Removing the own-race bias in face recognition by attentional shift using fixation crosses to diagnostic features: An eye-tracking study

Hills and Lewis (2011) have demonstrated that the own-race bias in face recognition can be reduced or even removed by guiding participants' attention and potentially eye movements to the most diagnostic visual features. Using the same old/new recognition paradigm as Hills and Lewis, we recorded Black and White participants' eye movements whilst viewing Black and White faces following fixation crosses that preceded the bridge of the nose (between the eyes) or the tip of the nose. White faces were more accurately recognized when following high fixation crosses (that preceded the bridge of the nose) than when following low fixation crosses. The converse was true for Black faces. These effects were independent of participant race. The fixation crosses attracted the first fixation but had less effect on other eye-tracking measures. Furthermore, the location of the first fixation was predictive of recognition accuracy. These results are consistent with an attentional allocation model of the own-race bias in face recognition and highlight the importance of the first fixation for face perception (cf. Hsiao & Cottrell, 2008).     

Eccentricity biases of object categories are evident in visual working memory

In high-order object areas, face-selective areas prefer centrally presented stimuli, whereas building-selective areas prefer peripherally presented stimuli (Levy et al., 2001). We investigated whether this eccentricity bias was also evident in visual working memory. In Experiment 1, we found that working memory performance for faces decreased towards the periphery while the performance for buildings remained unchanged across different eccentricities. To rule out the possibility that lower level features influence these results, we manipulated the spatial frequency of faces and buildings (Experiment 2) and the spatial layout information of the buildings (Experiment 3). In both of the experiments, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, even when these lower level features of stimuli were controlled. Consistent with previous findings, the current results suggest that each object category is processed in a different manner depending on the eccentricity. This eccentricity bias is likely the result of how the high-order object areas represent different object categories.     

The other-species effect in human perceptions of sexual dimorphism using human and macaque faces

Humans are better able to discriminate among human faces than faces of other species. This difference in perceptual discrimination is known as the “other-species effect”. Models of perception have posited that the ultimate functional significance of the other-species effect is a higher discrimination capability within an organism's most familiar and salient stimulus set while attenuating the ability to discriminate amongst unfamiliar stimuli. Here, human participants made masculinity judgements of human and macaque faces manipulated based on either human or macaque sexual dimorphism. Humans were more accurate at identifying masculine/feminine faces in species-congruent than species-incongruent transforms in both human and macaque faces. We observed an other-species effect whereby accuracy (correctly judging masculinized faces as more masculine) was highest for own-species faces. We also found that both men and women were better at judging the sex-typicality of male faces than female faces, regardless of the species of the face or the species of the manipulation. Our findings demonstrate an other-species effect for the perception of sex-typicality among human raters.     

Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult

Three studies examine the influence of varying the difficulty of reasoning on the extent of belief bias, while minimising the possibility that the manipulation would influence the way participants approach the task. Specifically, reasoning difficulty was manipulated by making variations in problem content, while maintaining all other aspects of the problems constant. In Study 1, 191 participants were presented with consistent and conflict problems varying in two levels of difficulty. The results showed a significant influence of problem difficulty on the extent of the belief bias, such that the effect of belief was more pronounced for difficult problems. This effect was stronger in Study 2 (73 participants) where the difference in the difficulty of the problems was purposely accentuated. The results of both studies stress the importance of controlling for problem difficulty when studying belief bias. Study 3 examined one consequence of this, i.e., the classic belief vs. logic interaction could be eliminated by manipulating problem difficulty. Theoretical implications for dual-process accounts of belief bias are also discussed.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.     

Attributions of Responsibility for Problem Cause and Problem Solution: Their Relationship to Self-Esteem

The relationship of self-esteem to attribution of responsibility for problem cause and problem solution was studied in a sample of 205 college undergraduates. The results revealed a tendency for self-esteem to be negatively associated with the endorsement of an attribution style that features high responsibility for problem cause but low responsibility for problem solving. This result may be due to the lack of instrumentality and the feelings of failure associated with such an attribution style. The results are also discussed with reference to previous research on self-esteem and attribution of responsibility.     

Individual differences in positivity offset and negativity bias: Gender-specific associations with two serotonin receptor genes

Individual differences in the evaluation of affective stimuli, such as the positivity offset and negativity bias may have a biological basis. We tested whether two SNPs (HTR2A; 102T>C and HTR1A; 1019C>G) related to serotonin receptor function, a biological pathway associated with affective regulation, were differentially related to positivity offset and negativity bias for males and females. Participants were 109 cigarette smokers who rated a series of affective stimuli to assess reactions to positive and negative pictures. Gender × genotype interactions were found for both SNPs. Males with the 102T allele showed a greater positivity offset than males with the 102C allele. For females, in contrast, the 1019C allele was associated with a greater positivity offset than the 1019G allele, whereas the 102T allele was associated with a greater negativity bias than the 102C allele. Identifying how gender differences may moderate the effect of serotonin receptor genes on affective information processing may provide insight into their role in guiding behavior and regulating affect.     

Attentional Bias Modification in People with Chronic Pain: A Proof of Concept Study

The purpose of this proof of concept study was to explore the role of attentional bias modification (ABM) in improving clinically relevant outcomes in chronic pain. Eight participants with chronic pain completed eight ABM sessions, which featured a modified version of the visual-probe task implicitly training attention away from pain-related stimuli towards neutral stimuli. Training sessions included a variety of linguistic and pictorial pain-related stimuli, which were presented at two presentation times (500 and 1250 ms). Participants also completed a standard version of the visual-probe task pre- and post-ABM to assess changes in bias. The primary outcome measure was pain intensity, and secondary outcome measures were anxiety, depression severity and pain interference. Statistically and clinically significant change was shown pre- to post-ABM in pain intensity, anxiety, depression and pain interference. Attentional bias scores did not statistically differ across time. These results support the continued exploration of ABM in chronic pain and the modifications we made to the intervention (i.e. the inclusion of pictorial stimuli and a longer presentation time). Future research is needed to explore the optimal form of ABM and whether improvements are maintained over time.     

行为决策中的比率偏差

比率偏差是指小概率事件以不同比率形式呈现时,人们倾向于认为以较小数字呈现的事件更不可能发生.这种现象在医疗卫生领域和职业生涯决策中有重要的应用价值.目前关于比率偏差产生的解释主要包括标准理论与认知经验自我理论.比率偏差的影响因素主要包括元认知技能、计算能力、认知视角和任务性质等.未来的研究需要从比率偏差现象的产生、心理机制及应用方面进行深入研究.