non-gaze visual cue (arrow). Our findings show that both cues similarly direct listeners’ attention and that listeners can benefit in utterance comprehension from both cues. Only when they are similarly precise, however, does this equality extend to incongruent cueing sequences: that is, even when the cue sequence does not match the concurrent sequence of spoken referents can listeners benefit from gaze as well as arrows. The results suggest that listeners are able to learn a counter-predictive mapping of both cues to the sequence of referents. Thus, gaze and arrows can in principle be applied with equal flexibility and efficiency during language comprehension.     

Inference and coherence in causal-based artifact categorization

In four experiments, we tested conditions under which artifact concepts support inference and coherence in causal categorization. In all four experiments, participants categorized scenarios in which we systematically varied information about artifacts’ associated design history, physical structure, user intention, user action and functional outcome, and where each property could be specified as intact, compromised or not observed. Consistently across experiments, when participants received complete information (i.e., when all properties were observed), they categorized based on individual properties and did not show evidence of using coherence to categorize. In contrast, when the state of some property was not observed, participants gave evidence of using available information to infer the state of the unobserved property, which increased the value of the available information for categorization. Our data offers answers to longstanding questions regarding artifact categorization, such as whether there are underlying causal models for artifacts, which properties are part of them, whether design history is an artifact’s causal essence, and whether physical appearance or functional outcome is the most central artifact property.     

How Patient-Perpetrated Workplace Violence Leads to Turnover Intention Among Nurses: The Mediating Mechanism of Occupational Stress and Burnout

This study looked into the impact of patient-perpetrated workplace violence on nurses’ turnover intention by examining the sequential mediation effect of occupational stress and burnout. Results were obtained by analyzing the data collected from 216 nurses working in four public hospitals of central Pakistan. Results provided full support to the research hypotheses, demonstrating that patient-inflicted violence negatively affects nurses’ turnover intention, and that occupational stress and burnout both individually mediate the patient violence–turnover intention relationship. Particularly, the results illustrated that patient violence is related to turnover intention through occupational stress first and then burnout. These results widen the focus of past research by demonstrating that the patient violence–turnover intention link is not as simple as previously believed. Future researchers can use these findings to further develop integrated models that explore the adverse consequences of workplace violence on nursing staff’s personal and professional well-being.     

Be green and clearly be seen: How consumer values and attitudes affect adoption of bicycle sharing

Environmental concerns have propelled public and private entities to search for ways to increase usage of public bicycle sharing systems. However, usage rates in many cities remain below expectations. Using the theory of perceived value to motivate our hypotheses, this paper evaluates the impact of perceived value on consumer adoption intentions, and assesses the moderating effects of social and personal attitudes towards environmental behavior, on perceived value-adoption intention relationships. Our findings suggest that public bicycle sharing adoption intention is significantly influenced by its perceived functional, conditional, green and social values. Moreover, personal and social attitudes towards “greenness” and bicycle sharing, respectively, are found to moderate the relationship between perceived values and adoption intentions. This research contributes to theory-building in bicycle sharing adoption, and informs business and government leaders on how to promote adoption.     

材料生态性和性别因素对理解友好与敌对意图的影响

为考察材料生态性、被试性别和角色性别对理解友好与敌对意图的影响,分析了100名被试观察由2名男性或2名女性表演的三类互动意图的照片或卡通时的正确率和反应时。结果：理解真实人物的正确率高于虚拟角色;女性被试理解虚拟角色的反应时长于真实人物,而男性被试却未出现材料生态性差异;理解男性角色敌对意图的反应时短于女性角色的,而理解友好意图时却未出现角色性别差异。研究为负性偏向等理论提供实证证据,揭示材料生态性、角色性别对理解友好和敌对意图的影响机制。     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state

This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as (e.g.) tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while (1) merely preparing, (2) not taking any steps, and (3) the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs (such as tadpoles) are immature frogs, some actions (such as intentions) are immature actions.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).