婴幼儿面孔注意偏向：先天倾向与发展轨迹——来自正常和孤独症婴幼儿的证据

正常发展(Typically developing, TD)婴儿的先天面孔注意倾向稳定地存在于不同发展阶段不同刺激情景中, 且在生命第一年内呈现短暂下降后快速增强的发展趋势。TD婴幼儿的视觉注意在第4至6周之间发生由皮下控制向皮层控制的关键性转变之后, 伴随面孔视觉经验的不断积累, 逐渐形成的面孔特异性皮层网络对面孔的优先选择性反应逐渐增强。而孤独症谱系(Autism Spectrum Disorder, ASD)婴幼儿具备初始的面孔注意先天倾向, 但在面孔皮层发育关键期内逐渐偏离正常轨道, 在1岁左右表现出面孔注意障碍。该群体先天的感知注意损伤或社会动机缺失可能导致其在关键性转变期内的面孔视觉经验输入不足, 进而阻碍面孔特异性皮层网络的正常发展。未来研究可考虑采用生物遗传学方法和近红外脑成像技术探索新生儿面孔注意先天倾向的起源, 系统考察社会场景中感知觉特征和社会性特征对ASD高危婴儿面孔注意发展轨迹尤其是关键性转变期的影响作用。     

大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向

主要考察大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向。实验1中的两个单类内隐联想测验结果与前人研究基本一致：虽然被试对穷人热情的评价相对积极,但总体上认为穷人低能力、低热情。实验2通过源监测任务发现,在忘记特质词来源的情况下,被试倾向于猜测消极特质词来自贫困者,积极特质词来自小康者。研究不仅证实了大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象,而且进一步发现大学生存在对穷人的消极猜测偏向。     

推理判断中偏差反应的加工机制：冲突探查失败，还是抑制失败？

通过控制自变量一致性（冲突、非冲突）与问题类型（基础比率问题、合取问题）,对推理判断中偏差反应的加工机制：冲突探查失败,还是抑制失败,进行验证。反应时、反应自信度的结果支持抑制失败说,被试对冲突的探查是成功的,偏差反应的产生是没能抑制占主导的直觉。而冲突探查大小（Conflict detection size）的结果表明冲突探查存在个体差异,有些被试对两种加工间的冲突探查过程完美无暇(Flawless detection),有些被试的冲突探查过程松散马虎(Lax detection),而且受到问题类型的影响。     

Understanding subgroup differences with general mental ability tests in employment selection: Exploring socio-cultural factors across inter-generational groups

In employment selection, general mental ability (GMA) tests predict training and job performance but also lead to subgroup differences which in turn can produce adverse impact against minority groups. Although researchers have explored genetic, developmental, and environmental explanations for ethnic group differences, few studies have explored socio-cultural factors comparing immigrant and non-immigrant job applicants. Given that many ethnic job applicants may also be immigrants, understanding these factors can provide insight into GMA test score differences. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of individual and socio-cultural factors on GMA test scores with immigrant and non-immigrant bus driver applicants. This is the first study of its kind to our knowledge that has attempted to disentangle the effects of socio-cultural factors from race/ethnicity in the study of subgroup differences. Incorporating these variables between non-visible minority and minority groups accounted for considerable variance in GMA test scores across groups. The implications of focusing on socio-cultural variables to enhance our understanding of subgroup differences are discussed. Our results specifically suggest that practitioners attend to the issue of the intersecting grounds of potential discrimination when using GMA tests in personnel selection.     

Moral psychology of the fading affect bias

We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attributed to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the “fading affect bias,” namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emotions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. Secondarily, we note that if Julia Driver’s moral theory is correct, then the disposition to display the fading affect bias is a moral virtue.     

Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski, Hoffman, and Wilbur (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA.     

Cross-task and cross-manipulation stability in shifting the decision criterion

In recognition memory experiments participants must discriminate between old and new items, a judgment influenced by response bias. Research has shown substantial individual differences in the extent to which people will strategically adjust their response bias to diagnostic cues such as the prior probability of an old item. Despite this significant between subject variability, shifts in bias have been found to be relatively predictive within individuals across memory tests. Experiment 1 sought to determine whether this predictability extends beyond memory. Results revealed that the amount a subject shifted response bias in a recognition memory task was significantly predictive of shifting in a visual perception task, suggesting that shifting can generalise outside of a specific testing domain. Experiment 2 sought to determine how predictive shifting would be across two manipulations well known to induce shifts in bias: a probability manipulation and a response payoff manipulation. A modest positive relationship between these two methods was observed, suggesting that shifting behaviour is relatively predictive across different manipulations of shifting. Overall, results from both experiments suggest that response bias shifting, like response bias setting, is a relatively stable behaviour within individuals despite changes in test domain and test manipulation.     

Monkey see,monkey do: The effect of social influence on selective‐exposure bias

Selective‐exposure bias refers to the tendency to predominantly seek out attitude‐consistent information and avoid attitude‐inconsistent information. Although researchers have proposed and tested several underlying psychological factors that might contribute to this tendency, the potential role of social influence has not been addressed. In the present research, we address this issue. In four experiments (total N = 645), participants’ selective‐exposure bias was significantly reduced when the bias was portrayed as non‐normative (vs. normative). In Experiment 4, we obtained evidence for the possibility that this social‐norm manipulation could result in effects on attitudes through information selection. Overall, this research contributes novel evidence for the effect of social influence on selective‐exposure bias.     

Effects of task-irrelevant emotional information on deception

Deception has been reported to be influenced by task-relevant emotional information from an external stimulus. However, it remains unclear how task-irrelevant emotional information would influence deception. In the present study, facial expressions of different valence and emotion intensity were presented to participants, where they were asked to make either truthful or deceptive gender judgments according to the preceding cues. We observed the influence of facial expression intensity upon individuals’ cognitive cost of deceiving (mean difference of individuals’ truthful and deceptive response times). Larger cost was observed for high intensity faces compared to low intensity faces. These results provided insights on how automatic attraction of attention evoked by task-irrelevant emotional information in facial expressions influenced individuals’ cognitive cost of deceiving.