Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect

This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.     

Discussion about the Triple Foundational Relationship between Intellect,Emotion, and Willing from the Perspective of the Phenomenology of Consciousness

There are at least three foundational relationships between the three conscious acts of intellect, emotion, and willing. Section 2 covers the structural foundational relationship (Brentano and Husserl in his early period): all conscious acts are intentional and can be divided into objectifying (intuition and representation) and non-objectifying acts (emotion and willing). Because a non-objectifying act cannot constitute an object, things must be based on objectifying acts and the object constituted by the latter; in this sense, a non-objectifying act is rooted in an objectifying one. Section 3 explains the genetic foundational issue with consciousness (Husserl in his later period, Scheler, and Heidegger): the stream of consciousness has its earliest origins and follows a process where it gradually unfolds. The earliest origin is the intentional willing, followed by nonintentional feelings, and, finally, the representation and thinking of willing. Intentional activity taking place afterward must be based on the conscious activity that has come already. Section 4 points out that, apart from the two aforementioned kinds of foundational relationships (i.e. structural and genetic), a third foundational relationship (i.e. dynamic) can also be found between the conscious acts of intellect, emotion, and willing in the Consciousness-only school (a Buddhist tradition in the East). In a continuous activity, the foundational relationship between the three aspects of intellect, emotion, and willing always remains encased in dynamic changes, and the change of primary and secondary roles (i.e. a change in the foundational relationship) could happen at any time. From this perspective, one can explain and resolve the confrontation and conflicts between the two former foundational relationships.     

Trait Intellect Predicts Cognitive Engagement: Evidence from a Resource Allocation Perspective

Trait Intellect, one of the two ‘aspects’ of the broader Openness/Intellect ‘domain’, predicts performance on a range of cognitive tasks including tests of intelligence and working memory. This has been explained in terms of the tendency for high‐Intellect individuals to explore, or engage more effortfully with, abstract information. This theoretical perspective can be framed in the language of Resource Allocation Theory, in terms of high‐Intellect individuals allocating more of their available cognitive resources to abstract cognitive tasks. In two experiments (total N = 160), we examined the relation between Intellect and cognitive engagement during a primary word‐search task under conditions of both high and low secondary cognitive load. Both experiments revealed that high‐Intellect individuals were more vulnerable to the impact of the secondary cognitive load on primary task performance. This suggests that, under low secondary load, such individuals were indeed allocating more of their available cognitive resources to the primary task. These results held after controlling for trait Openness, trait Industriousness (an aspect of Conscientiousness) and a measure of working memory capacity (N‐back task). Our findings provide novel support for the cognitive mechanisms proposed to underlie trait Intellect. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Predicting Creativity Based on the Facets of the Theoretical Intellect Framework

The present study investigates how the construct intellect, according to the Theoretical Intellect Framework (TIF), predicts creativity. The TIF is a theoretical model describing the structure of the construct intellect, a sub‐dimension of the Big Five domain openness to experience. People (N = 2709) from two sub‐samples (undergraduate students and Amazon MTurkers) completed one of three creativity tasks (self‐reported, remote associates, or rated photo caption) and the Intellect Scale. The results support hypotheses derived from the TIF, as the operation Create, rather than the operations Think or Learn, significantly and in some cases uniquely predicted the self‐reported creativity indicators. Creativity indicators with a strong cognitive load (remote associates test and rated photo caption), however, were predicted by the operation Think. Results are discussed with regards to the nomological net of the operation Create and the construct validity of the creativity assessments. We provide implications for applied purposes and call for further examination of the TIF with additional creativity measures. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Varieties of openness in Tehran and Qom: psychological and religious parallels of faith and intellect-oriented Islamic religious reflection

