Intentionalism and Change Blindness

According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.

Nature and facts about natural and artifactual categories: Sex differences in the semantic priming paradigm

There is abundant evidence from behavioral and neurophysiological experiments for the distinction of natural versus artifactual categories and a gender-specific difference: women’s performances in cognitive tasks increase when natural categories are used, whereas men’s performances increase with artifactual categories. Here, we used the semantic priming paradigm to study retrieval processes by presenting category labels as primes and exemplars as targets. Overall, in two experiments we found larger priming effects for natural than for artifactual categories. In addition, females showed positive priming effects for natural but negative effects for artifactual categories, whereas males showed positive priming effects for both categories. This pattern matches with that from other tasks and can be interpreted as evidence that the findings from these other tasks are, at least partially, indeed due to different representations or processing modes for males and females and not (exclusively) due to—for example—different familiarity with a category. In a further experiment, we showed that the found pattern for females can be manipulated by focusing on perceptual vs. functional features. The results can be interpreted as first evidence that there are (eventually in addition to different “crystallized” semantic structures) specific default processing modes that differ for males and females.     

整体/局部加工中的半球功能不对称效应

20世纪末的研究证据显示,对Navon等级刺激的整体/局部加工中半球功能不对称效应发生在早期还是晚期阶段,研究者存在着争论。近期的电生理和功能成像研究资料表明,整体/局部加工的半球不对称效应可能是一个受到多种因素调节的复杂动态系统;早期信息表征的半球功能不对称效应可能主要受知觉因素的影响,而注意控制和反应冲突可能主要调节晚期知觉加工的半球功能不对称     

不同难度阅读材料对阅读知觉广度影响的眼动研究

采用经典的呈现随眼动变化技术,以Eyelink II眼动仪为工具,考察材料难度和窗口大小对中文句子阅读的影响.实验设计为2(材料难度:难,易)× 5(窗口大小:1个字,3个字,5个字,7个字和整行)被试内实验设计,被试为15名在校大学生.研究结果表明:(1)阅读容易材料时的知觉广度为5个字.(2)阅读困难材料时知觉广度为3-5个字.     

面孔识别异族效应的研究

异族效应是面孔识别过程中一种非常稳定的现象,表现为对本族面孔的识别与再认成绩显著高于异族面孔.脑成像研究也证实了这两类面孔在神经表征上的差异.关于该效应主要有知觉经验说与社会分类说两种理论解释,但围绕着其心理机制仍然存在着很多争议然,未来的研究需要考虑族群认同等社会-人格因素对于异族效应的影响,并注意考察本族面孔与异族面孔有提取阶段可能存在的神经活动的差异.     

简单结构刺激非规则特征突显条件下的样例效应

用变化了的Allen和Brooks的实验范式,采用2(学习轮次:5轮、10轮)×2(项目类型:旧项目、新项目)×2(项目匹配性质:正向匹配、反向匹配)混合实验设计,研究对4个特征刺激分类时非规则特征突显条件下的样例效应。结果发现,无论是错误率还是反应时都取得了明显的样例效应,但是学习时间的影响不明显。     

Threat in dreams: an adaptation?

Revonsuo's influential Threat Simulation Theory (TST) predicts that people exposed to survival threats will have more threat dreams, and evince enhanced responses to dream threats, compared to those living in relatively safe conditions. Participants in a high crime area (South Africa: n=208) differed significantly from participants in a low crime area (Wales, UK: n=116) in having greater recent exposure to a life-threatening event (chi([1,N=186])(2)=14.84, p<.00012). Contrary to TST's predictions, the SA participants reported significantly fewer threat dreams (chi([1,N=287])(2)=6.11, p<.0134), and did not differ from the Welsh participants in responses to dream threats (Fisher's Exact test, p=.2478). Overall, the incidence of threat in dreams was extremely low-less than 20% of dreams featured realistic survival threats. Escape from dream threats occurred in less than 2% of dreams. We conclude that this evidence contradicts key aspects of TST.     

Shooting the messenger won’t change the news

Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and Tredoux [Malcolm-Smith, S., Solms, M., Turnbull, O., & Tredoux, C. (2008). Threat in dreams: An adaptation? Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1281–1291.] conducted a rigorous study that sampled two populations differentially exposed to threat in real life, and found that critical predictions from the Threat Simulation Theory of dreams [Revonsuo, A. (2000a). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 877-901.; Revonsuo, A. (2000b). Did ancestral humans dream for their lives? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 1063–1082.] were not supported. Specifically, we found no evidence of increased realistic threats to physical survival or enhanced threat avoidance in the dreams of those from the exposed population. Revonsuo and Valli’s [Revonsuo, A., & Valli, K. (2008). How to test the threat simulation theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1292-1296.] commentary on our study argues that the methods we used are so flawed as to render the results meaningless. In this response article, we address the criticisms raised in their commentary.     

In Defence of Non-conceptual Content

In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.

注视方向的知觉对注视追随行为的影响

他人的注视线索可诱导观察者将注意自动地转移到该线索所指示的方向上去(注视追随), 但仍不清楚注视方向的知觉在注视追随中起到何种作用。本研究结合注视适应和注视线索提示范式发现：知觉到的注视线索角度越大, 其线索提示效应越强; 知觉适应后被试判断注视方向的准确性下降, 注视线索引起的注意转移量显著减少。可见, 对注视方向的知觉能直接影响注视追随行为, 而注视方向抽取受到刺激显著性(注视角度)和知觉适应等因素的调节。这提示：在意识状态下, 注视知觉与注视追随存在直接联系, 即可能存在从注视知觉系统到注意转移系统的皮层加工通路; 注视追随并非纯粹的反射式加工, 它受自上而下知觉经验的调节。