Choice and foraging: the effects of accessibility on acceptability.

Pigeons responded in a successive-encounters choice procedure in which accessibility of the less profitable of two outcomes varied either in terms of probability of encounter or search time to encounter (keeping search time to the more profitable outcome constant). When the less profitable outcome was made more probable its acceptance became more likely. However, when search time to encounter the less profitable outcome was shortened, its acceptance became less likely. Both results are consistent with the delay-reduction hypothesis and with an optimality model developed for application to the successive-encounters choice procedure.     

Statistical inference for false positive and false negative error rates in mastery testing

This paper describes an asymptotic inferential procedure for the estimates of the false positive and false negative error rates. Formulas and tables are described for the computations of the standard errors. A simulation study indicates that the asymptotic standard errors may be used even with samples of 25 cases as long as the Kuder-Richardson Formula 21 reliability is reasonably large. Otherwise, a large sample would be required.This work was performed pursuant to Grant No NIE-G-78-0087 with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Huynh Huynh, Principal Investigator. Points of view or opinions stated do not necessarily reflect NIE position or policy and no official endorsement should be inferred. The editorial assistance of Joseph C. Saunders is gratefully acknowledged.     

Learning How to Generalize

Generalization is a fundamental problem solved by every cognitive system in essentially every domain. Although it is known that how people generalize varies in complex ways depending on the context or domain, it is an open question how people learn the appropriate way to generalize for a new context. To understand this capability, we cast the problem of learning how to generalize as a problem of learning the appropriate hypothesis space for generalization. We propose a normative mathematical framework for learning how to generalize by learning inductive biases for which properties are relevant for generalization in a domain from the statistical structure of features and concepts observed in that domain. More formally, the framework predicts that an ideal learner should learn to generalize by either taking the weighted average of the results of generalizing according to each hypothesis space, with weights given by how well each hypothesis space fits the previously observed concepts, or by using the most likely hypothesis space. We compare the predictions of this framework to human generalization behavior with three experiments in one perceptual (rectangles) and two conceptual (animals and numbers) domains. Across all three studies we find support for the framework's predictions, including individual‐level support for averaging in the third study.     

Reward value effects on timing in the peak procedure

Three experiments examined the effect of motivational variables on timing in the peak procedure. In Experiment 1, rats received a 60-s peak procedure that was coupled with long-term, between-phase changes in reinforcer magnitude. Increases in reinforcer magnitude produced a leftward shift in the peak that persisted for 20 sessions of training. In a final phase, the rats received lithium chloride-induced aversion prior to testing and a rightward shift in the peak was observed. Experiment 2 confirmed the rightward shift in the peak under lithium chloride devaluation and induced a comparable shift with satiety devaluation. The degree of rightward shift was neither additive nor multiplicative, suggesting that two processes may have contributed. Experiment 3 examined the effect of extinction on peak responding, revealing a decrease in response rate, but no evidence of any change in the timing of responding. The implications of the results for contemporary timing theories are discussed.     

Some effects of response-correlated increases in reinforcer magnitude on human behavior

After training under short or long fixed-interval schedules, humans responded under a modified fixed-interval schedule in which magnitude of reinforcement (X or 2X) was minimally correlated with response frequency. Response frequencies that equaled or exceeded a minimum response criterion were followed by the larger reinforcer at the end of the interval; otherwise, the smaller reinforcer was delivered. The modified schedule alternated with the baseline schedule across conditions. In a control condition, the reinforcer magnitudes produced by control subjects were yoked to those of experimental subjects. Experimental subjects, but not control subjects, showed increased responding. In addition to the baseline and modified fixed-interval schedules used in Experiment 1, subjects in Experiment 2 also responded under a second modified fixed-interval contingency in which increases in reinforcer magnitude were more highly correlated with response frequency. Experimental subjects, but not control subjects, showed increased responding under both procedures. Direct comparison of these two procedures showed that the high-correlation procedure produced greater increases in responding than did the low-correlation procedure.     

The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

内隐推理的实验研究

采用加工分离程序和多重分离程序,以瑞文高级推理测验为实验材料,对内隐推理进行了实验研究。实验1对包含测验与排除测验中正确猜测的期望概率进行了估计;实验2采用公式P1=Pc∪PA∪R1和PE=PC^－∩(PA∪RE)对外显推理和内隐推理的贡献进行了计算。结果发现存在显著的外显推理和内隐推理效应。     

阅读理解困难儿童的认知加工

阅读理解困难是阅读障碍的一个主要类型,近年来受到西方研究者的重视。阅读理解认知加工,核心是有层次的语义加工,理解困难儿童在词汇语义加工和篇章推理和整合上都存在落后。理解困难儿童的信息推理水平落后,可能原因来自两个方面：一方面是语音工作记忆缺陷导致推理加工能力缺陷,另一方面是阅读元认知缺陷导致阅读目的和理解监控发展不正常。这些缺陷之间复杂的关系,还需要进一步研究     

类别标签与典型性程度对类别特征推理的影响

本研究采用学习-测试二阶段实验范式,探讨了类别标签及典型性程度对类别特征推理任务的共同影响,结果表明,类别标签及典型性程度都会影响类别特征推理任务,而且,类别标签及典型性程度之间存在交互作用,典型性程度为高条件下类别标签对类别特征推理任务的影响要高于典型性程度为低条件,类别标签匹配条件下,典型性程度对类别特征推理任务的影响要高于类别标签不匹配条件。     

CRITICAL REALISM REDUX: A RESPONSE TO JOSH REEVES

This article combines an appreciation of several themes in Josh Reeves's Against Methodology in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology while arguing in favor of critical realism. The author holds that critical realism manages to combine the objective truth reached through inference and especially cognitive acts of judgment as well as the various, contingent historical contexts that also define where science is practiced. Reeves advocates a historical perspective, but this article claims that in order for critical realism to be credible, a philosophical perspective must be maintained.