Dehumanization of women and men in elective abortion: A preregistered replication in China

Although abortion in China has been legalized for several decades, it is still controversial and the woman and man involved are at risk of being stigmatized. The current research replicated two studies conducted in Italy by investigating how the abortion decision of the woman and man influence received moral outrage, dehumanization, and perceptions of female professional competence. Study 1, which only included female participants, found higher moral outrage toward a woman having an abortion when the pregnancy was depicted as referring to a “child” (vs. “foetus”), and higher dehumanization of the woman in terms of human nature. Study 2, which included both male and female participants, and clarified responsibility for the abortion decision with respect to the woman and the man, revealed higher moral outrage and a reduction in the attribution of human uniqueness to the man, and of human nature to both the woman and the man. Moral outrage mediated dehumanization when participants had low positive attitudes toward abortion in Study 1 and high positive attitudes in Study 2. Both studies showed a negative impact of the decision to have an abortion on the woman's perceived traditional professional competence. The results generally align with the findings from Italy and yield some practical implications on reducing abortion stigma. Future abortion stigma research should consider more gender-related factors.     

Pavlovian Disgust Conditioning and Generalization: Specificity and Associations With Individual Differences

Although studies have identified differences between fear and disgust conditioning, much less is known about the generalization of conditioned disgust. This is an important gap in the literature given that overgeneralization of conditioned disgust to neutral stimuli may have clinical implications. To address this knowledge gap, female participants (n = 80) completed a Pavlovian conditioning procedure in which one neutral food item (conditioned stimulus; CS+) was followed by disgusting videos of individuals vomiting (unconditioned stimulus; US) and another neutral food item (CS–) was not reinforced with the disgusting video. Following this acquisition phase, there was an extinction phase in which both CSs were presented unreinforced. Importantly, participants also evaluated generalization stimuli (GS+, GS?) that resembled, but were distinct from, the CS after each conditioning phase. As predicted, the CS+ was rated as significantly more disgusting and fear inducing than the CS? after acquisition and this pattern persisted after extinction. However, disgust ratings of the CS+ after acquisition were significantly larger than fear ratings. Participants also rated the GS+ as significantly more disgusting, but not fear inducing, than the GS? after acquisition. However, this effect was not observed after extinction. Disgust proneness did predict a greater increase in disgust and fear ratings of the CS+ relative to the CS? after acquisition and extinction. In contrast, trait anxiety predicted only higher fear ratings to the CS+ relative to the CS? after acquisition and extinction. Disgust proneness nor trait anxiety predicted the greater increase in disgust to the GS+ relative to the GS? after acquisition. These findings suggest that while conditioned disgust can generalize, individual difference variables that predict generalization remain unclear. The implications of these findings for disorders of disgust are discussed.     

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.     

Ideology,moral reframing,and persuasion in the context of COVID-19 vaccines

A possible strategy for circumventing vaccine hesitancy and increasing support for vaccines is moral reframing. Moral Foundations Theory suggests messages framed using individuating foundations should be more persuasive to liberals, while messages framed using binding foundations should be more persuasive to conservatives. In an experiment, we investigated the role of political ideology and moral reframing in persuading college students to support mandating COVID-19 vaccination on university campuses. We tested harm-framed and loyalty-framed interventions to persuade liberals and conservatives, respectively. Results indicated that overall conservatives were less persuaded than liberals. Liberals were more persuaded by a harm-framed than loyalty-framed message when measuring ideology categorically (but not continuously). There were no differences in persuasion among conservatives. With further research, moral reframing could be effective in increasing support for vaccines and mandatory vaccinations.     

Intellectual humility predicts COVID-19 preventive practices through greater adoption of data-driven information and feelings of responsibility

Preventive health practices have been crucial to mitigating viral spread during the COVID-19 pandemic. In two studies, we examined whether intellectual humility—openness to one's existing knowledge being inaccurate—related to greater engagement in preventive health practices (social distancing, handwashing, mask-wearing). In Study 1, we found that intellectually humble people were more likely to engage in COVID-19 preventive practices. Additionally, this link was driven by intellectually humble people's tendency to adopt information from data-driven sources (e.g., medical experts) and greater feelings of responsibility over the outcomes of COVID-19. In Study 2, we found support for these relationships over time (2 weeks). Additionally, Study 2 showed that the link between intellectual humility and preventive practices was driven by a greater tendency to adopt data-driven information when encountering it, rather than actively seeking out such information. These findings reveal the promising role of intellectual humility in making well-informed decisions during public health crises.     

