On the nature of intuitive and delusional thought: Its implications in clinical work with psychotic patients

The author tries to differentiate intuitive imagination from delusional imagination and hypothesises that psychosis alters the system of intuitive thinking, which consequently cannot develop in a dynamic and selective way. Scholars of different disciplines, far removed from psychoanalysis, such as Einstein, Hadamard or Poincar, believe that intuitive thinking works in the unconscious by means of hidden processes, which permit a creative meeting of ideas. Thanks to Bion's work, psychoanalysts have begun to understand that waking thinking is unconsciously intertwined with dream‐work. The delusional construction is similar to a dreamlike sensorial production but, unlike a real dream, it remains in the waking memory and creates characters which live independently of the ‘dreamer's’ awareness. It is a dream that never ends. On the contrary, the real dream disappears when it has brought its communicative task to an end. In the analysis of psychotic patients it is very important to analyse the delusional imagination which dominates the personality and continuously transforms the mental state, twisting emotional truth. The delusional imagination is so deeply rooted in the patient's mental functioning that, even after systematic analysis, the delusional world, which had seemed to disappear, re‐emerges under new configurations. The psychotic core remains encapsulated; it produces unsteadiness and may induce further psychotic states in the patient. The author reports some analytic material of a patient, who, after a delusional episode treated with drugs, shows a vivid psychotic functioning. Some considerations are added on the nature of the psychotic state and on the therapeutic approach used to transform the delusional structure. This paper particularly deals with the difficulty in working through the psychotic episode and in ‘deconstructing’the delusional experience because of the terror connected with it. In the reported case, the analytic work changed the delusional construction into a more benign one characterised by phobic qualities. The analysis of the psychotic transference allowed the focus to be on the hidden work which had been continuously influencing the transferential picture of the analyst and the patient's psychic reality.     

The New Political Infamy and the Sacrilege of Feminism

Abstract: This essay is about women being crucial to the constitution of the state and the construction of the ideal of the nation. It argues that the role of actual women as reproducers of the nation and as iconic representations of mythological figures at the helm of nation building is bound up with a certain psychical fantasy of woman. It argues further that Women in Black and other political activist groups have developed embodied feminist politics that not only bring the feminine body into public view during wartime but also undermine the place of the good woman as the reproducer of the nation who mourns only for the lost soldiers of her people.     

想象膨胀范式下错误记忆的老化效应

通过2个实验探究想象膨胀范式下老年人的错误记忆特点及其认知机制。实验1采用经典想象膨胀实验范式, 考察老年人是否会产生比年轻人更大的想象膨胀错误记忆效应; 实验2引入情景特异性诱导技术, 进一步考察老年人的想象膨胀错误记忆可能的认知机制。研究结果表明：(1)老年人与年轻人均表现出显著的想象膨胀错误记忆, 但老年人并没有比年轻人产生更多的错误记忆; (2)当通过情景特异性诱导技术有效增加了老年人在事件想象过程中的内在细节数量后, 老年人的错误记忆显著上升。该结果揭示对事件情景的想象过程是想象膨胀错误记忆发生的关键环节, 老年人没有表现出明显的老化效应, 主要是由于该群体随年龄增长表现出在回忆/想象情景事件时内部细节缺乏这一特征所致。研究结果支持了建构性情景模拟假说和激活/监测理论。     

Imagination links with schizotypal beliefs,not with creativity or learning

Imagination refers to creating mental representations of concepts, ideas, and sensations that are not contemporaneously perceived by the senses. Although it is key to human individuality, research on imagination is scarce. To address this gap, we developed here a new psychometric test to assess individual differences in imagination and explored the role of imagination for learning, creativity, and schizotypal beliefs. In a laboratory‐based (N = 180) and an online study (N = 128), we found that imagination is only weakly associated with learning achievement and creativity, accounting for 2–8% of the variance. By contrast, imagination accounted for 22.5% of the variance in schizotypal beliefs, suggesting overall that imagination may be more indicative of cognitive eccentricities rather than benefit the accumulation of knowledge or production of novel and useful ideas.     

The importance of body satisfaction to physical self‐concept and body mass index in Spanish adolescents

This research examines the association between measured body mass index (BMI) and the perception of BMI by young students. Moreover, this research tests the importance of BMI and self‐concept, in order to predict body dissatisfaction in high school students. The sample consisted of 2087 individuals from different high schools in Extremadura, Spain, both males (n = 1046) and females (n = 1041), ranging in age from 15 to 17 years old (M = 15.42; SD = 0.86). Initially, participants' BMIs were assessed through anthropometry. Later, all individuals were asked about their weight and height, and their self‐reported BMI was calculated. Participants also answered a questionnaire about their perception of self‐concept, as well as completed a test about body image perception using Stunkard images. Outcomes revealed that factors concerning self‐concept and perceived BMI explained body dissatisfaction. Finally, results are discussed with the aim of improving knowledge in body dissatisfaction context.     

On Nonequivalence of Several Procedures of Structural Equation Modeling

The normal theory based maximum likelihood procedure is widely used in structural equation modeling. Three alternatives are: the normal theory based generalized least squares, the normal theory based iteratively reweighted least squares, and the asymptotically distribution-free procedure. When data are normally distributed and the model structure is correctly specified, the four procedures are asymptotically equivalent. However, this equivalence is often used when models are not correctly specified. This short paper clarifies conditions under which these procedures are not asymptotically equivalent. Analytical results indicate that, when a model is not correct, two factors contribute to the nonequivalence of the different procedures. One is that the estimated covariance matrices by different procedures are different, the other is that they use different scales to measure the distance between the sample covariance matrix and the estimated covariance matrix. The results are illustrated using real as well as simulated data. Implication of the results to model fit indices is also discussed using the comparative fit index as an example. The work described in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Project No. CUHK 4170/99M) and by NSF grant DMS04-37167.     

Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.     

Imagination after neurological losses of movement and sensation: The experience of spinal cord injury

To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?