Getting the big picture: Development of spatial scaling abilities

Spatial scaling is an integral aspect of many spatial tasks that involve symbol-to-referent correspondences (e.g., map reading, drawing). In this study, we asked 3–6-year-olds and adults to locate objects in a two-dimensional spatial layout using information from a second spatial representation (map). We examined how scaling factor and reference features, such as the shape of the layout or the presence of landmarks, affect performance. Results showed that spatial scaling on this simple task undergoes considerable development, especially between 3 and 5 years of age. Furthermore, the youngest children showed large individual variability and profited from landmark information. Accuracy differed between scaled and un-scaled items, but not between items using different scaling factors (1:2 vs. 1:4), suggesting that participants encoded relative rather than absolute distances.     

当代大学生创业意向影响因素研究

为了深入了解当代大学生的创业意向及其影响因素,研究者以全国30所高校5000多名大学生为被试,对影响大学生创业意向的诸多因素进行了分析。研究发现:当代大学生的创业意向在性别、奖学金获得次数、学生干部经历、出生地上均存在一定差异。大学生主客观条件中的性别、学校性质、创业兴趣、创意能力改善对创业意向有显著影响。创业教育和创业环境认知的引入对于预测大学生的创业意向均有增量效度,能够在个体的主客观条件以外解释个体创业意向的变异。在大学生认知中,影响创业成功的因素主要由客观背景资源、主观能力经验和外部宏观环境3个因子组成,其中主观能力经验的作用排在首位。     

Spatial imagery of novel places based on visual scene transformation

The hippocampus is known to maintain memories of object-place associations that can produce a scene expectation at a novel viewpoint. To implement such capabilities, the memorized distances and directions of an object from the viewer at a fixed location should be integrated with the imaginary displacement to the new viewpoint. However, neural dynamics of such scene expectation at the novel viewpoint have not been discussed. In this study, we propose a method of coding novel places based on visual scene transformation as a component of the object-place memory in the hippocampus. In this coding, a novel place is represented by a transformed version of a viewer’s scene with imaginary displacement. When the places of individual objects are stored with the coding in the hippocampus, the object’s displacement at the imaginary viewpoint can be evaluated through the comparison of a transformed viewer’s scene with the stored scene. Results of computer experiments demonstrated that the coding successfully produced scene expectation of a three object arrangement at a novel viewpoint. Such the scene expectation was retained even without similarities between the imaginary scene and the real scene at the location, where the imaginary scenes only functioned as indices to denote the topographical relationship between object locations. The results suggest that the hippocampus uses the place coding based on scene transformation and implements the spatial imagery of object-place associations from the novel viewpoint.     

The shadow of familiarity: a contributor to the intersubjective field

This paper examines the influence of familiarity on the progress of analysis. It is proposed that familiarity is a particular aspect of the intersubjective field which emerges over time and begins to shape and influence the behaviours, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of the participants. It is also proposed that states of familiarity can have facilitative or defensive functions in an analytic relationship and that it is an influence co-created in the field. The experience of familiarity operates as background to our various foreground concerns in analytic work and therefore exists primarily as an implicit, rather than explicit, experience in analysis. Defensive familiarity often creates a feeling of relatedness that is subtly unrelated, a form of pseudo-intimacy. Parallels between defensive familiarity and related concepts are examined including defences against the unknown, role responsiveness, romantic love, the image of the stranger, and unformulated experience. This paper concludes with two case examples and a discussion of procedural knowledge in the implicit domain as an explanatory framework for the understanding of familiarity states in the analytic setting.     

Mighty metaphors: behavioral and ERP evidence that power shifts attention on a vertical dimension

Thinking about the abstract concept power may automatically activate the spatial up-down image schema (powerful up; powerless down) and consequently direct spatial attention to the image schema-congruent location. Participants indicated whether a word represented a powerful or powerless person (e.g. ‘king’ or ‘servant’). Following each decision, they identified a target at the top or bottom of the visual field. In Experiment 1 participants identified the target faster when their spatial position was congruent with the perceived power of the preceding word than when it was incongruent. In Experiment 2 ERPs showed a higher N1 amplitude for congruent spatial positions. These results support the view that attention is driven to the image schema congruent location of a power word. Thus, power is partially understood in terms of vertical space, which demonstrates that abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing.     

Handedness shapes children's abstract concepts

Can children’s handedness influence how they represent abstract concepts like kindness and intelligence? Here we show that from an early age, right‐handers associate rightward space more strongly with positive ideas and leftward space with negative ideas, but the opposite is true for left‐handers. In one experiment, children indicated where on a diagram a preferred toy and a dispreferred toy should go. Right‐handers tended to assign the preferred toy to a box on the right and the dispreferred toy to a box on the left. Left‐handers showed the opposite pattern. In a second experiment, children judged which of two cartoon animals looked smarter (or dumber) or nicer (or meaner). Right‐handers attributed more positive qualities to animals on the right, but left‐handers to animals on the left. These contrasting associations between space and valence cannot be explained by exposure to language or cultural conventions, which consistently link right with good. Rather, right‐ and left‐handers implicitly associated positive valence more strongly with the side of space on which they can act more fluently with their dominant hands. Results support the body‐specificity hypothesis ( Casasanto, 2009 ), showing that children with different kinds of bodies think differently in corresponding ways.     

Representing Spatial Structure Through Maps and Language: Lord of the Rings Encodes the Spatial Structure of Middle Earth

Spatial mental representations can be derived from linguistic and non‐linguistic sources of information. This study tested whether these representations could be formed from statistical linguistic frequencies of city names, and to what extent participants differed in their performance when they estimated spatial locations from language or maps. In a computational linguistic study, we demonstrated that co‐occurrences of cities in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy and The Hobbit predicted the authentic longitude and latitude of those cities in Middle Earth. In a human study, we showed that human spatial estimates of the location of cities were very similar regardless of whether participants read Tolkien’s texts or memorized a map of Middle Earth. However, text‐based location estimates obtained from statistical linguistic frequencies better predicted the human text‐based estimates than the human map‐based estimates. These findings suggest that language encodes spatial structure of cities, and that human cognitive map representations can come from implicit statistical linguistic patterns, from explicit non‐linguistic perceptual information, or from both.     

Representations in dynamical embodied agents: re-analyzing a minimally cognitive model agent

Understanding the role of 'representations' in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as 'standing in,' and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a first experiment, no representation can be found, but the relevance of the task is undermined by the fact that agents with no internal states can reach high performance. A simple modification makes the task more "representationally hungry," and in this case, agents' internal states are found to qualify as representations. I conclude by discussing the benefits of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach with the notion of representation.     

Perceptual simulation in developing language comprehension

We tested an embodied account of language proposing that comprehenders create perceptual simulations of the events they hear and read about. In Experiment 1, children (ages 7–13 years) performed a picture verification task. Each picture was preceded by a prerecorded spoken sentence describing an entity whose shape or orientation matched or mismatched the depicted object. Responses were faster for matching pictures, suggesting that participants had formed perceptual-like situation models of the sentences. The advantage for matching pictures did not increase with age. Experiment 2 extended these findings to the domain of written language. Participants (ages 7–10 years) of high and low word reading ability verified pictures after reading sentences aloud. The results suggest that even when reading is effortful, children construct a perceptual simulation of the described events. We propose that perceptual simulation plays a more central role in developing language comprehension than was previously thought.