Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model

The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model appears to violate Bayesian conditionalization, but I argue that this is not the case. By paying close attention to the details of conditionalization in contexts where indexical information is relevant, we discover that the hybrid model is in fact consistent with Bayesian kinematics. If the proposed model is correct, there are important lessons for the study of self-location, observation selection theory, and anthropic reasoning.     

瘢痕治疗的选择与思考

瘢痕作为人类最常见的疾病之一,其治疗一直是整形外科界研究的热点和焦点。本文从治疗方法的发展过程,认识到科学的认识论对方法论具有良好的指导作用,满意的治疗其根本在于提高医生的素质,从哲学角度对如何科学的选择治疗方法进行总结,指明从根本上解决瘢痕,最终要依靠现代发达的基础科学研究。     

Are Newborns Morally Different from Older Children?

Policies and position statements regarding decision-making for extremely premature babies exist in many countries and are often directive, focusing on parental choice and expected outcomes. These recommendations often state survival and handicap as reasons for optional intervention. The fact that such outcome statistics would not justify such approaches in other populations suggests that some other powerful factors are at work. The value of neonatal intensive care has been scrutinized far more than intensive care for older patients and suggests that neonatal care is held to a higher standard of justification. The relative value placed on the life of newborns, in particular the preterm, is less than expected by any objective medical data or any prevailing moral frameworks about the value of individual lives. Why do we feel less obligated to treat the premature baby? Do we put newborns in a special and lesser moral category? We explore this question from a legal and ethical perspective and offer several hypotheses pertaining to personhood, reproductive choices, “precious children,” and probable evolutionary and anthropological factors.     

VALUE AND INTELLIGENT COLLEGIATE DEPRESSION

Abstract: Philosophy teachers converse with troubled students who suffer from what I dub “intelligent collegiate depression” (ICD): a lack of self‐esteem, feelings of futility and pessimism about their futures, a distrust of academic values, and a lack of conviction that their lives matter. Students express their values and their resignation with what approaches conventional wisdom for them: They must be allowed to act as they wish so long as they do not hurt anyone; otherwise it does not matter what they do with their lives. I argue here that students' endorsement of this near‐nihilistic version of Mill's harm principle shows that they are committed to believing in more values than they realize. I then show how to parlay this commitment into a rejection of the worst effects of ICD—all the while holding in abeyance the question of metaethical objectivism vs. subjectivism. My approach shows that accepting a popular ICD premise logically undermines much of the unhappy ICD worldview.     

The divergent effects of fear and disgust on unconscious inhibitory control

Previous studies have shown that negative emotional distracters impair conscious inhibitory control. Recent research has shown that inhibitory control can be triggered unconsciously; therefore, in Experiment 1, we aimed to investigate whether negative emotional distracters affect unconscious inhibitory control. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we examined whether fearful and disgusting distracters have differential effects on unconscious inhibitory control. Participants were instructed to perform a masked Go/No-Go task superimposed on a negative or neutral image cue (Experiment 1) or on a fearful, disgusting or neutral image cue (Experiment 2). Results showed that negative emotional distracters impaired unconscious inhibitory control; furthermore, disgusting distracters impeded unconscious inhibitory control when compared to fearful ones. This study is the first to provide evidence that fear and disgust may affect unconscious inhibitory control differently. These results expand the understanding of the relationship between emotions and inhibitory control.     

Revisiting the crisis in Freud's libido theory and Abraham's concept of the oral‐sadistic phase as a way out of it

The now available unabridged correspondence between Freud and Abraham leads to a re‐evaluation of the significance of Abraham's work. The author proposes the thesis that clinical observations by Karl Abraham of the ambivalence of object relations and the destructive‐sadistic aspects of orality have an important influence on the advancement of psychoanalytical theory. The phantasy problem of the Wolf Man and the question of the pathogenic relevance of early actual, or merely imagined traumata led Freud to doubt the validity of his theory. He attempted repeatedly to solve this problem using libido theory, but failed because of his problematic conception of oral erotics. The pathogenic effect of presymbolic traumatizations cannot be demonstrated scientifically because of the still underdeveloped brain in the early stage of the child's development. Consequently, the important empirical evidence of a scientific neurosis theory could not be provided. A revision of the theory of the instincts thus became necessary. With Abraham's clinical contributions and other pathologic evidence, Freud was, with some reservation, forced to modify his idea of oral erotics by ascribing to it a status of a merely constructed and fictive phase of oral organization. A solution was eventually facilitated via recognition of non‐erotic aggression and destruction, thereby opening libido theory to fundamental revisions. Driven by the desire to develop a scientific theory, Freud initially had, in his first theory of the instincts, assumed a strongly causal‐deterministic view on Psychic Function. His third revision of theory of the instincts, Beyond the Pleasure Principle including the death instinct hypothesis, considered the hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalytic theory, which had previously existed only implicitly in his theory. Further development of the death instinct hypothesis by Melanie Klein and her successors abandoned quantitative‐economic and causal‐deterministic principles, and instead focused on the practical utility of the psychoanalytic theory.     

Sound Body,Sound Mind? The Interrelation Between Health Change and Personality Change in Old Age

Personality development is characterized by increasing maturation, that is, people become more conscientious, agreeable and emotionally stable as they age. In late life, however, these trends seem to be reversed. Because many changes and transitions in older age are related to health, we investigated correlated changes in health problems and personality traits, the sources of health changes in later life and the directionality of effects. Our sample consisted of older adult twins, aged 64–85 years at time 1 (n = 410; 135 male/275 female; 134 monozygotic/63 dizygotic twin pairs), assessed at two different time points about five years apart, and we ran bivariate latent change and latent change twin model analyses. Increasing health problems were associated with decreases in agreeableness, extraversion, emotional stability and conscientiousness. Changes in health problems were only due to environmental influences, implying that the association between health and personality changes was exclusively environmental. Directional effects were largely absent, but health and personality were significantly related at the second measurement occasion (age 69–89 years). Our results support the link between health change and personality change in late life and spark the assumption of normative personality adaptations to deterioration of health status as a means of developmental regulation. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The Repeatability Argument and the Non-Extensional Bundle Theory

I present a new objection to Bundle Theory. The objection rests on the repeatability of universals, and targets every version of Bundle Theory that assumes that concrete particulars constituted by the same universals are numerically identical. The only way that bundle theorists can elude this objection is to admit the possibility of distinct bundles constituted by the same universals. If even this view is untenable, then Bundle Theory as such is hopeless. Finally, I show how the present inquiry reshapes the dialectical relationship between Bundle Theory and the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.     

Semantic and Moral Luck

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either.     

Debunking,supervenience, and Hume’s Principle

ABSTRACT

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same.