The double-edged pen: Omnipotent fantasies in the creativity and addictions of Stephen King

The legendary debate over whether a connection between creativity and addictions exists is one that is shrouded in mystery and intrigue, but also one that continuously returns to the circuitous metaphor of the chicken and the egg. In an effort to better understand nuances in the relationship between creativity and addictions, this paper examines the life of Stephen King, and the omnipotent fantasies from which both his creative processes and addictive behaviours emerged. Since the early twentieth century, psychodynamic thinkers have highlighted omnipotent fantasies as a psychological force driving creative processes as efforts towards personal transformation. Similarly, numerous psychodynamic theories have highlighted omnipotent fantasies as playing a cardinal role in the psychological processes that propel substance abuse. And yet, the construct of omnipotence has yet to be examined as a theoretical bridge to bind such theories of creativity and substance abuse together. While fostering personal meaning and self-transformation when manifested in his creative writing processes, omnipotent fantasies have also lead Stephen King down a precarious path of addictive behaviours. Through a narrative analysis of the life of Stephen King, who has written in great depth about both his creativity and substance abuse, I will illustrate how omnipotent fantasies often shape and foster both healthy, creative processes towards growth and maladaptive, addictive impulses towards self-destruction.     

Illusory line motion is not caused by object-differentiating mechanisms or endogenous attention

Christie and Klein [2005. Does attention cause illusory line motion? Perception & Psychophysics, 67(6), 1032–1043] published line motion ratings consistent with illusory line motion (ILM) after peripheral endogenous cues but not central arrow cues. When attention was directed endogenously on the basis of the shape of one of two peripherally presented objects, participants reported small, but significant motion away from the attended object, and this was attributed to participant bias, or to a peripherally directed object-based attention system endogenously recruited to differentiate the peripheral shapes. By using a unique cueing method with identical peripheral markers, but still allowing them to act as cues, the findings of Christie and Klein Experiment 4 were replicated. This reduces the likelihood that object discrimination or object attention mechanisms are responsible for the reported ILM-like effects.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Body ownership and beyond: Connections between cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology

During the past few decades, two disciplines that rarely come together—namely, cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology—have been generating remarkably similar results regarding the representational domain of personal possessions. Research in cognitive neuroscience indicates that although the core self is grounded in body ownership, the extended self encompasses a variety of noncorporeal possessions, especially those that play a key role in defining one’s identity. And research in linguistic typology indicates that many languages around the world contain a distinct grammatical construction for encoding what is commonly called “inalienable” possession—a category of owned objects that almost always includes body parts, but that also tends to include several other kinds of personally relevant entities. Both of these independent lines of investigation are summarized, and a number of interdisciplinary connections between them are discussed.     

Is the sense of bodily ownership related to pre-reflective bodily awareness? A reply to Kuhle

There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily awareness: the sense of bodily ownership. Unfortunately, I argue, there is little reason to believe a relationship between pre-reflective bodily awareness and the sense of bodily ownership exists. Until more work is done, pre-reflective bodily awareness remains beyond our empirical grasp.     

Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic

Kant's response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant's response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects of this response. The first is that Kant's response to Pyrrhonian scepticism is also a response to Hume. The second is that aspects of this response are decidedly positive. In particular, I argue (1) that Kant believed Hume's scepticism manifested important elements of Pyrrhonian scepticism and (2) that both Pyrrhonian scepticism and Hume had a significant positive influence on the development of the Transcendental Dialectic.     

Rubber hand illusion, empathy, and schizotypal experiences in terms of self-other representations

When participants observed a rubber hand being touched, their sense of touch was activated (rubber hand illusion: RHI). While this illusion might be caused by multi-modal integration, it may also be related to empathic function, which enables us to simulate the observed information. We examined individual differences in the RHI, including empathic and schizotypal personality traits, as previous research had suggested that schizophrenic patients would be more subject to the RHI. The results indicated that people who experience a stronger RHI might have stronger empathic and schizotypal personalites simultaneously. We discussed these relationships in terms of self-other representations.     

Yang's iris illusion: External contour causes length‐assimilation illusions1

The Delboeuf illusion and the Ebbinghaus illusion (also known as the Titchener illusion) demonstrate that an external contour can lead to size‐assimilation and size‐contrast perception. This paper explores a novel illusion, revealing that neighboring external contours can also lead to a distortion in length perception. The illusion was originally discovered from a face stimulus (Experiment 1) in which a face was depicted alongside its mirror image so as to make the four irises absolutely equidistant. The distance between the middle two irises was underestimated in Asian faces, but overestimated in Caucasian faces. The illusion was also maintained when the facial stimuli were replaced by line drawings of eyes (Experiment 2). However, the illusion vanished when the irises were presented alone. Further scrutiny of the differences in facial characteristics between Asian and Caucasian faces reveals that the illusion might be elicited by the relative position of the eye shapes. This hypothesis was confirmed in Experiment 3, in which the distances between the eye shapes and the irises were manipulated.     

货币幻觉的心理机制与影响因素

货币幻觉是指经济交易活动中,人们因倾向于以货币的名义价值而非实际价值思考而对其消费和投资行为造成影响的一种认知偏差。大量研究表明,货币幻觉普遍存在于房地产投资、股票投资、组织管理以及捐赠等领域中。目前,研究者主要从决策框架、锚定与调整启发式、数目启发式以及神经心理机制这四个方面解释货币幻觉的形成机制。研究发现,货币幻觉的影响因素有心境、货币兑换率、通货膨胀率、情感依恋和先前经验。未来的研究可以从深入探讨货币幻觉的心理机制、影响因素和探索货币幻觉的应对策略这三个方面展开。     

人际互动中的被洞悉错觉

被洞悉错觉是人际互动中的一种认知偏差。文章回顾了被洞悉错觉在不同领域存在的证据;介绍了被洞悉错觉在旁观者冷漠、刑事审讯、社交障碍、自我泄露感和亲密关系中的相关应用;分析了锚定及其调节效应、知识之祸、自我关注和朴素实在论对被洞悉错觉的理论解释;讨论了以往研究在对象、方法及跨文化比较方面的不足。