Arguers as editors

People use editorial criteria to decide whether to say or to suppress potential arguments. These criteria constitute people's standards as to what effective and appropriate arguments are like, and reflect general interaction goals. A series of empirical investigations has indicated that the standards fall into three classes: those having to do with argument effectiveness, those concerned with personal issues for arguer and target, and those centered on discourse quality. The essay also sketches the affinities certain types of people have for the different criteria.     

The expected likelihood of transitivity of preference

May's model of pairwise preference determination is used to assess the expected likelihood that a subject's pairwise preference comparisons on three alternatives will be transitive. A closed form representation for this expected likelihood is obtained for each situation considered. When the subject is assumed to act precisely according to rankings on attributes with May's model, the computed expected likelihoods the relatively large. When the subject becomes a probabilistic chooser, as defined in a specific manner, expected likelihoods of transitivity decrease significantly from corresponding values with May's model. For a probabilistic Chooser, there is a significant likelihood that the subject might yield transitive pairwise preferences substantially different than the results suggested by May's model.This research was supported by a grant from the General University Research Program and through a fellowship from the Center for Advanced Study, both of the University of Delaware. Very helpful input from John H. Antil, Meryl P. Gardner, and James M. Munch is also acknowledged.     

Lateralization of defence mechanisms related to creative functioning

Eighty-four undergraduate students were randomly divided into left and right visual half-field groups. They were tested in either visual half-field with a percept-genetic test of anxiety and defense mechanisms (the MCT). The subjects also took a test of creative functioning (the CFT) and degree of lateralization in the MCT was related to level of creativity in the CFT. Subjects low in creativity were significantly lateralized on measures typical for the right visual half-field group (isolation and repression) and tended to differ on a left visual half-field measure (regressive strategies). For high creative subjects no differences were found between the visual half-field groups. Also, high creative persons more often responded with non-hemisphere-specific defenses than low creative ones. The results were interpreted as due to differing levels of transmission of information between the two hemispheres of the brain.     

Culture wars: American moral divisions across the adult lifespan

Sociologists have argued that the public moral debate in contemporary America is characterized by a “culture war,” pitting “orthodox” and “progressivist” groups against one another (Hunter, 1991). This study addressed whether the culture war is evident in the moral thinking of ordinary Americans, and whether age-related patterns exist. Sixty fundamentalist Baptists (orthodox) and 60 mainline Baptists (progressivist) evaluated and reasoned about moral issues such as divorce and abortion. Each group was divided evenly into three age groups copsisting of young, midlife, and older adults. Moral reasoning was analyzed in terms of Shweder's (1990) ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity. Within all three age groups, progressivists used the ethic of, autonomy more than orthodox participants. Orthodox participants used the ethic of divinity more than progressivists. Orthodox and progressivist groups did not differ much in their use of the ethic, of community. Very few age group differences were found within the orthodox and progressivist groups. It is concluded that morality is conceived of in markedly different wasy by orthodox and progressivist groups, and that these conceptions are consistent across age groups.     

The responsibility of engineers, appropriate technology, and lesser developed nations

Projects importing technology to lesser developed nations may raise five important concerns: famine resulting from substitution of cash crops for subsistence crops, the use of products banned in the United States but permitted overseas, the use of products safe in the U.S. but unsafe under local conditions, ecological consequences of technological change, and cultural disruption caused by displacing traditional ways of life. Are engineers responsible for the foreseeable hunger, environmental degradation, cultural disruption, and illness that results from the project? Are engineers guilty of paternalism if they refuse to accept the project for that reason? Criteria are given to help engineers assess the extent of their responsibility when working in lesser developed nations.