A Zero-Relationship Justification of Rights： A Contractual Approach Based on Rawls＇ Device of the ＂Original Position＂

In contemporary moral and political philosophy, there are two leading approaches to the justification of rights. These could be broadly identified as deontological theories and consequential theories. These two schools of theories each have their own strengths and weakness, while there is also a third contractual approach that is under represented. Because Rawls＇ and Scanlon＇s well-known contractual theories are designed for purposes other than the justification of rights, the purpose of this paper is to establish a principle of rights on the basis of Rawls＇ justification device of the ＂original position.＂ First, it supplies a criterion based on human conduct or action. Second, based on this account of human conduct, different types of relationships are constructed and presented to the parties in the ＂original position.＂ Third, it will show that the parties in the ＂original position＂ would choose one of these relationships as the principle of rights. Finally, Rawls＇ first principle of justice will be reformulated. The procedure of choosing a principle of rights in this paper could also be viewed as a demonstration that, when properly situated and motivated, human beings exhibit their potential as rational beings.     

On Replacing the Ethical Principle of Autonomy With an Ethical Principle of Accordance

The author defines and critiques the ethical principle of autonomy. As a concept, autonomy is most aligned with paradigms of counseling that focus on the individual as a psychological entity with moral agency. It is less consistent with frameworks that focus on relationships philosophically and in practice. Autonomy is paradoxical, because it is a consensually defined principle imposed on counseling practice while denying counselors a choice in its application. The author suggests accordance as an alternative ethical principle. Accordance is consistent with relational paradigms of practice and the other relationship‐focused ethical principles in counseling. Accordance fully contextualizes individual responsibility and choice.     

On the reception of the concept of the death drive in Germany: expressing and resisting an ‘evil principle’?

With Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud attempted ‘to describe and to account for the facts of daily observation in our field of study’ (1920, p. 7), in particular concerning destructive clinical phenomena that confront us in the analytic situation: traumatic neuroses, melancholic states, negative‐therapeutic reactions, masochism, repetition compulsion and so on. The author demonstrates in the first section how Freud's own resistance – later self‐diagnosed – to recognizing these unwelcome facts was expressed in the terminological and conceptual ambiguities of the death drive hypothesis then introduced, ambiguities that to some extent continue to impede the reception of its clinical usefulness to this day. As soon as Freud had demonstrated the connection with clinical practice more directly in The Ego and the Id (1923), some contemporaries adopted it as a helpful clinical concept, while others believed that they could (and must) refute it. The second part outlines its reception in the 1920s and 1930s, which was part of an international discussion that was, of course, initially conducted mainly in German. The beginnings of an important further development of the death drive hypothesis are described in a separate section because it originated from Melanie Klein's earliest experiences in analysing children in Berlin in the early to mid‐1920s. She referred at that time to an ‘evil principle’, and in 1932 published her view of the death drive hypothesis, which was further developed in subsequent decades by her and her followers in London. In this period, conditions changed dramatically: in Germany Freud's books (among others) were burnt, crimes against humanity were instigated and psychoanalysis ceased to exist in this country. Almost all the analysts who published on the death drive had to emigrate. From then on, entirely different discourses took place in the various regions. In Germany, the death drive hypothesis was (largely) disregarded or rejected for decades after the Holocaust. Frank demonstrates how the uncritical recourse in relevant works to this day to an article by Brun in 1953 that considered the death drive to have been comprehensively refuted on the basis of (apparently) comprehensive literature research can be understood as a symptom. Pursuing some reflections by Beland (1988) and Cycon (1995), the author expounds her thesis that in Germany the clinical usefulness of the death drive hypothesis could not be considered as long as destructive impulses were still an immediate social reality. According to the author's observations, in stating that there had been a ‘definite reaction formation against death drive hypotheses’, Brun had unintentionally made an accurate diagnosis. It was not until the realization of inevitable perpetrator identifications (‘Hitler in us’) in this country became (more widely) possible that a concern with the death drive hypothesis could also resume. In the final section, the author takes up one line of this development and traces how some German analysts in the 1980s came into contact with Kleinian developments that had since occurred and how these found and find their way into their analytic working. She closes by asking whether it might be appropriate to consider Melanie Klein's concept of an evil principle – along with the pleasure and reality principles – as a less ambiguous one for the phenomena under consideration.     

