Fluid insight moderates the relationship between psychoticism and crystallized intelligence

To elucidate potential relationships between personality and intelligence it is necessary to move beyond the ad hoc reporting of correlation coefficients and focus instead on testing deductions from well-established theories. To this end the present paper references Eysenck’s (1995) theoretical work linking the dimension of psychoticism to both psychosis and creative genius. Drawing on this theory it was argued that the relationship between psychoticism and crystallized ability will be conditional on the level of fluid intelligence. Participants (N = 100) completed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-R) and the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT). Moderated multiple regression revealed a significant interaction effect. Crystallized ability (K-BIT vocabulary) was negatively related to psychoticism at low levels of fluid ability (K-BIT matrices) and positively related to psychoticism at high levels of fluid ability. These findings highlight the potential importance of psychoticism within GfGc investment theory.     

Individual differences in (non-visual) processing style predict the face inversion effect

Recent research suggests that individuals with relatively weak global precedence (i.e., a smaller propensity to view visual stimuli in a configural manner) show a reduced face inversion effect (FIE). Coupled with such findings, a number of recent studies have demonstrated links between an advantage for feature-based processing and the presentation of traits associated with autism among the general population. The present study sought to bridge these findings by investigating whether a relationship exists between the possession of autism-associated traits (i.e., as indicated by individuals'"autism quotient" [(AQ) and the size of the FIE. Participants completed an on-line study in which the AQ was measured prior to a standard face recognition task where half of the faces were inverted at test. The results confirmed that higher AQ levels were predictive of smaller FIEs. Implications for a common underlying factor relating to processing orientation are discussed.     

Understanding the executive functioning heterogeneity in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is characterized by heterogeneous brain abnormalities involving cerebral regions implied in the executive functioning. The dysexecutive syndrome is one of the most prominent and functionally cognitive features of schizophrenia. Nevertheless, it is not clear to what extend executive deficits are heterogeneous in schizophrenia patients. Furthermore, it is still unknown if the executive impairments observed in schizophrenia are better characterized as specific or as reflecting generalized cognitive factors. The four executive processes (i.e. updating, inhibition, shifting and divided attention) described in Miyake et al.'s (2000) theoretical model were examined in 62 individuals with schizophrenia and 49 healthy controls. At group level, impairments in all four executive processes confirmed the marked impairment in executive functioning in patients with schizophrenia. Statistical analysis indicated that executive performances in schizophrenia patients were more heterogeneous than in healthy controls. Compared with standardized norms, 94% of patients exhibited impairment in at least one of the executive tasks. Twenty-one percent of patients exhibited impairment in one executive task, 27% in two tasks, 23% in three executive tasks and 23% exhibited impairments in the four executive tasks. Six percent of patients had normal executive profile. Regression analysis indicated that only premorbid intellectual quotient and a general slowing in processing speed predicted the executive dysfunction severity. Executive functioning was not affected by age, duration of illness, psychotic status, or by antipsychotic dosage. Our results emphasize the heterogeneity of the dysexecutive syndrome in schizophrenia when individual profile analysis is considered, and extend the view that individual cognitive differences in schizophrenia are largely underlined by general cognitive factors such as intellectual level and general processing speed.     

Sensitive but not sentimental: Emotionally intelligent people can put their emotions aside when necessary

Are emotionally intelligent people sentimental? Does their greater sensitivity handicap them or are they able, as theory would expect, to experience and regulate emotions flexibly, depending on their goals? We examined this issue in organizational settings. Good managers are indeed expected to be both attuned to feelings (theirs as well as their subordinates’) and able to put them aside when needed to take tough (but necessary) decisions. Our results show that emotionally intelligent managers do make better managers, as reflected by greater managerial competencies, higher team efficiency and less stressed subordinates. Moreover, and most importantly, emotionally intelligent managers are not just nicer managers. As our results show, emotional intelligence has nothing to do with sentimentality. Actually, it is managers with low EI who have the greatest difficulties to put their emotions aside and not let them interfere when inappropriate.     

Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Self‐concepts of Intelligence Predict Performance on Tests of Intelligence

Three studies investigated the correspondence between implicit and explicit self‐concepts of intelligence and how that correspondence is related to performance on different intelligence tests. Configurations of these two self‐concepts were found to be consistently related to performance on intelligence tests in all three studies. For individuals who self‐reported high intelligence (high explicit self‐concept), a negative implicit self‐concept (measured with the Implicit Association Test) led to a decrease in performance on intelligence tests. For participants whose self‐report indicated a low self‐concept of intelligence, positive automatic associations between the self and intelligence had a similar effect. In line with a stress hypothesis, the results indicate that any discrepant configuration of self‐concepts will impair performance. Importantly, the prediction of performance on intelligence tests by the self‐concept of intelligence was shown to be independent of self‐esteem (Study 3). Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sense of humor, emotional intelligence, and social competence

Associations among sense of humor, emotional intelligence (EI), and social competence were examined in 111 undergraduate students using measures of humor styles, trait cheerfulness, social competence, and an ability test of EI. Emotional management ability was positively correlated with self-enhancing humor and trait cheerfulness, and negatively correlated with trait bad mood. Ability to accurately perceive emotions was negatively related to aggressive and self-defeating humor. Positive humor styles and trait cheerfulness were positively correlated with various domains of social competence, whereas negative humor styles and trait bad mood were negatively correlated with social competence. Finally, the emotional management facet of EI was positively correlated with several social competence domains.     

抑制和加工速度与液态智力的年老化

研究抑制能力和加工速度在液态智力年老化过程中的相对作用。被试为142名18~85岁健康成年人,完成包括抑制优势反应、加工速度和液态智力共13项测验。分层回归分析显示,抑制能力与年龄相关的特异性变异,在控制简单的速度变量时较控制复杂的速度变量时更大;结构方程分析表明,对液态智力年老化的中介作用,当选取较复杂的速度变量时加工速度的作用更大,而当选取较简单的速度变量时抑制能力的作用更大。研究结果表明,在液态智力的年老化过程中,除了加工速度的作用之外,抑制能力也起重要的中介作用。该结果为认知年老化的抑制理论和执行衰退假说提供了认知行为学研究的证据,并且对加工速度理论作了有益的补充和修正     

KANT ON RELIGION AND SCIENCE: INDEPENDENCE OR INTEGRATION?

Abstract. Immanuel Kant's theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge tempt conclusion that natural science and religion are two independent discourses of a dualistic system. To be sure, knowledge is anchored in two kinds of causality. Theoretical knowledge is governed by physical causality. Practical knowledge is concerned with the human capacity to initiate a sequence of events that nature could not accomplish on its own—although in conformity with, not independent of, natural causality. Furthermore, the two realms presuppose a common totality of order not of humanity's creation. Without these presuppositions, we could not experience the world as we do, and it would never occur to us to engage in a scientific investigation of the natural world. Hence, we should first exhaust our attempts at explanation on the basis of physical causality before turning to the aid of teleology. The anomalous becomes an occasion to seek a physical law not yet known whereas the miraculous hinders search for a natural law. However, higher than knowledge of “what is” is our capacity to discern “what should be.” This is an inclusive moral capacity that establishes what it means to be human and unites all moral agents in an invisible kingdom of ends that constitutes a moral culture in the physical world uniting religion and science.     

EMERGENCE AND HUMAN UNIQUENESS: LIMITING OR DELIMITING EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION?

Abstract. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence presents a highly sophisticated argument against any kind of uncritical theology that might want to follow science into a world of overly narrow, compartmentalized disciplines that do not sufficiently communicate between themselves. Clayton argues persuasively that the basic structure of the phenomenal world is multileveled, with emergent properties and degrees of freedom that cannot be adequately described, predicted, or explained in terms of lower‐level phenomena only. Moreover, the various levels of organization are linked to one another by interfaces of mutual constraint in terms of upward and downward causation. The most valuable part of Clayton's argument, however, is that in a philosophy of emergence one must also, if not especially, account for the role of the biological sciences and especially for the influence of human thoughts and skills, human choices and actions, and—one of the most important causes of all—human purposes. Clayton's biggest challenge is that the level of human personhood offers us the only appropriate level to introduce the question of God and the possibility of divine agency. I critically evaluate this central claim and its implications not only for the extent of divine influence on the world but also for the scope and limitations of the interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the sciences.