How counting represents number: what children must learn and when they learn it

This study compared 2- to 4-year-olds who understand how counting works (cardinal-principle-knowers) to those who do not (subset-knowers), in order to better characterize the knowledge itself. New results are that (1) Many children answer the question "how many" with the last word used in counting, despite not understanding how counting works; (2) Only children who have mastered the cardinal principle, or are just short of doing so, understand that adding objects to a set means moving forward in the numeral list whereas subtracting objects mean going backward; and finally (3) Only cardinal-principle-knowers understand that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving forward exactly 1 word in the list, whereas subset-knowers do not understand the unit of change.     

我国现阶段的卫生财政政策及其理念分析

系统地描述和总结了我国现行的卫生财政政策,分析了其理念,指出了其不足之处。政府应当担负起社会合作的责任,建立起卫生财政转移支付制度,在不同行政区域之间,在城市与农村之间,公平地分配公共卫生服务物品和基本医疗服务物品。以药品差价收入补偿医疗机构的卫生财政政策理念是有害的。     

Supervision and imagination

Abstract :  This paper explores the role of imagination for the supervisor and examines the differences between the supervisor's use of creative and defensive imagination. It is suggested that reverie and imagining play a central role in supervision but that these need to be harnessed in the service of the reality principle. It is argued that the Jungian emphasis on the ego-self relationship provides a context for this process. A clinical example of work with a supervisee is described in which hidden aspects of a strong erotic transference/countertransference were revealed in the supervisor's imagining and became available for reflection.     

NONEMPIRICAL REALITY: TRANSCENDING THE PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL IN THE ORDER OF THE ONE

I describe characteristic phenomena of quantum physics that suggest that reality appears to us in two domains: the open and well‐known domain of empirical, material things—the realm of actuality—and a hidden and invisible domain of nonempirical, non‐material forms—the realm of potentiality. The nonempirical forms are part of physical reality because they contain the empirical possibilities of the universe and can manifest themselves in the empirical world. Two classes of nonempirical states are discussed: the superposition states of microphysical entities, which are nonempirical because observation destroys them, and the virtual states of material systems, which are nonempirical because they are empty. The non‐empirical part to physical reality represents a predetermined and hidden order that exists before it is empirical, and the visible world is an emanation out of it. I discuss consequences for our understanding of human nature, the origin of life, and human values. Reality is an indivisible wholeness that is aware of its processes, like a Cosmic Spirit, and it reveals its awareness in the mindlike properties of elementary processes as well as in the human consciousness. Thus, one is led to G. W. F. Hegel's thesis that the Cosmic Spirit is thinking in us.     

组合原则

组合原则是逻辑语义学的基本原则,表现为函项的思想和句法与语义的对应。就构造逻辑系统而言,组合原则是一种方法论。作为延伸到自然语言形式语义学的产物,组合原则起到一种核心灵魂的作用。组合原则在理论层面和应用领域皆获得一些有价值的结果。自然语言违反组合原则的实例主要表现为歧义现象、语用因素和句法与语义不对应的情况,这正是调整组合原则的适用条件从而促进形式语义学发展的契机。     

"人造美女"热的冷思考

"人造美女"是对美的本质的亵渎,是对女性价值全面性的否定,同时也是对医学人道主义和医学伦理基本原则的全面践踏.作为一名医务工作者,应该避免经济利益的驱动,全心全意地践行医德誓言,把治疗伤疾、维护人们的身心健康作为自己的神圣信条和基本准则.     

THE KENOSIS OF THE CREATOR AND OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR

Abstract I comment on moral and theological aspects of human technology, which I consider as an evolutionary moment of our cultural and genetic variation. It is an important moment both scientifically and theologically. Starting from Philip Hefner's theological program of the human being as created co‐creator, I distinguish between the limitations and responsibilities of the human being as a created agent and the possibilities and ideals as a co‐creator. I develop the idea of the kenosis (self‐emptying) of the Creator, which as the root of God's love principle should be reenacted by the created co‐creators. I analyze elements of this kenosis presented by Jürgen Moltmann in relation to creation and eschatology.     

关于我国新道德建设的思考

当前我国新道德建设应遵循与市场经济相适应,与社会主义法律规范相协调等七个原则,并要注意与人重建的融会及建设的层次性与多元性、原则性与灵活性。     

Transzendentalpragmatik und Diskursethik. Elemente und Perspektiven der Apelschen Diskursphilosophie

Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’ (Frankfurt a.M. 1973). Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of a particular, historically evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a (fallible) internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the (logical) situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate (‘Auseinandersetzungen’, Apel, Frankfurt a.M. 1998) with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility” (Frankfurt a.M. 1988). In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds

I argue that judgments of what is ‘true in a fiction’ presuppose the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is (really) true is fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work. By contrast with the more familiar Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption is not a rule for inferring implied content from what is explicit. Instead, it provides an array of real-world truths that can be used in such inferences. I claim that the Reality Assumption is essential to our ability to understand stories, drawing on a range of empirical evidence that demonstrates our reliance on it in narrative comprehension. However, the Reality Assumption has several unintuitive consequences, not least that what is fictionally the case includes countless facts that neither authors nor readers could (or should) ever consider. I argue that such consequences provide no reason to reject the Reality Assumption. I conclude that we should take fictions, like non-fictions, to be about the real world.