Attentional Bias Modification in People with Chronic Pain: A Proof of Concept Study

The purpose of this proof of concept study was to explore the role of attentional bias modification (ABM) in improving clinically relevant outcomes in chronic pain. Eight participants with chronic pain completed eight ABM sessions, which featured a modified version of the visual-probe task implicitly training attention away from pain-related stimuli towards neutral stimuli. Training sessions included a variety of linguistic and pictorial pain-related stimuli, which were presented at two presentation times (500 and 1250 ms). Participants also completed a standard version of the visual-probe task pre- and post-ABM to assess changes in bias. The primary outcome measure was pain intensity, and secondary outcome measures were anxiety, depression severity and pain interference. Statistically and clinically significant change was shown pre- to post-ABM in pain intensity, anxiety, depression and pain interference. Attentional bias scores did not statistically differ across time. These results support the continued exploration of ABM in chronic pain and the modifications we made to the intervention (i.e. the inclusion of pictorial stimuli and a longer presentation time). Future research is needed to explore the optimal form of ABM and whether improvements are maintained over time.     

Neural correlates of social perception on response bias

Accurate person perception is crucial in social decision-making. One of the central elements in successful social perception is the ability to understand another’s response bias; this is because the same behavior can represent different inner states depending on whether other people are yea-sayers or naysayers. In the present study, we have tried to investigate how the internal biases of others are perceived. Using a multi-trial learning paradigm, perceivers made predictions about a target’s responses to various suggested activities and then received feedback for each prediction trial-by-trial. Our hypotheses were that (1) the internal decision criterion of the targets would be realized through repeated experiences, and (2) due to positive–negative asymmetry, yea-sayers would be recognized more gradually than naysayers through the probabilistic integration of repeated experiences. To find neural evidence that tracks probabilistic integration when forming person knowledge on response biases, we employed a model-based fMRI with a State-Space Model. We discovered that person knowledge about yea-sayers modulated several brain regions, including caudate nucleus, DLPFC, hippocampus, etc. Moreover, when person knowledge was updated with incorrect performance feedback, brain regions including the caudate nucleus, DLPFC, dmPFC, and TPJ were also involved. There were overlapping regions for both processes, caudate nucleus and DLPFC, suggesting that these regions take crucial roles in forming person knowledge with repeated feedback, while reflecting acquired information up to the current prediction.     

Accuracy of retrospective memory and covariation estimation in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder

Assessment methods relying on biased or inaccurate retrospective recall may distort knowledge about the nature of disorders and lead to faulty clinical inferences. Despite concerns about the accuracy of retrospective recall in general and in particular with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, the accuracy of retrospective recall for one's own symptoms assessed in vivo is unknown in this population. This study used a prospective ecological momentary assessment (EMA) methodology to create a criterion against which to assess recall accuracy in OCD patients. Although results indicated that patients’ retrospective recall of OCD symptoms was fairly accurate, they consistently overestimated the magnitude of OCD symptom covariation with non-OCD facets (e.g., sleep duration, contemporaneous stress level, etc.). Findings suggest that even when recall of OCD symptoms is accurate, patients may be inaccurate in estimating symptom covariation. The findings have implications for the research, case conceptualization, and assessment of OCD, and may extend to other disorders.     

Inner speech slips exhibit lexical bias, but not the phonemic similarity effect

Inner speech, that little voice that people often hear inside their heads while thinking, is a form of mental imagery. The properties of inner speech errors can be used to investigate the nature of inner speech, just as overt slips are informative about overt speech production. Overt slips tend to create words (lexical bias) and involve similar exchanging phonemes (phonemic similarity effect). We examined these effects in inner and overt speech via a tongue-twister recitation task. While lexical bias was present in both inner and overt speech errors, the phonemic similarity effect was evident only for overt errors, producing a significant overtness by similarity interaction. We propose that inner speech is impoverished at lower (featural) levels, but robust at higher (phonemic) levels.     

Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments

An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest that the present finding favors the view that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping diverse cognitive representations across multiple domains.     

语言的群体间偏差研究

个体在用语言来描述他人的行为时,会因为描述对象的群体种类不同而有偏差,具体表现为在描述群体内成员的积极行为和群体外成员的负向行为时,会使用较高抽象水平的词;在描述群体外成员的积极行为和群体内成员的负向行为时,会使用较低抽象水平的词。这种抽象水平的差异由语言范畴模型来具体表明。Maass等人把这种描述上的偏差命名为语言的群体间偏差。并认为在这一现象下有两种机制：动机机制和认知机制,研究表明认知机制能解释大部分语言的群体间偏差现象,而动机机制会在群体内形象受到威胁时发挥作用。     

An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength

Self-affirmation seems to enable an individual to objectively evaluate information that would otherwise evoke a defensive reaction. If this objectivity reflects freedom from self-evaluative concerns, affirmation should sensitize people to central cues of a persuasive message, like argument strength. If affirmation simply induces agreeableness or trivializes the issue, affirmed participants should not particularly heed argument strength. Affirmed and non-affirmed participants rated the persuasiveness of pro- and counterattitudinal arguments that varied in strength. Among participants who rated their attitudes as personally important, self-affirmation decreased bias and increased sensitivity to argument strength, as predicted by self-affirmation theory.     

Turning quickly on myself: Automatic interpretation biases in dysphoria are self-referent

Cognitive theories emphasise automatic interpretation biases (AIB) in the development and maintenance of depression. The current study examined AIB using the word sentence association paradigm for depression (WSAP-D) via endorsement rates and reaction time indices. We directly tested the importance of self-relevance for AIB by modifying the WASP-D task to include self-referent ambiguous stimuli and contrasting them with other-referent ambiguous stimuli. We hypothesised that the dysphoric group, but not the non-dysphoric group, would demonstrate AIB only for self-referent ambiguous stimuli. Consistent with our main hypotheses, dysphoric individuals endorsed negative interpretations more often and faster than non-dysphoric individuals, only for self-referent ambiguous stimuli. Self-relevance may be a critical aspect of AIB in dysphoric populations.     

The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments

This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.     

Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: a test of the expertise defense

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate—as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge—does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed.