What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?

Most of us have settled views about various intellectual debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince one's opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? This article argues that the surprising answer to this question is no—you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find those reasons compelling. The article then briefly looks at some implications of this conclusion.     

Some thoughts about psychoanalysis and cinema

Abstract

This article approaches the pleasures of the cinema through a discussion of the conditions of cinema going and the place of the cinema in twentieth-century culture. It links them to the history of cinema and to the debates about art and psychoanalysis. It introduces the centrality of parallels between the cinema and dreaming and the importance of sexuality for the cinema. It suggests that discussion about the psychic mechanisms elicited by film going is a productive way of thinking about the cinema.     

Book reviews

Books reviewed:
Dale Mathers, An Introduction to Meaning and Purpose in Analytical Psychology
Jane Cabot Reid (ed. & narrator), Jung, My Mother, and I: The Analytic Diaries of Catharine Rush Cabot
Heather Formaini (compiler), Landmarks. Papers by Jungian Analysts from Australia and New Zealand
Neil Russack, Animal Guides in Life, Myth and Dreams: An Analyst's Notebook
Rose–Emily Rothenberg, The Jewel in the Wound
Judith Edwards (ed.), Being Alive, Building on the Work of Anne Alvarez     

Electrical stimulation of the pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus in freely moving awake rats: time- and site-specific effects on two-way active avoidance conditioning

The pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus (PPTg) is involved in the regulation of thalamocortical transmission and of several functions related to ventral and dorsal striatal circuits. Stimulation of the PPTg in anesthetized animals increases cortical arousal, cortical acetylcholine release, bursting activity of mesopontine dopaminergic cells, and striatal dopamine release. It was hypothetized that PPTg stimulation could improve learning by enhancing cortical arousal and optimizing the activity of striatal circuits. We tested whether electrical stimulation (ES) of the PPTg, applied to freely-moving awake rats previously implanted with a chronic electrode, would improve the acquisition and/or the retention of two-way active avoidance conditioning, and whether this effect would depend on the specific PPTg region stimulated (anterior vs posterior) and on the time of ES: just before (pre-training) or after (post-training) each of three training sessions. The treatment consisted of 20 min of ES (0.2 ms pulses at 100 Hz; current intensity: 40-80 microA). The results showed that (1) this stimulation did not induce either any signs of distress nor abnormal behaviors, apart from some motor stereotyped behaviors that disappeared when current intensity was lowered; (2) pre-training ES applied to the anterior PPTg improved the acquisition of two-way active avoidance, (3) no learning improvement was found after either post-training ES of the anterior PPTg, or pre- and post-training ES of the posterior PPTg. The results give support to a role of PPTg in learning-related processes, and point to the existence of functional PPTg regions.     

Hypnotizability, imaginative involvement, and anxiety

Forty-five undergraduate students were investigated to determine the relationship between hypnotizability, imaginative involvement (absorption), and anxiety responses. Hypnotizability was measured independently with the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS), and imaginative involvement was measured with the Absorption Scale (ABS). The results indicated moderate significant correlations between CIS, ABS, and several of the anxiety measures. In particular self-reported physiological aspects of anxiety/activation were associated with the CIS and the ABS. Three of the subjects reported having panic attacks. These subjects also exhibited high hypnotic responsiveness, and their scores on the ABS and several of the anxiety scales were considerably elevated as compared with the group mean level.     

“Scattered In Times”

Climate change is a temporally fragmented phenomenon: the causes and effects at work are dispersed over a remarkably long time period. Climate change exceeds human ability to forecast and quantify its effects in time. This creates serious epistemic, moral, and psychological difficulties and poses challenges to generating adequate ethical responses. Augustine’s understanding of time as a measure of imagination emphasizes the way in which human beings actively shape their sense of time. He sees “looking forward” in time as a matter of spiritual vocation that collects the self out of dispersion and connects to a transgenerational collective. A notable example of how this “looking forward” may be practiced is singing the Psalms. The Augustinian “temporal imagination” links the imaginative, affective, moral, and vocational dimensions of measuring time. This offers some preliminary avenues for reimagining a sense of time responsive to climate change’s temporal fragmentation.