When death is not a problem: Regulating implicit negative affect under mortality salience

Terror management theory assumes that death arouses existential anxiety in humans which is suppressed in focal attention. Whereas most studies provide indirect evidence for negative affect under mortality salience by showing cultural worldview defenses and self‐esteem strivings, there is only little direct evidence for implicit negative affect under mortality salience. In the present study, we assume that this implicit affective reaction towards death depends on people's ability to self‐regulate negative affect as assessed by the personality dimension of action versus state orientation. Consistent with our expectations, action‐oriented participants judged artificial words to express less negative affect under mortality salience compared to control conditions whereas state‐oriented participants showed the reversed pattern.     

Distinguished Lecture: Social structure,narrative and explanation

Recent work on social injustice has focused on implicit bias as an important factor in explaining persistent injustice in spite of achievements on civil rights. In this paper, I argue that because of its individualism, implicit bias explanation, taken alone, is inadequate to explain ongoing injustice; and, more importantly, it fails to call attention to what is morally at stake. An adequate account of how implicit bias functions must situate it within a broader theory of social structures and structural injustice; changing structures is often a precondition for changing patterns of thought and action and is certainly required for durable change.     

Explicit but not implicit sexist beliefs predict benevolent and hostile sexist behavior

Much work has been carried out on sexist attitudes, but only little on sexist behaviors. The goal of the present research was to close this gap by testing how a variety of benevolent and hostile sexist behaviors correlate with implicit and explicit sexist attitudes. In Study 1 (N = 126), we developed implicit association tests for benevolent sexism and hostile sexism and illustrated that implicit and explicit benevolent sexist beliefs, as well as implicit and explicit hostile sexist beliefs, were positively correlated. In Study 2 (N = 83 of Study 1), we tested whether implicit and explicit benevolent and hostile sexist attitudes correlate with benevolent and hostile sexist behaviors. As expected, explicit benevolent (but not hostile) sexist attitudes predicted benevolent sexist behavior, whereas explicit hostile (but not benevolent) sexist attitudes predicted hostile sexist behavior. Implicit sexist attitudes did not predict sexist behavior. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context‐Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects

According to grounded cognition, words whose semantics contain sensory‐motor features activate sensory‐motor simulations, which, in turn, interact with spatial responses to produce grounded congruency effects (e.g., processing the spatial feature of up for sky should be faster for up vs. down responses). Growing evidence shows these congruency effects do not always occur, suggesting instead that the grounded features in a word's meaning do not become active automatically across contexts. Researchers sometimes use this as evidence that concepts are not grounded, further concluding that grounded information is peripheral to the amodal cores of concepts. We first review broad evidence that words do not have conceptual cores, and that even the most salient features in a word's meaning are not activated automatically. Then, in three experiments, we provide further evidence that grounded congruency effects rely dynamically on context, with the central grounded features in a concept becoming active only when the current context makes them salient. Even when grounded features are central to a word's meaning, their activation depends on task conditions.     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.     

The Impact of Analogies on Creative Concept Generation: Lessons From an In Vivo Study in Engineering Design

Research on innovation often highlights analogies from sources outside the current problem domain as a major source of novel concepts; however, the mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well understood. We analyzed the temporal interplay between far analogy use and creative concept generation in a professional design team's brainstorming conversations, investigating the hypothesis that far analogies lead directly to very novel concepts via large steps in conceptual spaces (jumps). Surprisingly, we found that concepts were more similar to their preceding concepts after far analogy use compared to baseline situations (i.e., without far analogy use). Yet far analogies increased the team's concept generation rate compared to baseline conditions. Overall, these results challenge the view that far analogies primarily lead to novel concepts via jumps in conceptual spaces and suggest alternative pathways from far analogies to novel concepts (e.g., iterative, deep exploration within a functional space).     

Learning to Manipulate and Categorize in Human and Artificial Agents

This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two‐dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment interaction, the relation between category and action development, and the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge.     

Early maladaptive schemas and non-suicidal self-injury among young adults: A preliminary investigation

Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) represents a critical mental health issue among young adults. Accordingly, it is important to understand potentially modifiable processes involved in its enactment. The current investigation built on previous work to better understand the nature of early maladaptive schemas (EMS) in the context of NSSI. One hundred and thirty young adults completed questionnaires assessing NSSI history, EMS and depressive symptoms. Results indicate that EMS may play a role in NSSI engagement after controlling for depressive symptoms. Specifically, higher scores on social isolation and emotional inhibition and possibly lower scores on entitlement/grandiosity schemas may differentiate those who self-injure from those who do not. Furthermore, higher levels of dependence/incompetence schema may differentiate those who report a higher NSSI frequency and those who report a less frequent NSSI history. Although a nascent area of study, our findings suggest that it may be fruitful to consider conceptualizing NSSI within a schema therapy framework.     

On Direct Social Perception

Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.     

Mirroring patients – or not. A study of general practitioners and psychiatrists and their interactions with patients with depression

For mentalization theorists, implicit mentalization is a key component of all forms of therapy. However, it has been difficult to grasp and to describe precisely how implicit mentalization works. It is said to take place partly by mirroring others in posture, facial expression and vocal tone. Based on studies of imitative behaviour within linguistics and psychology, we argue that interactional mirroring is an important aspect of displaying implicit mentalization. We aimed to explore if, and in that case how, mirroring is displayed by general practitioners (GPs) and psychiatrists in consultations with patients with depression. We wanted to see how implicit mentalizing unfolds in physician–patient interactions. Consultations were video-recorded and analysed within the framework of conversation analysis. GPs and psychiatrists differed substantially in their propensity to mirror body movements and verbal and acoustic features of speech. GPs mirrored their patients more than psychiatrists in all modalities and were more flexible in their interactional behaviour. Psychiatrists seemed more static, regardless of the emotionality displayed by patients. Implicitly mirroring and attuning to patients could signify enactment of implicit mentalization, according to how it is described by mentalization theorists. We discuss reasons for the differences between GPs and psychiatrists, and their implications.