This study examined whether faith and intellect-oriented religious reflection would be polarised in Iranian Muslins as they appear to be in American Christians. Iranian students at a university in Tehran and at an Islamic seminary in Qom responded to Faith and Intellect-Oriented Islamic Religious Reflection measures along with scales recording various forms of religious commitment and psychological openness. Both types of religious reflection and the Intrinsic Religious Orientation predicted greater Integrative Self-Knowledge, Openness to Experience, and Need for Cognition and also interacted in ways suggesting complexity in Muslim thought. Comparisons between Tehran and Qom students supported the same conclusion. The Quest Religious Orientation had limited relevance for understanding Muslim commitments. The Extrinsic Personal Religious Orientation predicted greater and the Extrinsic Social Religious Orientation predicted lower psychological openness. These data contrasted with previous evidence of polarisation in the religious reflection of American Christians. They also argued against any simple equation of Muslim commitments with cognitive and religious rigidity.     

Freedom Beyond Practical Reason: Duns Scotus on Will-Dependent Relations

Most acts of the will have a complex structure, i.e. wanting A in relation to B (e.g. as a means for an end or as a good for another person or for oneself). Duns Scotus makes the innovative claim that the will itself is responsible for the order of this complex structure. It does this by causing its own will-dependent relations, which he construes as a kind of mind-dependent relations (relationes rationis). By means of these relations, the will can arrange the terms of its will-acts independently of any arrangement proposed by the intellect. This not only allows the structure of one's will-act to diverge from the structure proposed by the intellect's final practical judgement; the structure of the will-act need not even have been considered by the intellect at all. One could, therefore, even will an inconceivable state of affairs. I argue that this theory, which scholars have virtually ignored, is fundamental to Scotus's account of divine, angelic, and human freedom, and that it follows necessarily from his voluntarist understanding of freedom. For Scotus, if the will could not structure its acts independently of the intellect, it would not be free.¹¹Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte (Leuven), the Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy, and at UCLA. I am grateful for the discussion with those present on these occasions. Special thanks are due to Joshua Benson, Francis Feingold, Gloria Frost, Michael Gorman, Bonnie Kent, Calvin Normore, and Nick Kahm for helpful comments.     

FREE WILL ACCORDING TO JOHN DUNS SCOTUS AND NEUROSCIENCE

Abstract. This paper examines two views of free will. It looks first at the fourteenth‐century religious insights of John Duns Scotus, one of history's seminal thinkers about free will. It then examines what current neuroscience tells us about free will. Finally, it summarizes the past and present views and concludes by answering two questions: Does free will refer to an absence of external constraint, or does it refer to a human ability to decide in an acausal manner?     

Art and intellect

Many educators persist in opposing art to intellect. This is incompatible with modern understandings of the interdependence of cognition and feeling. It also causes neglect of the value of art as one medium for presenting and exploring ideas. Historical examples add weight to the point by showing the richness of thought that has often informed visual art. The educational waste and cultural damage consequent on neglecting this aspect of art is indicated and remedial approaches are suggested.     

The Two-Sense Reading of Spinoza’s definition of attribute

Spinoza’s definition of ‘attribute’ (E1d4) has been described as ‘one of the most puzzling passages in the Ethics’ and ‘a longstanding worry’ for Spinoza interpreters. Its puzzling status stems from (a) its apparent ‘subjectivist’ character and (b) the dominant understanding of Spinoza’s notion of attribute as an ‘objectivist’ notion. The paper aspires to remove this puzzlement by proposing and defending a reading of E1d4 in which it is understood to have two senses. First, I defend the objectivist character of Spinoza’s notion of attribute, and explain why E1d4 is problematic within the framework of an objectivist interpretation of the Spinozistic attribute. Second, I propose a reading of E1d4 as having two senses and explain the cause of an apparent contradiction in E1d4. Finally, I devote the largest part of the paper to a defence of the Two-Sense Reading of E1d4. More specifically, I draw on four sources for this defence: (a) the structure of E1d1 and E1d3, (b) the content and form of E1p4 and its demonstration, (c) Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism and (d) Descartes’ treatment of attribute and its influence on Spinoza.