形状-性别内隐联结及其对消费者形状偏好的影响

本文探讨了形状与性别之间的内隐联结及其对消费者形状偏好的影响。通过4个实验, 作者发现形状与性别之间存在内隐联结, 即圆润的形状与女性更相关, 而有棱角的形状与男性更相关。这一内隐联结被拓展到品牌感知上, 导致品牌的性别形象影响消费者对圆形或棱角形产品的偏好, 而感知匹配度在其中起中介作用。这些研究发现进一步丰富了现有关于形状偏好以及形状象征意义的文献, 并对视觉营销中的形状设计提供了重要的实践指导。     

认知疲劳效应对内隐记忆与外显记忆的影响

本研究通过比较内隐记忆与外显记忆受到认知疲劳影响的情况,以了解内隐记忆的自动化加工机制。实验采用被试内设计,使用词汇判断与词汇再认任务测量内隐记忆与外显记忆。实验结果发现,相对于控制组,疲劳组的被试在完成疲劳任务后内隐记忆成绩显著下降,而外显记忆没有受到影响。结果说明相对于外显记忆,内隐记忆更容易受到认知疲劳影响。内隐记忆虽然是无意识的认知加工,但是与其他自动化加工具有不同的特征。     

积极追随原型-特质匹配对辱虐管理的影响——基于多项式回归与响应面分析的探索

基于内隐追随理论,探索了领导者的积极追随原型(PFP)与追随者的积极追随特质(PFT)之间的匹配程度如何影响辱虐管理。对194份上下级配对数据进行多项式回归和响应面分析,结果显示:(1)相较于非匹配情形,领导者在"PFP—PFT匹配"情形下更少辱虐追随者;(2)与"PFP低—PFT低"相比,"PFP高—PFT高"情形下辱虐管理程度更低;(3)在非匹配情况下,与"PFP高—PFT低"相比,领导者在"PFP低—PFT高"时对追随者有更少的辱虐管理。以上结论能够为组织预防或减少辱虐管理提供理论指导。     

A common ground in clinical discussion groups: Intersubjective resonance and implicit operational theories

Clinical discussion groups based on the Three‐Level Model for Observing Patient Transformations (3‐LM) enable us to reflect on the clinical common ground shared by psychoanalysts who have different theoretical frameworks. The very existence of this common ground is controversial. While analysts such as Wallerstein support it, others, like Green, think it is just a myth. In their 2005 controversy Wallerstein and Green proposed an observation procedure that might clarify this matter. This procedure bears great similarity to the one used by clinical discussion groups that apply the 3‐LM. The study of numerous theoretically heterogeneous groups that use this model shows that communication is possible in crucial areas. We may thus conclude that a partial and dynamic common ground exists. At a phenomenological level, certain fragments of material produce a shared resonance that enriches clinical understanding for the whole group. Communication is also possible with regard to the conceptualization of patient changes, although some controversial issues persist at this level. Finally, at the level of theoretical explanations, divergences concerning abstract theories do not prevent a fertile interaction among ‘in vivo’ personal implicit theories. The latter give rise to the actual operational frameworks underlying participants' approach to clinical problems.     

Explicit and implicit shame aversion predict symptoms of avoidant and borderline personality disorders

Research on the connections between shame and personality disorders (PDs) has focused predominantly on shame proneness. We examined the relationships of shame aversion, or experiencing shame as painful and unbearable, with avoidant and borderline personality disorders. Participants completed self-report measures assessing avoidant and borderline PDs, shame aversion, shame proneness and general experiential avoidance, as well as the recently developed questionnaire-based implicit association test that assessed shame aversion. Self-reported and implicit shame aversion correlated with both PDs, and hierarchical regression models showed that shame aversion incrementally predicted these PDs over and above shame proneness and general experiential avoidance. These findings suggest that individuals who perceive shame as particularly aversive tend to resort to maladaptive behavioral patterns that may impair personality functioning.     

Matching between oral inward–outward movements of object names and oral movements associated with denoted objects

In eight experiments, we explored matching effects between oral approach–avoidance movements triggered by word articulation and meaning of the objects the words denoted. Participants (total N?=?1264) rated their liking for words that featured consonantal muscle stricture spots either wandering inwards (e.g., BODIKA, resembling ingestion movements) or outwards (e.g., KODIBA, resembling expectoration movements). These words were labelled as names for various objects. For objects the use of which entails ingestive oral actions (lemonade and mouthwash) inward words were preferred over outward words. For objects that trigger expectorative oral actions (toxical chemical, pill, and bubble gum) this preference was attenuated or even reversed (outward words were liked more than inward). Valence of the denoted object did not play a role in these modulations. Thus, the sagittal direction of mouth movements during silent reading meaningfully interacted with direction of oral actions associated with the denoted objects.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

Defining agency after implicit bias

Recent findings in empirical psychology show that implicit biases can affect behavior in ways that are difficult to control deliberatively. Doris argues that findings like these constitute a threat to agency, if agency is defined as the ability to reflectively, deliberatively direct one’s actions. I argue, however, that implicit biases pose no fundamental threat to agency since they can be brought under indirect deliberative control, whereby deliberative, reflective actions put in place automatic processes that automatically inhibit unwanted biases. Since automatic processes can be thus used to achieve deliberatively, reflectively endorsed goals, agency should be defined as the ability to act in line with reflectively endorsed goals, whether by deliberative or automatic processes.     

Divided attention enhances explicit but not implicit conceptual memory: an item-specific account of the attentional boost effect

The Attentional Boost Effect (ABE) refers to the counterintuitive finding that words encoded with to-be-responded targets in a divided-attention condition are remembered better than words encoded with distractors. Previous studies suggested that the ABE-related enhancement of verbal memory depends upon the activation of abstract lexical representations. In the present study, we extend this hypothesis by embedding it in the context of a broader perspective, which proposes that divided attention in the ABE paradigm affects item-specific, but not relational, processing. To this purpose, we examined the ABE in the matched tasks of category-cued recall (CCRT: explicit memory) and category exemplar generation (CEGT: implicit memory). In addition, study time was varied (500, 1500 or 4000?ms), to further determine whether the attentional boost manipulation could influence late-phase elaborative processing. In agreement with the predictions of the item-specific account, the results showed that exemplars encoded with targets were recalled better than exemplars encoded with distractors in the CCRT, but not in the CEGT. Moreover, performance in the CCRT increased with study time, whereas the size of the ABE-related enhancement tended to decrease, further confirming that this effect hinges upon early phase encoding processes.     

The effect of presentation rate on implicit sequence learning in aging

Implicit sequence learning is thought to be preserved in aging when the to-be learned associations are first-order; however, when associations are second-order, older adults (OAs) tend to experience deficits as compared to young adults (YAs). Two experiments were conducted using a first (Experiment 1) and second-order (Experiment 2) serial-reaction time task. Stimuli were presented at a constant rate of either 800 milliseconds (fast) or 1200 milliseconds (slow). Results indicate that both age groups learned first-order dependencies equally in both conditions. OAs and YAs also learned second-order dependencies, but the learning of lag-2 information was significantly impacted by the rate of presentation for both groups. OAs showed significant lag-2 learning in slow condition while YAs showed significant lag-2 learning in the fast condition. The sensitivity of implicit sequence learning to the rate of presentation supports the idea that OAs and YAs different processing speeds impact the ability to build complex associations across time and intervening events.