Breaking face processing tasks apart to improve their predictive value in the real world: A comment on Ramon,Bobak, and White (2019)

In this commentary, I will expand on three aspects suggested by Ramon et al. (2019, British Journal of Psychology, 110, 461) to improve the predictive value of laboratory‐based tasks in real‐world applications. There are potential benefits that may arise from three interrelated considerations, particularly in terms of predicting agents’ susceptibility to errors in operational settings. The first is a proposal to conduct a detailed examination of performance on face processing tests rather than only analysing overall accuracy scores. The second involves considering non‐face‐related cognitive and meta‐cognitive sub‐processes involved in face processing tasks. The third highlights the contribution of superior recognisers in creating challenging tests that simulate difficult real‐world situations.     

Bilingual toddlers’ comprehension of mixed sentences is asymmetrical across their two languages

In bilingual language environments, infants and toddlers listen to two separate languages during the same key years that monolingual children listen to just one and bilinguals rarely learn each of their two languages at the same rate. Learning to understand language requires them to cope with challenges not found in monolingual input, notably the use of two languages within the same utterance (e.g., Do you like the perro? or ¿Te gusta el doggy?). For bilinguals of all ages, switching between two languages can reduce the efficiency in real‐time language processing. But language switching is a dynamic phenomenon in bilingual environments, presenting the young learner with many junctures where comprehension can be derailed or even supported. In this study, we tested 20 Spanish–English bilingual toddlers (18‐ to 30‐months) who varied substantially in language dominance. Toddlers’ eye movements were monitored as they looked at familiar objects and listened to single‐language and mixed‐language sentences in both of their languages. We found asymmetrical switch costs when toddlers were tested in their dominant versus non‐dominant language, and critically, they benefited from hearing nouns produced in their dominant language, independent of switching. While bilingualism does present unique challenges, our results suggest a united picture of early monolingual and bilingual learning. Just like monolinguals, experience shapes bilingual toddlers’ word knowledge, and with more robust representations, toddlers are better able to recognize words in diverse sentences.     

Emotion differentiation dissected: between-category,within-category,and integral emotion differentiation,and their relation to well-being

Emotion differentiation, the ability to describe and label our own emotions in a differentiated and specific manner, has been repeatedly associated with well-being. However, it is unclear exactly what type of differentiation is most strongly related to well-being: the ability to make fine-grained distinctions between emotions that are relatively closely related (e.g. anger and irritation), the ability to make larger distinctions between very distinct emotions (e.g. anger and sadness), or the combination of both. To determine which type of differentiation is most predictive of well-being, we performed a comprehensive meta-analysis across six datasets. We examined the correlations between these three types of differentiation and several indicators of well-being (depression, emotional clarity, and self-esteem). Results showed that individuals differentiated most between very distinct emotions and least between more related emotions, and that an index computed across emotions from both the same and different emotion categories was most strongly associated with well-being indicators.     

The semantic structure of emotion words across languages is consistent with componential appraisal models of emotion

Appraisal theories of emotion, and particularly the Component Process Model, claim that the different components of the emotion process (action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences) are essentially driven by the results of cognitive appraisals and that the feeling component constitutes a central integration and representation of these processes. Given the complexity of the proposed architecture, comprehensive experimental tests of these predictions are difficult to perform and to date are lacking. Encouraged by the “lexical sedimentation” hypothesis, here we propose an indirect examination of the compatibility of the theoretical assumptions with the semantic structure of a set of major emotion words as measured in a cross-language and cross-cultural study. Specifically, we performed a secondary analysis of the large-scale data set with ratings of affective features covering all components of the emotion process for 24 emotion words in 27 countries, constituting profiles of emotion-specific appraisals, action tendencies, physiological reactions, expressions, and feeling experiences. The results of a series of hierarchical regression analyses to examine the prediction of the theoretical model are highly consistent with the claim that appraisal patterns determine the structure of the response components, which in turn predict central dimensions of the feeling component.     

Evaluations versus stereotypes in emotion recognition: a replication and extension of Craig and Lipp’s (2018) study on facial age cues

Recently, Cognition and Emotion published an article demonstrating that age cues affect the speed and accuracy of emotion recognition. The authors claimed that the observed effect of target age on emotion recognition is better explained by evaluative than stereotype associations. Although we agree with their conclusion, we believe that with the research method the authors employed, it was impossible to detect a stereotype effect to begin with. In the current research, we successfully replicate previous findings (Study 1). Furthermore, by changing the comparative context, Study 2 provides a first test of age-stereotypes affecting emotions recognition. We discuss recommendations for future studies in the domain of social categorisation and emotion recognition.     