Moral Dilemmas in Military Situations: Proportionality Principle,Religiosity, Political Attitudes,and Authoritarian Personality

The current study focuses on a moral dilemma in military situations: the amount of force to be used in order to neutralize a “most wanted” terrorist. This study examines the association between this moral dilemma with 4 independent variables: agreement with the proportionality principle (mediating variable), level of religiosity, authoritarian personality, and political attitudes. Three equal groups of participants (together, N = 357) were included: Israeli regular army combat soldiers, Israeli reserve combat soldiers, and Israeli students. In accordance with the study hypotheses, the 4 independent variables significantly correlated with each other and with moral decisions. Structural equation modeling indicated that agreement with the proportionality principle is the best predictor of moral decision, and mediated the association between level of religiosity and political attitudes and moral decisions.     

Hume on the Distinction of Reason

This paper concerns Hume’s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume’s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume’s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson).     

Clarke Against Spinoza on the Manifest Diversity of the World

Samuel Clarke was one of Spinoza's earliest and fiercest opponents in England. I uncover three related Clarkean arguments against Spinoza's metaphysic that deserve more attention from readers today. Collectively, these arguments draw out a tension at the very heart of Spinoza's rationalist system. From the conjunction of a necessary being who acts necessarily and the principle of sufficient reason, Clarke reasons that there could be none of the diversity we find in the universe. In doing so, Clarke potentially reveals an inconsistent triad in Spinoza. Responses to this inconsistency map onto a deep division in the contemporary Spinoza literature. I conclude that Clarke's arguments provide a new approach to the recently revived debate over acosmic interpretations of Spinoza and point to new interpretive possibilities.     

Information-Hierarchical Organization of Natural Systems I: The Information-Physical Principle

The mathematical notion of information characterizing system organization as such has been developed. The information-physical principle, which characterizes an information exchange in natural hierarchical systems and has been confirmed by its numerous applications, is laid down. It is shown to be based on the ancient “matter–measure–information” concept of physical world structure and talked about in the Hermes Trismegistus's will.     

Information-Hierarchical Organization of Natural Systems II: Futures of Man–Biosphere Interactions and Climate Control

The informational influence of both the vegetation and human society on climate dynamics in moderate and arid zones is revealed. The stability of the Eurasia climate during the last 2,000 years was determined by the specific structure of the Christianity-Judaism sociobiosystem. The study has also revealed the potential information-hierarchical organization of human society with a 71,874-year existence. This organization includes three world religions (Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam) as subsystems and provides both the global stability of climate processes and the conservation of evolutionary developed information-hierarchical organization of the biosphere.     

Structural and functional information—an evolutionary approach to pragmatic information

The paper starts with a critics of the potential information which is related to the statistical entropy. In order to include the syntactic and semantic aspects of information, we propose a distinction between structural and functional information, instead. Structural information represents the structural determination of a system state, it measures the content of information, as given by the material structure. Functional information, on the other hand, represents the operational closure of the system, it could be e.g. an algorithm which activates and interprets the existing structural information.

From an evolutionary point of view, pragmatic information is generated by an interplay of structural and functional information. This leads to a new insight into the concept of pragmatic information, which is not an invariant of evolution, but must be steadily re‐generated.

The active role of information in a self‐organization process is demonstrated in a model of artificial agents. It is shown by means of computer simulations that the feedback of already existing information on the generation of new information performs analogies to the creation of a collective memory.     

平等的正义性及其形式原则考论

正义在逻辑上是比平等更底层、更基础的概念,可以为平等理论提供逻辑基础,平等的论证是一种正义性论证。支撑平等的正义的形式原则相同的人相同对待,不同的人不同对待,恰恰是从平等的描述性概念即人们的相同性到平等的规范性概念即平等要求的逻辑过渡。