Sibling rivalry at work; from family to groups

Sibling relationships are ambivalent. They are full of love and hate, and therefore, our most basic wish cannot simply be to get rid of our siblings. Many of the conflicts we find ourselves in, either with friends or within institutions, may need a complex and subtle understanding of sibling dynamics. The famous Controversial Discussions that nearly destroyed the Institute of Psychoanalysis in the early forties could be partly attributed to the unacknowledged and unconscious dynamics of the sibling transferences that swirled around Melanie Klein, Anna Freud and Freud. One of the tasks of therapists is to explore how we all must live within a society, with our contemporaries. This difficulty involves observing that sometimes in therapy we are part of the nursery quarrel itself, rather than superior. And so in adult sibling conflict within an institution, there may be a need for an outside moderator, like a parent, to sort out the quarrel; for when sibling passions are revived at work or in the consulting room, they can knock one sideways with the unmeditated quality of the encounter.     

Blessed fetishism: Language ideology and embodied worship among Pentecostals in Java

A prominent trend of late Christianity has been a cultivation of ‘unmediated’ inspiration realised in embodied worship, notably glossolalia, ecstasy and verbal exuberance. Speaking unfathomable language and embracing spontaneous feelings, Pentecostals in Java have relied on and reworked local language ideologies by passionately employing both the babbling and yelling forms of code-switching in Indonesian, English, Hebrew and glossolalia, in an aspiration to achieve ‘true worshiper-hood’. A closer scrutiny of some elements of this embodied worship against the larger religiously heterogeneous context, furthermore, reveals the salient impacts of cross-religious relations on the process of shaping Pentecostal Christianity. This article argues that specific forms of Pentecostal worship can be better understood when situated in Muslim–Christian relations. Specifically, they speak to a thriving form of religious fetishism that is locally primed for a distinct voice out of the flourishing movements of Islamic resurgence.     

‘Pluralistic accountability’ for the psychological therapies? Holding the tension between diversity's virtues and the need for accountability

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the field of counselling and psychotherapy needs to find values-congruent ways of managing, and creatively engaging with, the challenging tension between accountability and diversity in therapy work. The authors strongly support the preservation of pluralism and diversity in therapy practice, in the face of the increasingly urgent, anxiety-driven demands for audit, regulation and accountability typifying Late Modernity. It is argued that if accountability itself is to be ‘evidence-based’, then incorporating a relational dimension is essential; for if relationship factors are central to successful therapy, then accountability frameworks must themselves be founded on/in ‘relationship’. The arguments against formal institutional regulation of the psychological therapies in relation to the ineffectiveness of systems are rehearsed, and alternative, more values-congruent approaches considered. In making a case for ‘pluralistic accountability’, a detailed case-study of Bristol's developing local directory of therapists is offered, illustrating how local initiative can deliver good-enough accountability, avoiding the many negative side-effects of more didactic, centralised systems. The paper concludes that innovation and diversity in the field are more likely to be preserved if approaches can be found that hold and embrace the tensions between accountability and diversity, rather than seeking ‘solutions’ that prematurely and inappropriately resolve them.     

Book Notes: Adams,Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa,The Bounds of Cognition,Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, pp. xiii + 197, AU$120.00 / NZ$130.00 (cloth)

Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall 2006 articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest 2006a Priest, Graham. 2006a. Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar] and Field 2009 Field, Hartry. 2009. Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic, 2/2: 342–59. doi:10.1017/S1755020309090182[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] have suggested that there is a relationship between their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is the claim, often associated with Quine 1970 Quine, W. V. O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar], that a change of logic entails a change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism and meaning-variance, both in general and for Beall and Restall's theory specifically. We argue that contrary to what Beall and Restall claim, their type of pluralism is wedded to meaning-variance. We then develop an alternative form of logical pluralism that circumvents at least some forms of meaning-variance.     

The partnership between the Early Intervention Institute,St Petersburg,and the Anna Freud Centre,London

The authors describe study and teaching links between the Early Intervention Institute in St Petersburg and the Anna Freud Clinic in London. Some brief clinical examples from a variety of settings are given as well as a longer case presentation. The impact of widespread institutional care, alcoholism and terrible housing conditions on child mental health are illustrated. This raises questions about the role of child psychotherapy when social conditions are so harsh. The case material indicates that, despite this, children can be helped in some measure to feel more secure, by the therapist providing constancy and reliability within an often frightening and dangerous external world.     

Lgbt Catholics: a paradigmatic case of intra-confessional pluralism

ABSTRACT

I will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels.     

The Place of Rawls in Political and Ethical Theory

The work of John Rawls is central to contemporary political philosophy. A Theory of Justice provides a model for the justification of substantive principles of justice, and it defends principles that reject utilitarianism. Ultimately, justification is a matter of what the participants in a relationship or an institution can justify to one another. Unlike utilitarianism, which assumes that there is one good that it is the job of morality to maximize, Rawls holds that there are multiple conceptions of the good associated with different individuals. Furthermore, he holds that there are multiple principles of morality associated with different relationships and institutions. His principles of justice are designed for one of these—the basic structure of society. They establish a moral minimum that all members of a society owe to one another, but additional principles are required to govern other special relationships.     

Disputed practices and reasonable pluralism

This paper addresses the problem of disputed cultural practices within liberal, deliberative democracies, arguing against the currently dominant view, advocated by Susan Okin among others, that such problems represent a fundamental tension between two liberal values: gender equality and cultural autonomy. Such an approach, I argue, requires the state to render normative judgements about conceptions of the good life, something which is both arbitrary and unfair in societies characterised by reasonable pluralism. Disputed practices, I claim, are defined by the existence of reasonable disagreement over their legitimacy, which means they need to be resolved in a way that abstains from morally evaluating the religious or cultural doctrines of the group in question. The paper therefore articulates a cost-based approach to such problems. The cost-based approach focuses our conceptual attention on the sorts of publicly identifiable costs that any state decision will have on the various parties to a dispute. By restricting itself to public reasons, this method thereby avoids arbitrarily privileging certain conceptions of the good at the expense of others when determining the boundaries of reasonable pluralism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

In the Spirit of William James

In this essay, I identify several ways in which James Dittes extended the spirit of William James in his writings on psychology of religion. Like James, Dittes gave minimal attention to psychological theory and God-talk. Both authors located their reflections on religion within a philosophical, as well as a psychological, perspective. Both employed a discourse that was personalist, pluralist, and pragmatist. In the last section, I briefly note some of the ways in which Dittes moved beyond William James in the spirit of William James.     

Institutions of Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism

This article considers the difficult question of whether there are any reasons for theocratic religious devotees to affirm liberalism and liberal institutions. Swaine argues not only that there are reasons for theocrats to affirm liberalism, but that theocrats are committed rationally to three normative principles of liberty of conscience, as well. Swaine subsequently discusses three institutional and strategic implications of his arguments. First, he outlines an option of semisovereignty for theocratic communities in liberal democracies, and explains why an appropriate valuation of liberty of conscience may justify a standard of that kind. Second, he addresses the question of permissible government aid for religion and symbolic endorsement of religious groups. Third, Swaine considers innovations and new approaches that could be employed internationally to better display liberal government's affirmation of religiosity, to promote liberty of conscience, and to help improve relations between liberal and theocratic parties around the globe.