当局者迷,旁观者清?自我-他人决策的理性差异及其机制

生活充满抉择,由于知识经验的局限,人们常需寻求他人建议,抑或直接请他人代己决策.诸多研究探讨了自我决策、向他人建议,以及代他人决策之间的差异.探究这种差异的动因之一在于考察何种条件下的决策更优或更“理性”.以往研究表明,自我决策或他人决策(向他人建议或代他人决策)均有可能更易违背理性决策原则,隐含着他人决策优于自我决策的“当局者迷,旁观者清”这一传统智慧有一定的边界条件.研究者一般从认知(建构水平理论)、情绪(类型和卷入度),以及动机(调节聚焦理论)三种视角对自我-他人决策差异进行解释.本文作者提出基于理由的决策(reason-based account)假设来解释自我-他人决策在理性程度上的差异.未来研究可从决策过程及脑机制上深入考察自我-他人决策差异及其机制.     

Development of own-race biases

This review examines the emergence and development of perceptual and social biases towards own-race individuals. We first discuss evidence regarding the early emergence of an own-race bias in facial preferences and face recognition abilities demonstrated by infants with an abundance of visual experience with own-race individuals, but little to no experience with other-race individuals. We then consider perceptual categorization of face race, visual scanning, and differential processing of own- and other-race faces in relation to recognition of face identity. Finally, we review evidence regarding own-race preferences for social partners and own-race biases in social evaluations that emerge during early childhood. Implications of the existing evidence for understanding the role of experience in perceptual development and the emergence of racial preferences and stereotypes are discussed.     

I just love the attention: implicit preference for direct eye contact

Seven studies used the Implicit Association Test to measure preference for gaze direction. For faces with neutral expressions, people clearly preferred eyes looking towards them compared to eyes gazing to the right or left (Experiment 1). This preference remained for faces shown turned to the side (Experiment 2) and upside-down (Experiment 3). Even angry faces were preferred with direct compared to averted gaze (Experiments 4 and 5). Furthermore, preference for eye contact did not correlate to performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) or the Autism Quotient (AQ); note performance on the RMET and the AQ was only weakly correlated although both are claimed to measure social cognition. When the faces were replaced by coloured shapes (Experiment 6) or arrows (Experiment 7) people showed a weaker preference for the category label “looking at you” versus “looking to the side”. Overall, people revealed a robust preference for direct rather than averted gaze which generalized across face pose and expression. Together with a weaker preference for arrows pointing towards them, this is consistent with people having an implicit preference for self-directed attention.     

Afterword: some reflections on implicit religion and ordinary theology

This brief piece relates Edward Bailey's concept of implicit religion, together with some themes from the papers published in this special issue, to Astley's concept of ordinary theology. In particular, it attends to their different, but overlapping, focal concerns and their shared emphasis on a spiritual core of personal meaningfulness.     

You don't have to go to church to be a good Christian: the implicit religion of the cathedral carol service congregation

The notion that you don't have to go to church to be a good Christian is accepted as an indicator of the form of implicit religiosity espoused by those who (in Bailey's analysis) say that they “believe in Christianity.” The present paper builds on the findings of a recently published survey of rural Anglican churchgoers celebrating harvest which suggested that de-institutionalised implicit religion may be superseding commitment to conventional explicit religious attendance. The responses of 1081 people who attended Christmas carol services in two English cathedrals in 2009 and 2010 are analysed. The findings of the previous paper that implicit religiosity is more prevalent among younger people and among those who attend church less frequently are replicated. Evidence is also found that women are more inclined to this view than men and that those who have a loose historical connection through baptism are more likely to endorse it than those with either no historical connections or stronger ones. Suggestions are made for further research.     

Humble persons are more helpful than less humble persons: Evidence from three studies

Connections between humility and other prosocial qualities led us to develop a humility–helpfulness hypothesis. In three studies, humble persons were more helpful than less humble persons. In Study 1, participants (n?=?117) completed self-report measures of humility, the Big Five, and helpfulness. In Study 2, participants (n?=?90) completed an implicit measure of humility and were presented with an unexpected opportunity to help someone in need. In Study 3, participants (n?=?103) completed self-report and implicit measures of humility and were presented a similar helping opportunity. Humility and helpfulness correlated positively when personality and impression management were controlled. Humble participants helped more than did less humble participants even when agreeableness and desirable responding were statistically controlled. Further, implicit humility uniquely predicted helping behavior in an altruistic motivation condition.     

Are courageous actions successful actions?

When asked to describe a courageous action they have taken personally, people overwhelmingly describe an action with a successful outcome (Pury, Kowalski, & Spearman, 2007 Lopez, SJ, O’Byrne, KK and Peterson, S. 2003. “Profiling courage.”. In Positive psychological assessment: A handbook of models and measures, Edited by: Lopez, SJ and Snyder, CR. 185–197. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Study 1 replicated these findings in observations of other people. Fifty participants described a courageous action taken by another person and made parallel ratings to Pury et al. Participants in Study 1 also described actions with overwhelmingly successful outcomes. In Study 2, 152 participants rated otherwise identical scenarios differing in success of outcome and attribution (internal vs. external) for outcome. Successful actions were rated as more courageous than unsuccessful outcomes, although this effect was attenuated for external attributions. Thus, we suggest that successful outcome is an unarticulated part of implicit theories of courage.     

Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses among Aversive Racists

Might a hypocrisy induction procedure reduce prejudicial behavior among aversive racists? We identified aversive racists as individuals low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice toward Asians. Results revealed that aversive racists, but not truly low prejudiced participants (i.e., those low in both explicit and implicit prejudice), responded to a hypocrisy induction procedure with increased feelings of guilt and discomfort, compared to those in a control condition. Furthermore, aversive racists, but not low prejudiced participants, responded to a hypocrisy induction procedure with a reduction in prejudicial behavior. These results suggest that consciousness raising might play an important role in motivating aversive racists to reduce their prejudicial behavior.     

Name Letter Preferences Are Not Merely Mere Exposure: Implicit Egotism as Self-Regulation

People prefer the letters in their own names to letters that are not in their own names. Furthermore, people prefer the numbers in their own birthdays to numbers not in their own birthdays. In this article we argue that these examples of implicit egotism are best conceptualized as the product of unconscious self-regulation processes rather than a result of mere exposure. In support of this hypothesis, a study of name-letter preferences showed that people preferred their own name letters even when these letters were relatively rare. Furthermore, the name-letter and birthday-number preferences of high and low self-esteem participants diverged in response to an experimentally manipulated self-concept threat. We conclude that implicit egotism, specifically name-letter and birthday-number preferences, represent a form of unconscious self-regulation. Implications of these results for the mere exposure explanation of name-letter preferences and for theory and research in implicit egotism are discussed.     

Self-Other Discrepancies in Waiting Time Decisions

Both anecdotal evidence and recently reported research suggest that people are risk-averse when faced with waiting time decisions. Four studies investigate whether there is a self-other discrepancy in how people make waiting time decisions themselves and how they predict others will make similar decisions. People are found to believe that others have valuations of time similar to their own. However, when faced with alternatives that involve risk in the duration of the wait, the results point to a self-other discrepancy, in that people report greater risk-aversion themselves than they think others would. Further, when faced with waiting time gains, people are themselves more risk-averse than they think others would be. Conversely, when faced with waiting time losses, people are themselves more risk-seeking than they think others would be. Overall, the results are consistent with the recently proposed risk-as-feelings hypothesis.