Primate errors in transitive ‘inference’: a two-tier learning model

Transitive performance (TP) is a learning-based behaviour exhibited by a wide range of species, where if a subject has been taught to prefer A when presented with the pair AB but to prefer B when presented with the pair BC, then the subject will also prefer A when presented with the novel pair AC. Most explanations of TP assume that subjects recognize and learn an underlying sequence from observing the training pairs. However, data from squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and young children contradict this, showing that when three different items (a triad) are drawn from the sequence, subjects' performance degrades systematically (McGonigle and Chalmers, Nature 267:694-696, 1977; Chalmers and McGonigle, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 37:355-377, 1984; Harris and McGonigle, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 47B:319-348, 1994). We present here the two-tier model, the first learning model of TP which accounts for this systematic performance degradation. Our model assumes primate TP is based on a general-purpose task learning system rather than a special-purpose sequence-learning system. It supports the hypothesis of Heckers et al. (Hippocampus 14:153-162, 2004) that TP is an expression of two separate general learning elements: one for associating actions and contexts, another for prioritising associations when more than one context is present. The two-tier model also provides explanations for why phased training is important for helping subjects learn the initial training pairs and why some subjects fail to do so. It also supports the Harris and McGonigle (The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 47B:319-348, 1994) explanation of why, once the training pairs have been acquired, subjects perform transitive choice automatically on two-item diads, but not when exposed to triads from the same sequence.     

Is it enough to be willing to win or do you have to be smart? The relationship between competitive worldviews,cognitive abilities,and applicant faking in personality tests

Recent research has highlighted competitive worldviews as a key predictor of faking—the intentional distortion of answers by candidates in the selection context. According to theoretical assumptions, applicants’ abilities, and especially their cognitive abilities, should influence whether faking motivation, triggered by competitive worldviews, can be turned into successful faking behavior. Therefore, we examined the influence of competitive worldviews on faking in personality tests and investigated a possible moderation of this relationship by cognitive abilities in three independent high school and university student samples (N₁ = 133, N₂ = 137, N₃ = 268). Our data showed neither an influence of the two variables nor of their interaction on faking behavior. We discuss possible reasons for these findings and give suggestions for further research.