When your heart is in your mouth: the effect of second language use on negative emotions

Research on bilingualism and emotions has shown stronger emotional responses in the native language (L1) compared to a foreign language. We investigated the potential of purposeful second language (L2) use as a means of decreasing the experience of psychological distress. Native Swedish speakers read and answered questions about negative and neutral texts in their L1 (Swedish) and their L2 (English) and were asked to rate their level of distress before or after the questions. The texts and associated questions were either written in the same (within-language), or different languages (cross-language). We found that within-language trials when the text was written in participants’ native language (Swedish–Swedish) resulted in an increase of distress, whilst cross-language trials (Swedish–English) resulted in a decrease of distress. This implies that purposeful second language use can diminish levels of distress experienced following a negative event encoded in one's first language.     

A critical appraisal of the role of neuropsychological deficits in preschool ADHD

The present study aimed at improving our understanding of the role of neuropsychological deficits in preschool Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The study included 52 children in the ADHD group and 72 controls (age 4–6 years). Both laboratory measures and teacher reports of executive deficits (i.e., working memory, inhibition, and shifting), delay-related behaviors (i.e., the preference for minimizing delay), and emotional functions (i.e., emotion recognition and regulation) were included. Variable-oriented analyses were complemented with person-oriented analyses (i.e., identifying the proportion of patients considered impaired). Results showed that the ADHD group differed from controls with regard to all measures of executive functioning and most measures of delay-related behaviors, but few differences were found for emotional functioning. A substantial subgroup (23%) of children with ADHD did not have a neuropsychological deficit in any domain. There were subgroups with executive or delay-related deficits only, but no pure emotional subgroup. The overlap between different neuropsychological deficits was much larger when teacher reports were used as opposed to laboratory measures. Regarding functional impairments, large mean differences were found between the ADHD group and controls. However, neuropsychological deficits were not able to explain individual variations in daily life functioning among children with ADHD. In conclusion, the present study identified some important methodological and theoretical issues regarding the role of neuropsychological functioning in preschool ADHD.     

Which components of processing speed are affected in ADHD subtypes?

The term “processing speed” (PS) encompasses many components including perceptual, cognitive and output speed. Despite evidence for reduced PS in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), little is known about which component(s) is most impacted in ADHD, or how it may vary by subtypes. Participants included 151 children, ages 8–12 years, with ADHD Predominantly Inattentive Type, ADHD Combined Type and typically developing controls using DSM-IV criteria. All children completed four measures of processing speed: Symbol Search, Coding, Decision Speed, and simple reaction time. We found children with ADHD-PI and ADHD-C had slower perceptual and psychomotor/incidental learning speed than controls and that ADHD-PI had slower decision speed than controls. The subtypes did not differ on any of these measures. Mean reaction time was intact in ADHD. Hence, at a very basic output level, children with ADHD do not have impaired speed overall, but as task demands increase their processing speed becomes less efficient than controls’. Further, perceptual and psychomotor speed were related to inattention, and psychomotor speed/incidental learning was related to hyperactivity/impulsivity. Thus, inattention may contribute to less efficient performance and worse attention to detail on tasks with a higher perceptual and/or psychomotor load; whereas hyperactivity/impulsivity may affect psychomotor speed/incidental learning, possibly via greater inaccuracy and/or reduced learning efficiency. Decision speed was not related to either dimension. Results suggest that PS deficits are primarily linked to the inattention dimension of ADHD but not exclusively. Findings also suggest PS is not a singular process but rather a multifaceted system that is differentially impacted in ADHD.     

Human faces capture attention and attract first saccades without longer fixation

Human faces attract attention, evidenced by reaction time (RT) advantages over non-face stimuli in visual search tasks. In the current study, participants’ eye movements were tracked during a search task to test how the attentional capture of faces is related to looking behaviour. On each trial, participants were cued with a category name (automobiles, birds, chairs, dogs, faces, bodies, or plants). An array of images, one exemplar from each category, was then presented until participants indicated whether the target matched the cue. Results showed that faces as targets resulted in faster search times and were more likely to capture first fixations. Fixations on faces were also shorter compared to other categories. Faces captured attention, attracting first fixations, and participants appeared to be more fluent at processing faces, resulting in shorter fixations. Reaction time advantages for faces could be due to both attention capture and ultra-rapid processing.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.