Drives and objects - notes on the change of drive theory

Freud’s drive theory has been questioned since the 1940s when Fairbairn created a metaphor of the mind that is not based on the tripartite model and drive theory. His work inspired others to elaborate on the significance of internal object relationships. According to the object relation theory, internal object relations are dynamic structures capable of generating meanings and action. Consequently, two distinct metapsychologies were created.The aim of this article is to show how the interaction of theories has initiated revisions of classic drive theory. Freud’s concept of drive and three synthesizing viewpoints between the two perspectives are discussed. Otto Kernberg addresses affects as a primary motivational system; the mother–infant relationship organizes affects to drives. Joseph Sandler adheres to classic drive theory but proposes that the ego’s attempt to protect the mind against psychic pain is as important as drive derivatives in motivating the mind. Laplanche proposes that the unconscious of the care-giving adult is the crucial factor for the constitution of an infant’s unconscious and drives. For Freud and Klein, drive is inherent. Contemporary writers, like Loewald and Laplanche, conceive drive as a function of the mind that is born out of the same matrix of interaction with the other elements of the mind.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.     

Is a New Consciousness Emerging? Reflections on the Thought of Ibn ’Arabi and the Impact of an Integral Perspective

Every era embodies a perspective or worldview. In a time of profound change, what is the worldview that describes our current era? At the frontiers of the culture an integral way of thinking has started to form. An integral model looks to incorporate and embrace knowledge into a unified framework, and to cast a new light on the transformational processes that are at work both in human consciousness and in the culture. Evolutionary principles such as directionality and the ceaseless movement toward increasing complexity and wholeness have influenced not only science, but now also psychology, culture, and spirituality. As we look back at the stages of our development in history with an ever-sharper lens and contemplate our present and our future, we ask: is a new consciousness emerging as we transition to an increasingly inclusive and holistic worldview? This article reviews some of the ideas of thinkers such as Ken Wilber, Jean Gebser, Michael Murphy, Teilhard de Chardin, and Sri Aurobindo, and suggests further ways of advancing integral thought by reviewing the work of one of the greatest early integral thinkers, Sufi mystic and spiritual giant, Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi, and his teachings on the Logos as a principle for emergence.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

The Generalized Quantum Episodic Memory Model

Recent evidence suggests that experienced events are often mapped to too many episodic states, including those that are logically or experimentally incompatible with one another. For example, episodic over‐distribution patterns show that the probability of accepting an item under different mutually exclusive conditions violates the disjunction rule. A related example, called subadditivity, occurs when the probability of accepting an item under mutually exclusive and exhaustive instruction conditions sums to a number >1. Both the over‐distribution effect and subadditivity have been widely observed in item and source‐memory paradigms. These phenomena are difficult to explain using standard memory frameworks, such as signal‐detection theory. A dual‐trace model called the over‐distribution (OD) model (Brainerd & Reyna, 2008) can explain the episodic over‐distribution effect, but not subadditivity. Our goal is to develop a model that can explain both effects. In this paper, we propose the Generalized Quantum Episodic Memory (GQEM) model, which extends the Quantum Episodic Memory (QEM) model developed by Brainerd, Wang, and Reyna (2013). We test GQEM by comparing it to the OD model using data from a novel item‐memory experiment and a previously published source‐memory experiment (Kellen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2014) examining the over‐distribution effect. Using the best‐fit parameters from the over‐distribution experiments, we conclude by showing that the GQEM model can also account for subadditivity. Overall these results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that quantum probability theory is a valuable tool in modeling recognition memory.     

A Social Learning Perspective on Childhood Trauma and Same‐Sex Intimate Partner Violence

The family violence and childhood trauma literature has suggested that early adverse experiences create risk factors for intimate partner violence (IPV). Thus, this study used a sample of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) college students (N = 266) to explore differences among childhood trauma, same‐sex IPV, and IPV acceptance. The authors used survey methodology and multivariate analysis of variance. Results indicated that LGB individuals reporting childhood trauma also reported higher rates of IPV, suggesting implications for research and practice.     

Relational‐Cultural Theory and Reality Therapy: A Culturally Responsive Integrative Framework

The authors propose an integration of relational‐cultural theory and reality therapy. The authors contend that the traditional assumptions of reality therapy are consistent with the relational aspects of relational‐cultural theory and together provide a culturally responsive approach for diverse clients. The authors also include an overview of the 2 theories as well as highlight the convergences and divergences. In addition, the authors present a case illustration depicting the integration method in practice.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

Implications of an initial empirical victory for the truth of the theory and additional empirical victories

Psychologists take two propositions for granted. Specifically, empirical verification of predictions derived from a theory (a) support that the theory is more likely to be true and (b) support that additional predictions derived from the theory have an increased probability of being sustained if subjected to empirical testing. In contrast, I argue that both propositions depend strongly on whether auxiliary assumptions are taken into account. When auxiliary assumptions are not taken into account, the first proposition is valid but the second is not. When auxiliary assumptions are taken into account, the first proposition is not valid, and the second proposition encounters additional problems. I use Venn diagrams and Bayesian principles to demonstrate these conclusions.